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2989 Eliminate use of LOGNAME_MAX in ON
1166 useradd have warning with name more 8 chars
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--- old/usr/src/cmd/newtask/newtask.c
+++ new/usr/src/cmd/newtask/newtask.c
1 1 /*
2 2 * CDDL HEADER START
3 3 *
4 4 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5 5 * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
6 6 * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
7 7 * with the License.
8 8 *
9 9 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
10 10 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
11 11 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
12 12 * and limitations under the License.
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13 13 *
14 14 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
15 15 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
16 16 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
17 17 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
18 18 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
19 19 *
20 20 * CDDL HEADER END
21 21 */
22 22 /*
23 + * Copyright (c) 2013 Gary Mills
24 + *
23 25 * Copyright 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
24 26 * Use is subject to license terms.
25 27 */
26 28
27 -#pragma ident "%Z%%M% %I% %E% SMI"
28 -
29 29 #include <sys/types.h>
30 30 #include <sys/task.h>
31 31
32 32 #include <alloca.h>
33 33 #include <libproc.h>
34 34 #include <libintl.h>
35 35 #include <libgen.h>
36 36 #include <limits.h>
37 37 #include <project.h>
38 38 #include <pwd.h>
39 39 #include <secdb.h>
40 40 #include <stdio.h>
41 41 #include <stdlib.h>
42 42 #include <string.h>
43 43 #include <sys/varargs.h>
44 44 #include <unistd.h>
45 45 #include <errno.h>
46 46 #include <signal.h>
47 47 #include <priv_utils.h>
48 48
49 49 #include "utils.h"
50 50
51 51 #define OPTIONS_STRING "Fc:lp:v"
52 52 #define NENV 8
53 53 #define ENVSIZE 255
54 54 #define PATH "PATH=/usr/bin"
55 55 #define SUPATH "PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"
56 56 #define SHELL "/usr/bin/sh"
57 57 #define SHELL2 "/sbin/sh"
58 58 #define TIMEZONEFILE "/etc/default/init"
59 59 #define LOGINFILE "/etc/default/login"
60 60 #define GLOBAL_ERR_SZ 1024
61 61 #define GRAB_RETRY_MAX 100
62 62
63 63 static const char *pname;
64 64 extern char **environ;
65 65 static char *supath = SUPATH;
66 66 static char *path = PATH;
67 67 static char global_error[GLOBAL_ERR_SZ];
68 68 static int verbose = 0;
69 69
70 70 static priv_set_t *nset;
71 71
72 72 /* Private definitions for libproject */
73 73 extern projid_t setproject_proc(const char *, const char *, int, pid_t,
74 74 struct ps_prochandle *, struct project *);
75 75 extern priv_set_t *setproject_initpriv(void);
76 76
77 77 static void usage(void);
78 78
79 79 static void preserve_error(const char *format, ...);
80 80
81 81 static int update_running_proc(int, char *, char *);
82 82 static int set_ids(struct ps_prochandle *, struct project *,
83 83 struct passwd *);
84 84 static struct passwd *match_user(uid_t, char *, int);
85 85 static void setproject_err(char *, char *, int, struct project *);
86 86
87 87 static void
88 88 usage(void)
89 89 {
90 90 (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("usage: \n\t%s [-v] [-p project] "
91 91 "[-c pid | [-Fl] [command [args ...]]]\n"), pname);
92 92 exit(2);
93 93 }
94 94
95 95 int
96 96 main(int argc, char *argv[])
97 97 {
98 98 int c;
99 99 struct passwd *pw;
100 100 char *projname = NULL;
101 101 uid_t uid;
102 102 int login_flag = 0;
103 103 int finalize_flag = TASK_NORMAL;
104 104 int newproj_flag = 0;
105 105 taskid_t taskid;
106 106 char *shell;
107 107 char *env[NENV];
108 108 char **targs;
109 109 char *filename, *procname = NULL;
110 110 int error;
111 111
112 112 nset = setproject_initpriv();
113 113 if (nset == NULL)
114 114 die(gettext("privilege initialization failed\n"));
115 115
116 116 pname = getpname(argv[0]);
117 117
118 118 while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS_STRING)) != EOF) {
119 119 switch (c) {
120 120 case 'v':
121 121 verbose = 1;
122 122 break;
123 123 case 'p':
124 124 newproj_flag = 1;
125 125 projname = optarg;
126 126 break;
127 127 case 'F':
128 128 finalize_flag = TASK_FINAL;
129 129 break;
130 130 case 'l':
131 131 login_flag++;
132 132 break;
133 133 case 'c':
134 134 procname = optarg;
135 135 break;
136 136 case '?':
137 137 default:
138 138 usage();
139 139 /*NOTREACHED*/
140 140 }
141 141 }
142 142
143 143 /* -c option is invalid with -F, -l, or a specified command */
144 144 if ((procname != NULL) &&
145 145 (finalize_flag == TASK_FINAL || login_flag || optind < argc))
146 146 usage();
147 147
148 148 if (procname != NULL) {
149 149 /* Change project/task of an existing process */
150 150 return (update_running_proc(newproj_flag, procname, projname));
151 151 }
152 152
153 153 /*
154 154 * Get user data, so that we can confirm project membership as
155 155 * well as construct an appropriate login environment.
156 156 */
157 157 uid = getuid();
158 158 if ((pw = match_user(uid, projname, 1)) == NULL) {
159 159 die("%s\n", global_error);
160 160 }
161 161
162 162 /*
163 163 * If no projname was specified, we're just creating a new task
164 164 * under the current project, so we can just set the new taskid.
165 165 * If our project is changing, we need to update any attendant
166 166 * pool/rctl bindings, so let setproject() do the dirty work.
167 167 */
168 168 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
169 169 if (projname == NULL) {
170 170 if (settaskid(getprojid(), finalize_flag) == -1)
171 171 if (errno == EAGAIN)
172 172 die(gettext("resource control limit has been "
173 173 "reached"));
174 174 else
175 175 die(gettext("settaskid failed"));
176 176 } else {
177 177 if ((error = setproject(projname,
178 178 pw->pw_name, finalize_flag)) != 0) {
179 179 setproject_err(pw->pw_name, projname, error, NULL);
180 180 if (error < 0)
181 181 die("%s\n", global_error);
182 182 else
183 183 warn("%s\n", global_error);
184 184 }
185 185 }
186 186 __priv_relinquish();
187 187
188 188 taskid = gettaskid();
189 189
190 190 if (verbose)
191 191 (void) fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", (int)taskid);
192 192
193 193 /*
194 194 * Validate user's shell from passwd database.
195 195 */
196 196 if (strcmp(pw->pw_shell, "") == 0) {
197 197 if (access(SHELL, X_OK) == 0)
198 198 pw->pw_shell = SHELL;
199 199 else
200 200 pw->pw_shell = SHELL2;
201 201 }
202 202
203 203 if (login_flag) {
204 204 /*
205 205 * Since we've been invoked as a "simulated login", set up the
206 206 * environment.
207 207 */
208 208 char *cur_tz = getenv("TZ");
209 209 char *cur_term = getenv("TERM");
210 210
211 211 char **envnext;
212 212
213 213 size_t len_home = strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("HOME=") + 1;
214 214 size_t len_logname = strlen(pw->pw_name) + strlen("LOGNAME=") +
215 215 1;
216 216 size_t len_shell = strlen(pw->pw_shell) + strlen("SHELL=") + 1;
217 217 size_t len_mail = strlen(pw->pw_name) +
218 218 strlen("MAIL=/var/mail/") + 1;
219 219 size_t len_tz;
220 220 size_t len_term;
221 221
222 222 char *env_home = safe_malloc(len_home);
223 223 char *env_logname = safe_malloc(len_logname);
224 224 char *env_shell = safe_malloc(len_shell);
225 225 char *env_mail = safe_malloc(len_mail);
226 226 char *env_tz;
227 227 char *env_term;
228 228
229 229 (void) snprintf(env_home, len_home, "HOME=%s", pw->pw_dir);
230 230 (void) snprintf(env_logname, len_logname, "LOGNAME=%s",
231 231 pw->pw_name);
232 232 (void) snprintf(env_shell, len_shell, "SHELL=%s", pw->pw_shell);
233 233 (void) snprintf(env_mail, len_mail, "MAIL=/var/mail/%s",
234 234 pw->pw_name);
235 235
236 236 env[0] = env_home;
237 237 env[1] = env_logname;
238 238 env[2] = (pw->pw_uid == 0 ? supath : path);
239 239 env[3] = env_shell;
240 240 env[4] = env_mail;
241 241 env[5] = NULL;
242 242 env[6] = NULL;
243 243 env[7] = NULL;
244 244
245 245 envnext = (char **)&env[5];
246 246
247 247 /*
248 248 * It's possible that TERM wasn't defined in the outer
249 249 * environment.
250 250 */
251 251 if (cur_term != NULL) {
252 252 len_term = strlen(cur_term) + strlen("TERM=") + 1;
253 253 env_term = safe_malloc(len_term);
254 254
255 255 (void) snprintf(env_term, len_term, "TERM=%s",
256 256 cur_term);
257 257 *envnext = env_term;
258 258 envnext++;
259 259 }
260 260
261 261 /*
262 262 * It is also possible that TZ wasn't defined in the outer
263 263 * environment. In that case, we must attempt to open the file
264 264 * defining the default timezone and select the appropriate
265 265 * entry. If there is no default timezone there, try
266 266 * TIMEZONE in /etc/default/login, duplicating the algorithm
267 267 * that login uses.
268 268 */
269 269 if (cur_tz != NULL) {
270 270 len_tz = strlen(cur_tz) + strlen("TZ=") + 1;
271 271 env_tz = safe_malloc(len_tz);
272 272
273 273 (void) snprintf(env_tz, len_tz, "TZ=%s", cur_tz);
274 274 *envnext = env_tz;
275 275 } else {
276 276 if ((env_tz = getdefault(TIMEZONEFILE, "TZ=",
277 277 "TZ=")) != NULL)
278 278 *envnext = env_tz;
279 279 else {
280 280 env_tz = getdefault(LOGINFILE, "TIMEZONE=",
281 281 "TZ=");
282 282 *envnext = env_tz;
283 283 }
284 284 }
285 285
286 286 environ = (char **)&env[0];
287 287
288 288 /*
289 289 * Prefix the shell string with a hyphen, indicating a login
290 290 * shell.
291 291 */
292 292 shell = safe_malloc(PATH_MAX);
293 293 (void) snprintf(shell, PATH_MAX, "-%s", basename(pw->pw_shell));
294 294 } else {
295 295 shell = basename(pw->pw_shell);
296 296 }
297 297
298 298 /*
299 299 * If there are no arguments, we launch the user's shell; otherwise, the
300 300 * remaining commands are assumed to form a valid command invocation
301 301 * that we can exec.
302 302 */
303 303 if (optind >= argc) {
304 304 targs = alloca(2 * sizeof (char *));
305 305 filename = pw->pw_shell;
306 306 targs[0] = shell;
307 307 targs[1] = NULL;
308 308 } else {
309 309 targs = &argv[optind];
310 310 filename = targs[0];
311 311 }
312 312
313 313 if (execvp(filename, targs) == -1)
314 314 die(gettext("exec of %s failed"), targs[0]);
315 315
316 316 /*
317 317 * We should never get here.
318 318 */
319 319 return (1);
320 320 }
321 321
322 322 static int
323 323 update_running_proc(int newproj_flag, char *procname, char *projname)
324 324 {
325 325 struct ps_prochandle *p;
326 326 prcred_t original_prcred, current_prcred;
327 327 projid_t prprojid;
328 328 taskid_t taskid;
329 329 int error = 0, gret;
330 330 struct project project;
331 331 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ];
332 332 struct passwd *passwd_entry;
333 333 int grab_retry_count = 0;
334 334
335 335 /*
336 336 * Catch signals from terminal. There isn't much sense in
337 337 * doing anything but ignoring them since we don't do anything
338 338 * after the point we'd be capable of handling them again.
339 339 */
340 340 (void) sigignore(SIGHUP);
341 341 (void) sigignore(SIGINT);
342 342 (void) sigignore(SIGQUIT);
343 343 (void) sigignore(SIGTERM);
344 344
345 345 /* flush stdout before grabbing the proc to avoid deadlock */
346 346 (void) fflush(stdout);
347 347
348 348 /*
349 349 * We need to grab the process, which will force it to stop execution
350 350 * until the grab is released, in order to aquire some information about
351 351 * it, such as its current project (which is achieved via an injected
352 352 * system call and therefore needs an agent) and its credentials. We
353 353 * will then need to release it again because it may be a process that
354 354 * we rely on for later calls, for example nscd.
355 355 */
356 356 if ((p = proc_arg_grab(procname, PR_ARG_PIDS, 0, &gret)) == NULL) {
357 357 warn(gettext("failed to grab for process %s: %s\n"),
358 358 procname, Pgrab_error(gret));
359 359 return (1);
360 360 }
361 361 if (Pcreate_agent(p) != 0) {
362 362 Prelease(p, 0);
363 363 warn(gettext("cannot control process %s\n"), procname);
364 364 return (1);
365 365 }
366 366
367 367 /*
368 368 * The victim process is now held. Do not call any functions
369 369 * which generate stdout/stderr until the process has been
370 370 * released.
371 371 */
372 372
373 373 /*
374 374 * The target process will soon be restarted (in case it is in newtask's
375 375 * execution path) and then stopped again. We need to ensure that our cached
376 376 * data doesn't change while the process runs so return here if the target
377 377 * process changes its user id in between our stop operations, so that we can
378 378 * try again.
379 379 */
380 380 pgrab_retry:
381 381
382 382 /* Cache required information about the process. */
383 383 if (Pcred(p, &original_prcred, 0) != 0) {
384 384 preserve_error(gettext("cannot get process credentials %s\n"),
385 385 procname);
386 386 error = 1;
387 387 }
388 388 if ((prprojid = pr_getprojid(p)) == -1) {
389 389 preserve_error(gettext("cannot get process project id %s\n"),
390 390 procname);
391 391 error = 1;
392 392 }
393 393
394 394 /*
395 395 * We now have all the required information, so release the target
396 396 * process and perform our sanity checks. The process needs to be
397 397 * running at this point because it may be in the execution path of the
398 398 * calls made below.
399 399 */
400 400 Pdestroy_agent(p);
401 401 Prelease(p, 0);
402 402
403 403 /* if our data acquisition failed, then we can't continue. */
404 404 if (error) {
405 405 warn("%s\n", global_error);
406 406 return (1);
407 407 }
408 408
409 409 if (newproj_flag == 0) {
410 410 /*
411 411 * Just changing the task, so set projname to the current
412 412 * project of the running process.
413 413 */
414 414 if (getprojbyid(prprojid, &project, &prbuf,
415 415 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
416 416 warn(gettext("unable to get project name "
417 417 "for projid %d"), prprojid);
418 418 return (1);
419 419 }
420 420 projname = project.pj_name;
421 421 } else {
422 422 /*
423 423 * cache info for the project which user passed in via the
424 424 * command line
425 425 */
426 426 if (getprojbyname(projname, &project, &prbuf,
427 427 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
428 428 warn(gettext("unknown project \"%s\"\n"), projname);
429 429 return (1);
430 430 }
431 431 }
432 432
433 433 /*
434 434 * Use our cached information to verify that the owner of the running
435 435 * process is a member of proj
436 436 */
437 437 if ((passwd_entry = match_user(original_prcred.pr_ruid,
438 438 projname, 0)) == NULL) {
439 439 warn("%s\n", global_error);
440 440 return (1);
441 441 }
442 442
443 443 /*
444 444 * We can now safely stop the process again in order to change the
445 445 * project and taskid as required.
446 446 */
447 447 if ((p = proc_arg_grab(procname, PR_ARG_PIDS, 0, &gret)) == NULL) {
448 448 warn(gettext("failed to grab for process %s: %s\n"),
449 449 procname, Pgrab_error(gret));
450 450 return (1);
451 451 }
452 452 if (Pcreate_agent(p) != 0) {
453 453 Prelease(p, 0);
454 454 warn(gettext("cannot control process %s\n"), procname);
455 455 return (1);
456 456 }
457 457
458 458 /*
459 459 * Now that the target process is stopped, check the validity of our
460 460 * cached info. If we aren't superuser then match_user() will have
461 461 * checked to make sure that the owner of the process is in the relevant
462 462 * project. If our ruid has changed, then match_user()'s conclusion may
463 463 * be invalid.
464 464 */
465 465 if (getuid() != 0) {
466 466 if (Pcred(p, ¤t_prcred, 0) != 0) {
467 467 Pdestroy_agent(p);
468 468 Prelease(p, 0);
469 469 warn(gettext("can't get process credentials %s\n"),
470 470 procname);
471 471 return (1);
472 472 }
473 473
474 474 if (original_prcred.pr_ruid != current_prcred.pr_ruid) {
475 475 if (grab_retry_count++ < GRAB_RETRY_MAX)
476 476 goto pgrab_retry;
477 477
478 478 warn(gettext("process consistently changed its "
479 479 "user id %s\n"), procname);
480 480 return (1);
481 481 }
482 482 }
483 483
484 484 error = set_ids(p, &project, passwd_entry);
485 485
486 486 if (verbose)
487 487 taskid = pr_gettaskid(p);
488 488
489 489 Pdestroy_agent(p);
490 490 Prelease(p, 0);
491 491
492 492 if (error) {
493 493 /*
494 494 * error is serious enough to stop, only if negative.
495 495 * Otherwise, it simply indicates one of the resource
496 496 * control assignments failed, which is worth warning
497 497 * about.
498 498 */
499 499 warn("%s\n", global_error);
500 500 if (error < 0)
501 501 return (1);
502 502 }
503 503
504 504 if (verbose)
505 505 (void) fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", (int)taskid);
506 506
507 507 return (0);
508 508 }
509 509
510 510 static int
511 511 set_ids(struct ps_prochandle *p, struct project *project,
512 512 struct passwd *passwd_entry)
513 513 {
514 514 int be_su = 0;
515 515 prcred_t old_prcred;
516 516 int error;
517 517 prpriv_t *old_prpriv, *new_prpriv;
518 518 size_t prsz = sizeof (prpriv_t);
519 519 priv_set_t *eset, *pset;
520 520 int ind;
521 521
522 522 if (Pcred(p, &old_prcred, 0) != 0) {
523 523 preserve_error(gettext("can't get process credentials"));
524 524 return (1);
525 525 }
526 526
527 527 old_prpriv = proc_get_priv(Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
528 528 if (old_prpriv == NULL) {
529 529 preserve_error(gettext("can't get process privileges"));
530 530 return (1);
531 531 }
532 532
533 533 prsz = PRIV_PRPRIV_SIZE(old_prpriv);
534 534
535 535 new_prpriv = malloc(prsz);
536 536 if (new_prpriv == NULL) {
537 537 preserve_error(gettext("can't allocate memory"));
538 538 free(old_prpriv);
539 539 return (1);
540 540 }
541 541
542 542 (void) memcpy(new_prpriv, old_prpriv, prsz);
543 543
544 544 /*
545 545 * If the process already has the proc_taskid privilege,
546 546 * we don't need to elevate its privileges; if it doesn't,
547 547 * we try to do it here.
548 548 * As we do not wish to leave a window in which the process runs
549 549 * with elevated privileges, we make sure that the process dies
550 550 * when we go away unexpectedly.
551 551 */
552 552
553 553 ind = priv_getsetbyname(PRIV_EFFECTIVE);
554 554 eset = (priv_set_t *)&new_prpriv->pr_sets[new_prpriv->pr_setsize * ind];
555 555 ind = priv_getsetbyname(PRIV_PERMITTED);
556 556 pset = (priv_set_t *)&new_prpriv->pr_sets[new_prpriv->pr_setsize * ind];
557 557
558 558 if (!priv_issubset(nset, eset)) {
559 559 be_su = 1;
560 560 priv_union(nset, eset);
561 561 priv_union(nset, pset);
562 562 if (Psetflags(p, PR_KLC) != 0) {
563 563 preserve_error(gettext("cannot set process "
564 564 "privileges"));
565 565 (void) Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC);
566 566 free(new_prpriv);
567 567 free(old_prpriv);
568 568 return (1);
569 569 }
570 570 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
571 571 if (Psetpriv(p, new_prpriv) != 0) {
572 572 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
573 573 preserve_error(gettext("cannot set process "
574 574 "privileges"));
575 575 (void) Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC);
576 576 free(new_prpriv);
577 577 free(old_prpriv);
578 578 return (1);
579 579 }
580 580 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
581 581 }
582 582
583 583 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
584 584 if ((error = setproject_proc(project->pj_name,
585 585 passwd_entry->pw_name, 0, Pstatus(p)->pr_pid, p, project)) != 0) {
586 586 /* global_error is set by setproject_err */
587 587 setproject_err(passwd_entry->pw_name, project->pj_name,
588 588 error, project);
589 589 }
590 590 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
591 591
592 592 /* relinquish added privileges */
593 593 if (be_su) {
594 594 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
595 595 if (Psetpriv(p, old_prpriv) != 0) {
596 596 /*
597 597 * We shouldn't ever be in a state where we can't
598 598 * set the process back to its old creds, but we
599 599 * don't want to take the chance of leaving a
600 600 * non-privileged process with enhanced creds. So,
601 601 * release the process from libproc control, knowing
602 602 * that it will be killed.
603 603 */
604 604 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
605 605 Pdestroy_agent(p);
606 606 die(gettext("cannot relinquish superuser credentials "
607 607 "for pid %d. The process was killed."),
608 608 Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
609 609 }
610 610 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
611 611 if (Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC) != 0)
612 612 preserve_error(gettext("error relinquishing "
613 613 "credentials. Process %d will be killed."),
614 614 Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
615 615 }
616 616 free(new_prpriv);
617 617 free(old_prpriv);
618 618
619 619 return (error);
620 620 }
621 621
622 622 /*
623 623 * preserve_error() should be called rather than warn() by any
624 624 * function that is called while the victim process is being
625 625 * held by Pgrab.
626 626 *
627 627 * It saves a single error message to be printed until after
628 628 * the process has been released. Since multiple errors are not
629 629 * stored, any error should be considered critical.
630 630 */
631 631 void
632 632 preserve_error(const char *format, ...)
633 633 {
634 634 va_list alist;
635 635
636 636 va_start(alist, format);
637 637
638 638 /*
639 639 * GLOBAL_ERR_SZ is pretty big. If the error is longer
640 640 * than that, just truncate it, rather than chance missing
641 641 * the error altogether.
642 642 */
643 643 (void) vsnprintf(global_error, GLOBAL_ERR_SZ-1, format, alist);
644 644
645 645 va_end(alist);
646 646
647 647 }
648 648
649 649 /*
650 650 * Given the input arguments, return the passwd structure that matches best.
651 651 * Also, since we use getpwnam() and friends, subsequent calls to this
652 652 * function will re-use the memory previously returned.
653 653 */
654 654 static struct passwd *
655 655 match_user(uid_t uid, char *projname, int is_my_uid)
656 656 {
657 657 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ], username[LOGNAME_MAX+1];
658 658 struct project prj;
659 659 char *tmp_name;
660 660 struct passwd *pw = NULL;
661 661
662 662 /*
663 663 * In order to allow users with the same UID but distinguishable
664 664 * user names to be in different projects we play a guessing
665 665 * game of which username is most appropriate. If we're checking
666 666 * for the uid of the calling process, the login name is a
667 667 * good starting point.
668 668 */
669 669 if (is_my_uid) {
670 670 if ((tmp_name = getlogin()) == NULL ||
671 671 (pw = getpwnam(tmp_name)) == NULL || (pw->pw_uid != uid) ||
672 672 (pw->pw_name == NULL))
673 673 pw = NULL;
674 674 }
675 675
676 676 /*
677 677 * If the login name doesn't work, we try the first match for
678 678 * the current uid in the password file.
679 679 */
680 680 if (pw == NULL) {
681 681 if (((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) || pw->pw_name == NULL) {
682 682 preserve_error(gettext("cannot find username "
683 683 "for uid %d"), uid);
684 684 return (NULL);
685 685 }
686 686 }
687 687
688 688 /*
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689 689 * If projname wasn't supplied, we've done our best, so just return
690 690 * what we've got now. Alternatively, if newtask's invoker has
691 691 * superuser privileges, return the pw structure we've got now, with
692 692 * no further checking from inproj(). Superuser should be able to
693 693 * join any project, and the subsequent call to setproject() will
694 694 * allow this.
695 695 */
696 696 if (projname == NULL || getuid() == (uid_t)0)
697 697 return (pw);
698 698
699 - (void) strcpy(username, pw->pw_name);
699 + (void) strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof (username));
700 700
701 701 if (inproj(username, projname, prbuf, PROJECT_BUFSZ) == 0) {
702 702 char **u;
703 703 tmp_name = NULL;
704 704
705 705 /*
706 706 * If the previous guesses didn't work, walk through all
707 707 * project members and test for UID-equivalence.
708 708 */
709 709
710 710 if (getprojbyname(projname, &prj, prbuf,
711 711 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
712 712 preserve_error(gettext("unknown project \"%s\""),
713 713 projname);
714 714 return (NULL);
715 715 }
716 716
717 717 for (u = prj.pj_users; *u; u++) {
718 718 if ((pw = getpwnam(*u)) == NULL)
719 719 continue;
720 720
721 721 if (pw->pw_uid == uid) {
722 722 tmp_name = pw->pw_name;
723 723 break;
724 724 }
725 725 }
726 726
727 727 if (tmp_name == NULL) {
728 728 preserve_error(gettext("user \"%s\" is not a member of "
729 729 "project \"%s\""), username, projname);
730 730 return (NULL);
731 731 }
732 732 }
733 733
734 734 return (pw);
735 735 }
736 736
737 737 void
738 738 setproject_err(char *username, char *projname, int error, struct project *proj)
739 739 {
740 740 kva_t *kv_array = NULL;
741 741 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ];
742 742 struct project local_proj;
743 743
744 744 switch (error) {
745 745 case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK:
746 746 if (errno == EAGAIN)
747 747 preserve_error(gettext("resource control limit has "
748 748 "been reached"));
749 749 else if (errno == ESRCH)
750 750 preserve_error(gettext("user \"%s\" is not a member of "
751 751 "project \"%s\""), username, projname);
752 752 else if (errno == EACCES)
753 753 preserve_error(gettext("the invoking task is final"));
754 754 else
755 755 preserve_error(
756 756 gettext("could not join project \"%s\""),
757 757 projname);
758 758 break;
759 759 case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL:
760 760 if (errno == EACCES)
761 761 preserve_error(gettext("no resource pool accepting "
762 762 "default bindings exists for project \"%s\""),
763 763 projname);
764 764 else if (errno == ESRCH)
765 765 preserve_error(gettext("specified resource pool does "
766 766 "not exist for project \"%s\""), projname);
767 767 else
768 768 preserve_error(gettext("could not bind to default "
769 769 "resource pool for project \"%s\""), projname);
770 770 break;
771 771 default:
772 772 if (error <= 0) {
773 773 preserve_error(gettext("setproject failed for "
774 774 "project \"%s\""), projname);
775 775 return;
776 776 }
777 777 /*
778 778 * If we have a stopped target process it may be in
779 779 * getprojbyname()'s execution path which would make it unsafe
780 780 * to access the project table, so only do that if the caller
781 781 * hasn't provided a cached version of the project structure.
782 782 */
783 783 if (proj == NULL)
784 784 proj = getprojbyname(projname, &local_proj, prbuf,
785 785 PROJECT_BUFSZ);
786 786
787 787 if (proj == NULL || (kv_array = _str2kva(proj->pj_attr,
788 788 KV_ASSIGN, KV_DELIMITER)) == NULL ||
789 789 kv_array->length < error) {
790 790 preserve_error(gettext("warning, resource control "
791 791 "assignment failed for project \"%s\" "
792 792 "attribute %d"),
793 793 projname, error);
794 794 if (kv_array)
795 795 _kva_free(kv_array);
796 796 return;
797 797 }
798 798 preserve_error(gettext("warning, %s resource control "
799 799 "assignment failed for project \"%s\""),
800 800 kv_array->data[error - 1].key, projname);
801 801 _kva_free(kv_array);
802 802 }
803 803 }
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