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10924 Need mitigation of L1TF (CVE-2018-3646)
Reviewed by: Robert Mustacchi <rm@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Peter Tribble <peter.tribble@gmail.com>

*** 2119,2128 **** --- 2119,2141 ---- cpi->cpi_nthread_bits = ddi_fls(cpi->cpi_ncpu_per_chip / cpi->cpi_ncore_per_chip); } static void + spec_l1d_flush_noop(void) + { + } + + static void + spec_l1d_flush_msr(void) + { + wrmsr(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, IA32_FLUSH_CMD_L1D); + } + + void (*spec_l1d_flush)(void) = spec_l1d_flush_noop; + + static void cpuid_scan_security(cpu_t *cpu, uchar_t *featureset) { struct cpuid_info *cpi = cpu->cpu_m.mcpu_cpi; if (cpi->cpi_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
*** 2203,2212 **** --- 2216,2262 ---- add_x86_feature(featureset, X86FSET_SSBD); if (ecp->cp_edx & CPUID_INTC_EDX_7_0_FLUSH_CMD) add_x86_feature(featureset, X86FSET_FLUSH_CMD); } + + if (cpu->cpu_id != 0) + return; + + /* + * We're the boot CPU, so let's figure out our L1TF status. + * + * First, if this is a RDCL_NO CPU, then we are not vulnerable: we don't + * need to exclude with ht_acquire(), and we don't need to flush. + */ + if (is_x86_feature(featureset, X86FSET_RDCL_NO)) { + extern int ht_exclusion; + ht_exclusion = 0; + spec_l1d_flush = spec_l1d_flush_noop; + membar_producer(); + return; + } + + /* + * If HT is enabled, we will need HT exclusion, as well as the flush on + * VM entry. If HT isn't enabled, we still need at least the flush for + * the L1TF sequential case. + * + * However, if X86FSET_L1D_VM_NO is set, we're most likely running + * inside a VM ourselves, and we don't need the flush. + * + * If we don't have the FLUSH_CMD available at all, we'd better just + * hope HT is disabled. + */ + if (is_x86_feature(featureset, X86FSET_FLUSH_CMD) && + !is_x86_feature(featureset, X86FSET_L1D_VM_NO)) { + spec_l1d_flush = spec_l1d_flush_msr; + } else { + spec_l1d_flush = spec_l1d_flush_noop; + } + + membar_producer(); } /* * Setup XFeature_Enabled_Mask register. Required by xsave feature. */