1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
302 {
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
305 */
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
307
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
311 }
312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
314 {
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
317 * renegotiation.
318 */
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
321 ret = -1;
322 goto end;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
330 }
331 break;
332
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
335
336 s->shutdown=0;
337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
338 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
341 s->init_num=0;
342
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
344 break;
345
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
347 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
348 break;
349
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
353
354 s->shutdown=0;
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 {
362 int al;
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 {
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 goto end;
368 }
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 {
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
377 ret= -1;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 }
381 #endif
382
383 s->renegotiate = 2;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 s->init_num=0;
386 break;
387
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->hit)
394 {
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 }
400 #else
401 if (s->hit)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 #endif
404 else
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
406 s->init_num=0;
407 break;
408
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
416 {
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
422 else
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
424 }
425 else
426 {
427 skip = 1;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 }
430 #else
431 }
432 else
433 skip=1;
434
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 #endif
437 s->init_num=0;
438 break;
439
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
443
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
449 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
450 )
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
456 else
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
458
459
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
462 *
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
464 *
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
470 */
471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #endif
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 #endif
481 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
487 )
488 )
489 )
490 )
491 {
492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
494 }
495 else
496 skip=1;
497
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 s->init_num=0;
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
522 {
523 /* no cert request */
524 skip=1;
525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
527 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
529 return -1;
530 }
531 else
532 {
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
534 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
535 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
536 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 #else
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
540 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
541 #endif
542 s->init_num=0;
543 }
544 break;
545
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
548 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
552 s->init_num=0;
553 break;
554
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
556
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
564 * unconditionally.
565 */
566
567 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
568 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
569 {
570 ret= -1;
571 goto end;
572 }
573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
574
575 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
582 if (ret <= 0)
583 goto end;
584 if (ret == 2)
585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
586 else {
587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
588 {
589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
591 }
592 s->init_num=0;
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
594 }
595 break;
596
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
599 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
600 if (ret <= 0)
601 goto end;
602 if (ret == 2)
603 {
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
610 * for key exchange.
611 */
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
614 #else
615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
617 else
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619 #endif
620 s->init_num = 0;
621 }
622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
623 {
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 s->init_num=0;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
627 break;
628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
630 */
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
632 {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 return -1;
635 }
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
638 return -1;
639 }
640 else
641 {
642 int offset=0;
643 int dgst_num;
644
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 s->init_num=0;
647
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
652 */
653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
655 return -1;
656 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
657 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
658 {
659 int dgst_size;
660
661 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
662 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
663 if (dgst_size < 0)
664 {
665 ret = -1;
666 goto end;
667 }
668 offset+=dgst_size;
669 }
670 }
671 break;
672
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
675
676 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
680
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
683 #else
684 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
686 else
687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
688 #endif
689 s->init_num=0;
690 break;
691
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
695 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
696 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
697 s->init_num = 0;
698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
699 break;
700 #endif
701
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
704 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
705 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
707 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
708 if (s->hit)
709 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
711 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
713 #endif
714 else
715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
716 s->init_num=0;
717 break;
718
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
722 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
725 s->init_num=0;
726 break;
727
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
730 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
731 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
733 s->init_num=0;
734 break;
735
736 #endif
737
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
740
741 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
742 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
743 { ret= -1; goto end; }
744
745 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
746 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
747
748 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
750 s->init_num=0;
751
752 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
753 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
754 {
755 ret= -1;
756 goto end;
757 }
758
759 break;
760
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
763 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
764 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
765 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
766 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
769 if (s->hit)
770 {
771 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
772 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
773 #else
774 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
775 {
776 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
778 }
779 else
780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
781 #endif
782 }
783 else
784 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
785 s->init_num=0;
786 break;
787
788 case SSL_ST_OK:
789 /* clean a few things up */
790 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
791
792 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
793 s->init_buf=NULL;
794
795 /* remove buffering on output */
796 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
797
798 s->init_num=0;
799
800 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
801 {
802 s->renegotiate=0;
803 s->new_session=0;
804
805 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
806
807 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
808 /* s->server=1; */
809 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
810
811 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
812 }
813
814 ret = 1;
815 goto end;
816 /* break; */
817
818 default:
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
820 ret= -1;
821 goto end;
822 /* break; */
823 }
824
825 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
826 {
827 if (s->debug)
828 {
829 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
830 goto end;
831 }
832
833
834 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
835 {
836 new_state=s->state;
837 s->state=state;
838 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
839 s->state=new_state;
840 }
841 }
842 skip=0;
843 }
844 end:
845 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
846
847 s->in_handshake--;
848 if (cb != NULL)
849 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
850 return(ret);
851 }
852
853 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
854 {
855 unsigned char *p;
856
857 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
858 {
859 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
860 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
861 *(p++)=0;
862 *(p++)=0;
863 *(p++)=0;
864
865 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
866 /* number of bytes to write */
867 s->init_num=4;
868 s->init_off=0;
869 }
870
871 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
872 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
873 }
874
875 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
876 {
877 int ok;
878 long n;
879
880 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
881 * so permit appropriate message length */
882 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
883 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
884 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
885 -1,
886 s->max_cert_list,
887 &ok);
888 if (!ok) return((int)n);
889 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
890 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
891 {
892 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
893 * negotiation. */
894 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
895 {
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
897 return -1;
898 }
899 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
900 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
903 {
904 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
905 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
906 }
907 #endif
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
910 {
911 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
912 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
913 }
914 #endif
915 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
916 return 2;
917 }
918 return 1;
919 }
920
921 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
922 {
923 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
924 unsigned int cookie_len;
925 long n;
926 unsigned long id;
927 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
928 SSL_CIPHER *c;
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
930 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
931 #endif
932 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
933
934 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
935 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
936 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
937 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
938 * TLSv1.
939 */
940 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
941 )
942 {
943 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
944 }
945 s->first_packet=1;
946 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
947 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
948 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
949 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
950 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
951 &ok);
952
953 if (!ok) return((int)n);
954 s->first_packet=0;
955 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
956
957 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
958 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
959 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
960 p+=2;
961
962 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
963 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
964 {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
966 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
967 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
968 {
969 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
970 s->version = s->client_version;
971 }
972 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
973 goto f_err;
974 }
975
976 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
977 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
978 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
979 */
980 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
981 {
982 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
983
984 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
985 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
986
987 if (cookie_length == 0)
988 return 1;
989 }
990
991 /* load the client random */
992 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
993 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
994
995 /* get the session-id */
996 j= *(p++);
997
998 s->hit=0;
999 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1000 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1001 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1002 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1003 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1004 *
1005 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1006 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1007 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1008 * setting will be ignored.
1009 */
1010 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1011 {
1012 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1013 goto err;
1014 }
1015 else
1016 {
1017 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1018 if (i == 1)
1019 { /* previous session */
1020 s->hit=1;
1021 }
1022 else if (i == -1)
1023 goto err;
1024 else /* i == 0 */
1025 {
1026 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1027 goto err;
1028 }
1029 }
1030
1031 p+=j;
1032
1033 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1034 {
1035 /* cookie stuff */
1036 cookie_len = *(p++);
1037
1038 /*
1039 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1040 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1041 * does not cause an overflow.
1042 */
1043 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1044 {
1045 /* too much data */
1046 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1048 goto f_err;
1049 }
1050
1051 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1052 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1053 cookie_len > 0)
1054 {
1055 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1056
1057 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1058 {
1059 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1060 cookie_len) == 0)
1061 {
1062 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1064 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1065 goto f_err;
1066 }
1067 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1068 }
1069 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1070 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1071 {
1072 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1074 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1075 goto f_err;
1076 }
1077
1078 ret = 2;
1079 }
1080
1081 p += cookie_len;
1082 }
1083
1084 n2s(p,i);
1085 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1086 {
1087 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1088 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1090 goto f_err;
1091 }
1092 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1093 {
1094 /* not enough data */
1095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 goto f_err;
1098 }
1099 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1100 == NULL))
1101 {
1102 goto err;
1103 }
1104 p+=i;
1105
1106 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1107 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1108 {
1109 j=0;
1110 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1111
1112 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1113 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1114 #endif
1115 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1116 {
1117 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1118 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1119 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1120 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1121 #endif
1122 if (c->id == id)
1123 {
1124 j=1;
1125 break;
1126 }
1127 }
1128 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1129 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1130 */
1131 #if 0
1132 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1133 {
1134 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1135 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1136 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1137 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1138 * enabled, though. */
1139 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1140 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1141 {
1142 s->session->cipher = c;
1143 j = 1;
1144 }
1145 }
1146 #endif
1147 if (j == 0)
1148 {
1149 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1150 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1151 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1153 goto f_err;
1154 }
1155 }
1156
1157 /* compression */
1158 i= *(p++);
1159 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1160 {
1161 /* not enough data */
1162 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1164 goto f_err;
1165 }
1166 q=p;
1167 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1168 {
1169 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1170 }
1171
1172 p+=i;
1173 if (j >= i)
1174 {
1175 /* no compress */
1176 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1178 goto f_err;
1179 }
1180
1181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1182 /* TLS extensions*/
1183 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1184 {
1185 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1186 {
1187 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1189 goto f_err;
1190 }
1191 }
1192 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1194 goto err;
1195 }
1196
1197 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1198 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1199 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1200 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1201 {
1202 unsigned char *pos;
1203 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1204 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1205 {
1206 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1207 goto f_err;
1208 }
1209 }
1210
1211 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1212 {
1213 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1214
1215 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1216 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1217 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1218 {
1219 s->hit=1;
1220 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1221 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1222
1223 ciphers=NULL;
1224
1225 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1226 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1227 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1228 {
1229 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1231 goto f_err;
1232 }
1233
1234 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1235
1236 if (s->cipher_list)
1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1238
1239 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1241
1242 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1243 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1244 }
1245 }
1246 #endif
1247
1248 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1249 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1250 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1251 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1253 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1254 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1255 {
1256 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1257 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1258 /* Can't disable compression */
1259 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1260 {
1261 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1263 goto f_err;
1264 }
1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1266 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1267 {
1268 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1269 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1270 {
1271 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1272 break;
1273 }
1274 }
1275 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1276 {
1277 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1279 goto f_err;
1280 }
1281 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1282 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1283 {
1284 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1285 break;
1286 }
1287 if (m >= i)
1288 {
1289 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1291 goto f_err;
1292 }
1293 }
1294 else if (s->hit)
1295 comp = NULL;
1296 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1297 { /* See if we have a match */
1298 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1299
1300 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1301 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1302 {
1303 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1304 v=comp->id;
1305 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1306 {
1307 if (v == q[o])
1308 {
1309 done=1;
1310 break;
1311 }
1312 }
1313 if (done) break;
1314 }
1315 if (done)
1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1317 else
1318 comp=NULL;
1319 }
1320 #else
1321 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1322 * using compression.
1323 */
1324 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1325 {
1326 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1328 goto f_err;
1329 }
1330 #endif
1331
1332 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1333 * pick a cipher */
1334
1335 if (!s->hit)
1336 {
1337 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1338 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1339 #else
1340 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1341 #endif
1342 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1343 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1344 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1345 if (ciphers == NULL)
1346 {
1347 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1349 goto f_err;
1350 }
1351 ciphers=NULL;
1352 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1353 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1354
1355 if (c == NULL)
1356 {
1357 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1359 goto f_err;
1360 }
1361 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1362 }
1363 else
1364 {
1365 /* Session-id reuse */
1366 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1367 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1368 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1369 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1370
1371 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1372 {
1373 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1374 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1375 {
1376 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1377 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1378 nc=c;
1379 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1380 ec=c;
1381 }
1382 if (nc != NULL)
1383 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1384 else if (ec != NULL)
1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1386 else
1387 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1388 }
1389 else
1390 #endif
1391 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1392 }
1393
1394 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1395 {
1396 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1397 {
1398 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1399 goto f_err;
1400 }
1401 }
1402
1403 /* we now have the following setup.
1404 * client_random
1405 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1406 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1407 * compression - basically ignored right now
1408 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1409 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1410 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1411 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1412 */
1413
1414 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1415 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1416 {
1417 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1418 {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1420 goto err;
1421 }
1422 }
1423
1424 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1425 if (0)
1426 {
1427 f_err:
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1429 }
1430 err:
1431 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1432 return(ret);
1433 }
1434
1435 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1436 {
1437 unsigned char *buf;
1438 unsigned char *p,*d;
1439 int i,sl;
1440 unsigned long l;
1441
1442 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1443 {
1444 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1445 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1446 p=s->s3->server_random;
1447 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1448 return -1;
1449 #endif
1450 /* Do the message type and length last */
1451 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1452
1453 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1454 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1455
1456 /* Random stuff */
1457 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1458 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1459
1460 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1461 * back in the server hello:
1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1463 * we send back the old session ID.
1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1468 * session ID.
1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1473 * to send back.
1474 */
1475 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1476 && !s->hit)
1477 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1478
1479 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1480 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1481 {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 return -1;
1484 }
1485 *(p++)=sl;
1486 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1487 p+=sl;
1488
1489 /* put the cipher */
1490 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1491 p+=i;
1492
1493 /* put the compression method */
1494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1495 *(p++)=0;
1496 #else
1497 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1498 *(p++)=0;
1499 else
1500 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1501 #endif
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1504 {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1506 return -1;
1507 }
1508 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1509 {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 return -1;
1512 }
1513 #endif
1514 /* do the header */
1515 l=(p-d);
1516 d=buf;
1517 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1518 l2n3(l,d);
1519
1520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1521 /* number of bytes to write */
1522 s->init_num=p-buf;
1523 s->init_off=0;
1524 }
1525
1526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1527 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1528 }
1529
1530 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1531 {
1532 unsigned char *p;
1533
1534 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1535 {
1536 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1537
1538 /* do the header */
1539 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1540 *(p++)=0;
1541 *(p++)=0;
1542 *(p++)=0;
1543
1544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1545 /* number of bytes to write */
1546 s->init_num=4;
1547 s->init_off=0;
1548 }
1549
1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1552 }
1553
1554 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1555 {
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1557 unsigned char *q;
1558 int j,num;
1559 RSA *rsa;
1560 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1561 unsigned int u;
1562 #endif
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1564 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1565 #endif
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1567 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1568 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1569 int encodedlen = 0;
1570 int curve_id = 0;
1571 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1572 #endif
1573 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1574 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1575 unsigned char *p,*d;
1576 int al,i;
1577 unsigned long type;
1578 int n;
1579 CERT *cert;
1580 BIGNUM *r[4];
1581 int nr[4],kn;
1582 BUF_MEM *buf;
1583 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1584
1585 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1586 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1587 {
1588 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1589 cert=s->cert;
1590
1591 buf=s->init_buf;
1592
1593 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1594 n=0;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1597 {
1598 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1599 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1600 {
1601 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1602 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1603 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1604 if(rsa == NULL)
1605 {
1606 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1608 goto f_err;
1609 }
1610 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1611 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1612 }
1613 if (rsa == NULL)
1614 {
1615 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1617 goto f_err;
1618 }
1619 r[0]=rsa->n;
1620 r[1]=rsa->e;
1621 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1622 }
1623 else
1624 #endif
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1626 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1627 {
1628 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1629 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1633 if (dhp == NULL)
1634 {
1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1637 goto f_err;
1638 }
1639
1640 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1641 {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 goto err;
1644 }
1645
1646 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1647 {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649 goto err;
1650 }
1651
1652 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1653 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1654 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1655 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1656 {
1657 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1658 {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1660 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1661 goto err;
1662 }
1663 }
1664 else
1665 {
1666 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1667 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1668 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1669 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1670 {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 }
1675 r[0]=dh->p;
1676 r[1]=dh->g;
1677 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1678 }
1679 else
1680 #endif
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1682 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1683 {
1684 const EC_GROUP *group;
1685
1686 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1687 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1688 {
1689 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1690 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1692 }
1693 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1694 {
1695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1697 goto f_err;
1698 }
1699
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1701 {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1707 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1708 {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1710 goto err;
1711 }
1712 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1713 {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1719 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1721 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1722 {
1723 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1724 {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1726 goto err;
1727 }
1728 }
1729
1730 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1733 {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1735 goto err;
1736 }
1737
1738 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1739 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1740 {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1746 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1747 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1748 */
1749 if ((curve_id =
1750 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1751 == 0)
1752 {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1754 goto err;
1755 }
1756
1757 /* Encode the public key.
1758 * First check the size of encoding and
1759 * allocate memory accordingly.
1760 */
1761 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1763 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1764 NULL, 0, NULL);
1765
1766 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1767 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1768 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1769 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1770 {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774
1775
1776 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1779 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1780
1781 if (encodedlen == 0)
1782 {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 goto err;
1785 }
1786
1787 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1788
1789 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1790 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1791 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1792 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1793 * structure.
1794 */
1795 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1796
1797 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1798 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1799 */
1800 r[0]=NULL;
1801 r[1]=NULL;
1802 r[2]=NULL;
1803 r[3]=NULL;
1804 }
1805 else
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1808 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1809 {
1810 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1811 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1812 }
1813 else
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1817 {
1818 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1819 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1820 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1821 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1822 {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1824 goto err;
1825 }
1826 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1827 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1828 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1829 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1830 }
1831 else
1832 #endif
1833 {
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1836 goto f_err;
1837 }
1838 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1839 {
1840 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1843 n+=1+nr[i];
1844 else
1845 #endif
1846 n+=2+nr[i];
1847 }
1848
1849 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1850 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1851 {
1852 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1853 == NULL)
1854 {
1855 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 goto f_err;
1857 }
1858 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1859 }
1860 else
1861 {
1862 pkey=NULL;
1863 kn=0;
1864 }
1865
1866 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1867 {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1869 goto err;
1870 }
1871 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1872 p= &(d[4]);
1873
1874 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1875 {
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1878 {
1879 *p = nr[i];
1880 p++;
1881 }
1882 else
1883 #endif
1884 s2n(nr[i],p);
1885 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1886 p+=nr[i];
1887 }
1888
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1890 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1891 {
1892 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1893 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1894 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1895 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1896 * the actual encoded point itself
1897 */
1898 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1899 p += 1;
1900 *p = 0;
1901 p += 1;
1902 *p = curve_id;
1903 p += 1;
1904 *p = encodedlen;
1905 p += 1;
1906 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1907 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1908 encodedlen);
1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1910 encodedPoint = NULL;
1911 p += encodedlen;
1912 }
1913 #endif
1914
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1916 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1917 {
1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1919 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1920 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1921 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1922 }
1923 #endif
1924
1925 /* not anonymous */
1926 if (pkey != NULL)
1927 {
1928 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1929 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1932 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1933 {
1934 q=md_buf;
1935 j=0;
1936 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1937 {
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1939 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1940 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1941 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1946 (unsigned int *)&i);
1947 q+=i;
1948 j+=i;
1949 }
1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1951 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1952 {
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1954 goto err;
1955 }
1956 s2n(u,p);
1957 n+=u+2;
1958 }
1959 else
1960 #endif
1961 if (md)
1962 {
1963 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1964 * algorithm */
1965 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1966 {
1967 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1968 {
1969 /* Should never happen */
1970 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 goto f_err;
1973 }
1974 p+=2;
1975 }
1976 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1977 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1978 EVP_MD_name(md));
1979 #endif
1980 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1984 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1985 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1986 {
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1988 goto err;
1989 }
1990 s2n(i,p);
1991 n+=i+2;
1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1993 n+= 2;
1994 }
1995 else
1996 {
1997 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1998 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2000 goto f_err;
2001 }
2002 }
2003
2004 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2005 l2n3(n,d);
2006
2007 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2008 * it off */
2009 s->init_num=n+4;
2010 s->init_off=0;
2011 }
2012
2013 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2016 f_err:
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2018 err:
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2020 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2022 #endif
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2024 return(-1);
2025 }
2026
2027 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2028 {
2029 unsigned char *p,*d;
2030 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2032 X509_NAME *name;
2033 BUF_MEM *buf;
2034
2035 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2036 {
2037 buf=s->init_buf;
2038
2039 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2040
2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2042 p++;
2043 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2044 d[0]=n;
2045 p+=n;
2046 n++;
2047
2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2049 {
2050 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2051 s2n(nl, p);
2052 p += nl + 2;
2053 n += nl + 2;
2054 }
2055
2056 off=n;
2057 p+=2;
2058 n+=2;
2059
2060 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2061 nl=0;
2062 if (sk != NULL)
2063 {
2064 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2065 {
2066 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2067 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2069 {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2071 goto err;
2072 }
2073 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2074 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2075 {
2076 s2n(j,p);
2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2078 n+=2+j;
2079 nl+=2+j;
2080 }
2081 else
2082 {
2083 d=p;
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2085 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2086 n+=j;
2087 nl+=j;
2088 }
2089 }
2090 }
2091 /* else no CA names */
2092 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2093 s2n(nl,p);
2094
2095 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2096 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2097 l2n3(n,d);
2098
2099 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2100 * it off */
2101
2102 s->init_num=n+4;
2103 s->init_off=0;
2104 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2105 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2106 {
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2108 goto err;
2109 }
2110 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2111
2112 /* do the header */
2113 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2114 *(p++)=0;
2115 *(p++)=0;
2116 *(p++)=0;
2117 s->init_num += 4;
2118 #endif
2119
2120 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2121 }
2122
2123 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2124 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2125 err:
2126 return(-1);
2127 }
2128
2129 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2130 {
2131 int i,al,ok;
2132 long n;
2133 unsigned long alg_k;
2134 unsigned char *p;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2136 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2137 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2138 #endif
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2140 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2141 DH *dh_srvr;
2142 #endif
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2144 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2145 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2146
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2148 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2149 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2150 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2151 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2152 #endif
2153
2154 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2155 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2156 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2157 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2158 2048, /* ??? */
2159 &ok);
2160
2161 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2162 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2163
2164 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2165
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2167 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2168 {
2169 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2170 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2171 {
2172 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2173 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2174 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2175 * be sent already */
2176 if (rsa == NULL)
2177 {
2178 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2180 goto f_err;
2181
2182 }
2183 }
2184 else
2185 {
2186 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2187 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2188 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2189 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2190 {
2191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2193 goto f_err;
2194 }
2195 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2196 }
2197
2198 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2199 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2200 {
2201 n2s(p,i);
2202 if (n != i+2)
2203 {
2204 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2205 {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2207 goto err;
2208 }
2209 else
2210 p-=2;
2211 }
2212 else
2213 n=i;
2214 }
2215
2216 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2217
2218 al = -1;
2219
2220 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2221 {
2222 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2224 }
2225
2226 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2227 {
2228 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2229 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2230 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2231 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2232 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2233 * protocol version.
2234 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2235 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2236 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2237 {
2238 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2240
2241 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2242 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2243 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2244 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2245 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2246 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2247 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2248 }
2249 }
2250
2251 if (al != -1)
2252 {
2253 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2254 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2255 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2256 ERR_clear_error();
2257 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2258 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2259 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2260 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2261 goto err;
2262 }
2263
2264 s->session->master_key_length=
2265 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2266 s->session->master_key,
2267 p,i);
2268 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2269 }
2270 else
2271 #endif
2272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2273 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2274 {
2275 n2s(p,i);
2276 if (n != i+2)
2277 {
2278 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2279 {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2281 goto err;
2282 }
2283 else
2284 {
2285 p-=2;
2286 i=(int)n;
2287 }
2288 }
2289
2290 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2291 {
2292 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2294 goto f_err;
2295 }
2296 else
2297 {
2298 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2299 {
2300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2302 goto f_err;
2303 }
2304 else
2305 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2306 }
2307
2308 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2309 if (pub == NULL)
2310 {
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2312 goto err;
2313 }
2314
2315 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2316
2317 if (i <= 0)
2318 {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2320 BN_clear_free(pub);
2321 goto err;
2322 }
2323
2324 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2325 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2326
2327 BN_clear_free(pub);
2328 pub=NULL;
2329 s->session->master_key_length=
2330 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2331 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2332 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2333 }
2334 else
2335 #endif
2336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2337 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2338 {
2339 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2340 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2341 krb5_data authenticator;
2342 krb5_data enc_pms;
2343 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2345 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2346 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2347 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2348 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2349 int padl, outl;
2350 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2351 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2352
2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2354
2355 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2356
2357 n2s(p,i);
2358 enc_ticket.length = i;
2359
2360 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2361 {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2364 goto err;
2365 }
2366
2367 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2368 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2369
2370 n2s(p,i);
2371 authenticator.length = i;
2372
2373 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2374 {
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2377 goto err;
2378 }
2379
2380 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2381 p+=authenticator.length;
2382
2383 n2s(p,i);
2384 enc_pms.length = i;
2385 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2386 p+=enc_pms.length;
2387
2388 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2389 ** after decryption
2390 */
2391 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2392 {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2394 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2395 goto err;
2396 }
2397
2398 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2399 enc_pms.length + 6))
2400 {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2403 goto err;
2404 }
2405
2406 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2407 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2408 {
2409 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2410 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2411 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2412 if (kssl_err.text)
2413 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2414 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 kssl_err.reason);
2417 goto err;
2418 }
2419
2420 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2421 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2422 */
2423 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2424 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2425 {
2426 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2427 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2428 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2429 if (kssl_err.text)
2430 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2431 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2433 kssl_err.reason);
2434 goto err;
2435 }
2436
2437 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2438 {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2440 goto err;
2441 }
2442
2443 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2444 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2445 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2446
2447 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2448 if (enc == NULL)
2449 goto err;
2450
2451 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2452
2453 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2454 {
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2456 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2457 goto err;
2458 }
2459 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2460 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2461 {
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2464 goto err;
2465 }
2466 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2467 {
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2469 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2470 goto err;
2471 }
2472 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2473 {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2476 goto err;
2477 }
2478 outl += padl;
2479 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2480 {
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2482 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2483 goto err;
2484 }
2485 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2486 {
2487 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2488 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2489 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2490 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2491 * the protocol version.
2492 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2493 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2494 */
2495 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2496 {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2499 goto err;
2500 }
2501 }
2502
2503 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2504
2505 s->session->master_key_length=
2506 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2507 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2508
2509 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2510 {
2511 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2512 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2513 {
2514 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2515 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2516 }
2517 }
2518
2519
2520 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2521 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2522 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2523 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2524 */
2525 }
2526 else
2527 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2528
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2530 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2531 {
2532 int ret = 1;
2533 int field_size = 0;
2534 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2535 const EC_GROUP *group;
2536 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2537
2538 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2539 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2540 {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2543 goto err;
2544 }
2545
2546 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2547 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2548 {
2549 /* use the certificate */
2550 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2551 }
2552 else
2553 {
2554 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2555 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2556 */
2557 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2558 }
2559
2560 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2561 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2562
2563 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2564 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2565 {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2568 goto err;
2569 }
2570
2571 /* Let's get client's public key */
2572 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2573 {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 goto err;
2577 }
2578
2579 if (n == 0L)
2580 {
2581 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2582
2583 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2584 {
2585 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2587 goto f_err;
2588 }
2589 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2590 == NULL) ||
2591 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2592 {
2593 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2594 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2595 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2596 * never executed. When that support is
2597 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2598 * received in the certificate is
2599 * authorized for key agreement.
2600 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2601 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2602 * group.
2603 */
2604 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2606 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2607 goto f_err;
2608 }
2609
2610 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2611 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2612 {
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2614 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2615 goto err;
2616 }
2617 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2618 }
2619 else
2620 {
2621 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2622 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2623 */
2624 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2625 {
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2628 goto err;
2629 }
2630
2631 /* Get encoded point length */
2632 i = *p;
2633 p += 1;
2634 if (n != 1 + i)
2635 {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2638 goto err;
2639 }
2640 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2641 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2642 {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2645 goto err;
2646 }
2647 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2648 * currently, so set it to the start
2649 */
2650 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2651 }
2652
2653 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2654 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2655 if (field_size <= 0)
2656 {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2659 goto err;
2660 }
2661 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2662 if (i <= 0)
2663 {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2665 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2666 goto err;
2667 }
2668
2669 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2670 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2671 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2672 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2673 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2674 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2675
2676 /* Compute the master secret */
2677 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2678 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2679
2680 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2681 return (ret);
2682 }
2683 else
2684 #endif
2685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2686 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2687 {
2688 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2689 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2690 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2691 int psk_err = 1;
2692 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2693
2694 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2695
2696 n2s(p,i);
2697 if (n != i+2)
2698 {
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2700 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2701 goto psk_err;
2702 }
2703 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2704 {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2706 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2707 goto psk_err;
2708 }
2709 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2710 {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2713 goto psk_err;
2714 }
2715
2716 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2717 * string for the callback */
2718 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2719 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2720 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2721 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2722 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2723
2724 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2725 {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 goto psk_err;
2729 }
2730 else if (psk_len == 0)
2731 {
2732 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2735 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2736 goto psk_err;
2737 }
2738
2739 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2740 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2741 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2742 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2743 s2n(psk_len, t);
2744 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2745 t+=psk_len;
2746 s2n(psk_len, t);
2747
2748 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2749 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2750 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2751 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2752 {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2754 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2755 goto psk_err;
2756 }
2757
2758 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2759 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2760 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2761 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2762 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2763 {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2766 goto psk_err;
2767 }
2768
2769 s->session->master_key_length=
2770 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2771 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2772 psk_err = 0;
2773 psk_err:
2774 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2775 if (psk_err != 0)
2776 goto f_err;
2777 }
2778 else
2779 #endif
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2781 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2782 {
2783 int param_len;
2784
2785 n2s(p,i);
2786 param_len=i+2;
2787 if (param_len > n)
2788 {
2789 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2791 goto f_err;
2792 }
2793 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2794 {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2796 goto err;
2797 }
2798 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2799 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2800 {
2801 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2803 goto f_err;
2804 }
2805 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2806 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2807 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2808 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2809 {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2812 goto err;
2813 }
2814
2815 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2816 {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 goto err;
2819 }
2820
2821 p+=i;
2822 }
2823 else
2824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2825 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2826 {
2827 int ret = 0;
2828 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2829 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2830 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2831 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2832 unsigned long alg_a;
2833 int Ttag, Tclass;
2834 long Tlen;
2835
2836 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2837 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2838 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2839 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2840 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2841 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2842
2843 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2844 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2845 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2846 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2847 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2848 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2849 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2850 if (client_pub_pkey)
2851 {
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2853 ERR_clear_error();
2854 }
2855 /* Decrypt session key */
2856 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2857 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2858 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2859 {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2861 goto gerr;
2862 }
2863 start = p;
2864 inlen = Tlen;
2865 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2866
2867 {
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2869 goto gerr;
2870 }
2871 /* Generate master secret */
2872 s->session->master_key_length=
2873 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2874 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2875 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2876 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2877 ret = 2;
2878 else
2879 ret = 1;
2880 gerr:
2881 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2882 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2883 if (ret)
2884 return ret;
2885 else
2886 goto err;
2887 }
2888 else
2889 {
2890 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2892 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2893 goto f_err;
2894 }
2895
2896 return(1);
2897 f_err:
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2899 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2900 err:
2901 #endif
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2903 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2904 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2905 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2906 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2907 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2908 #endif
2909 return(-1);
2910 }
2911
2912 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2913 {
2914 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2915 unsigned char *p;
2916 int al,ok,ret=0;
2917 long n;
2918 int type=0,i,j;
2919 X509 *peer;
2920 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2921 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2922 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2923
2924 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2925 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2926 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2927 -1,
2928 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
2929 &ok);
2930
2931 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2932
2933 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2934 {
2935 peer=s->session->peer;
2936 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2937 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2938 }
2939 else
2940 {
2941 peer=NULL;
2942 pkey=NULL;
2943 }
2944
2945 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2946 {
2947 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2948 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2949 {
2950 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2952 goto f_err;
2953 }
2954 ret=1;
2955 goto end;
2956 }
2957
2958 if (peer == NULL)
2959 {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2961 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2962 goto f_err;
2963 }
2964
2965 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2966 {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2968 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2969 goto f_err;
2970 }
2971
2972 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2973 {
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2975 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2976 goto f_err;
2977 }
2978
2979 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2980 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2981 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2982 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2983 * signature without length field */
2984 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2985 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2986 {
2987 i=64;
2988 }
2989 else
2990 {
2991 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2992 {
2993 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2994 /* Should never happen */
2995 if (sigalg == -1)
2996 {
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2998 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2999 goto f_err;
3000 }
3001 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3002 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3003 {
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3005 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3006 goto f_err;
3007 }
3008 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3009 if (md == NULL)
3010 {
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3012 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3013 goto f_err;
3014 }
3015 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3016 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3017 #endif
3018 p += 2;
3019 n -= 2;
3020 }
3021 n2s(p,i);
3022 n-=2;
3023 if (i > n)
3024 {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3026 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3027 goto f_err;
3028 }
3029 }
3030 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3031 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3032 {
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3034 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 goto f_err;
3036 }
3037
3038 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3039 {
3040 long hdatalen = 0;
3041 void *hdata;
3042 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3043 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3044 {
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3046 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 goto f_err;
3048 }
3049 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3050 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3051 EVP_MD_name(md));
3052 #endif
3053 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3054 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3055 {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3057 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3058 goto f_err;
3059 }
3060
3061 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3062 {
3063 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3065 goto f_err;
3066 }
3067 }
3068 else
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3070 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3071 {
3072 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3073 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3074 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3075 if (i < 0)
3076 {
3077 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3079 goto f_err;
3080 }
3081 if (i == 0)
3082 {
3083 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3085 goto f_err;
3086 }
3087 }
3088 else
3089 #endif
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3092 {
3093 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3094 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3095 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3096 if (j <= 0)
3097 {
3098 /* bad signature */
3099 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3101 goto f_err;
3102 }
3103 }
3104 else
3105 #endif
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3107 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3108 {
3109 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3110 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3111 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3112 if (j <= 0)
3113 {
3114 /* bad signature */
3115 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3117 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3118 goto f_err;
3119 }
3120 }
3121 else
3122 #endif
3123 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3124 { unsigned char signature[64];
3125 int idx;
3126 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3127 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3128 if (i!=64) {
3129 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3130 }
3131 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3132 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3133 }
3134 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3136 if (j<=0)
3137 {
3138 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3140 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3141 goto f_err;
3142 }
3143 }
3144 else
3145 {
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3147 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3148 goto f_err;
3149 }
3150
3151
3152 ret=1;
3153 if (0)
3154 {
3155 f_err:
3156 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3157 }
3158 end:
3159 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3160 {
3161 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3162 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3163 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3164 }
3165 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3166 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3167 return(ret);
3168 }
3169
3170 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3171 {
3172 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3173 X509 *x=NULL;
3174 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3175 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3176 unsigned char *d;
3177 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3178
3179 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3180 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3181 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3182 -1,
3183 s->max_cert_list,
3184 &ok);
3185
3186 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3187
3188 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3189 {
3190 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3191 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3192 {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3194 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3195 goto f_err;
3196 }
3197 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3198 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3199 {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3201 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3202 goto f_err;
3203 }
3204 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3205 return(1);
3206 }
3207
3208 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3209 {
3210 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3212 goto f_err;
3213 }
3214 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3215
3216 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3217 {
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3219 goto err;
3220 }
3221
3222 n2l3(p,llen);
3223 if (llen+3 != n)
3224 {
3225 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3227 goto f_err;
3228 }
3229 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3230 {
3231 n2l3(p,l);
3232 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3233 {
3234 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3236 goto f_err;
3237 }
3238
3239 q=p;
3240 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3241 if (x == NULL)
3242 {
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3244 goto err;
3245 }
3246 if (p != (q+l))
3247 {
3248 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3250 goto f_err;
3251 }
3252 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3253 {
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3255 goto err;
3256 }
3257 x=NULL;
3258 nc+=l+3;
3259 }
3260
3261 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3262 {
3263 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3264 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3265 {
3266 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3268 goto f_err;
3269 }
3270 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3271 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3272 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3273 {
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3276 goto f_err;
3277 }
3278 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3279 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3280 {
3281 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3282 goto f_err;
3283 }
3284 }
3285 else
3286 {
3287 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3288 if (i <= 0)
3289 {
3290 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3292 goto f_err;
3293 }
3294 }
3295
3296 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3297 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3298 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3299 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3300
3301 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3302 * when we arrive here. */
3303 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3304 {
3305 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3306 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3307 {
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3309 goto err;
3310 }
3311 }
3312 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3313 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3314 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3315 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3316 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3317
3318 sk=NULL;
3319
3320 ret=1;
3321 if (0)
3322 {
3323 f_err:
3324 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3325 }
3326 err:
3327 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3328 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3329 return(ret);
3330 }
3331
3332 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3333 {
3334 unsigned long l;
3335 X509 *x;
3336
3337 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3338 {
3339 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3340 if (x == NULL)
3341 {
3342 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3343 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3344 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3345 {
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 return(0);
3348 }
3349 }
3350
3351 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3352 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3353 s->init_num=(int)l;
3354 s->init_off=0;
3355 }
3356
3357 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3358 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3359 }
3360
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3362 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3363 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3364 {
3365 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3366 {
3367 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3368 const unsigned char *const_p;
3369 int len, slen_full, slen;
3370 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3371 unsigned int hlen;
3372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3373 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3374 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3375 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3376 unsigned char key_name[16];
3377
3378 /* get session encoding length */
3379 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3380 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3381 * too long
3382 */
3383 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3384 return -1;
3385 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3386 if (!senc)
3387 return -1;
3388 p = senc;
3389 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3390
3391 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3392 const_p = senc;
3393 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3394 if (sess == NULL)
3395 {
3396 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3397 return -1;
3398 }
3399 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3400
3401 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3402 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3403 {
3404 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3405 return -1;
3406 }
3407 p = senc;
3408 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3409 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3410
3411 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3412 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3413 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3414 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3415 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3416 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3417 */
3418 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3419 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3420 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3421 return -1;
3422
3423 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3424 /* do the header */
3425 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3426 /* Skip message length for now */
3427 p += 3;
3428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3429 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3430 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3431 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3432 * from parent ctx.
3433 */
3434 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3435 {
3436 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3437 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3438 {
3439 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3440 return -1;
3441 }
3442 }
3443 else
3444 {
3445 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3446 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3447 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3448 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3449 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3450 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3451 }
3452
3453 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3454 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3455 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3456 * as their sessions. */
3457 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3458
3459 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3460 p += 2;
3461 /* Output key name */
3462 macstart = p;
3463 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3464 p += 16;
3465 /* output IV */
3466 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3467 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3468 /* Encrypt session data */
3469 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3470 p += len;
3471 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3472 p += len;
3473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3474
3475 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3476 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3477 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3478
3479 p += hlen;
3480 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3481 /* Total length */
3482 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3483 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3484 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3485 p += 4;
3486 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3487
3488 /* number of bytes to write */
3489 s->init_num= len;
3490 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3491 s->init_off=0;
3492 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3493 }
3494
3495 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3496 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3497 }
3498
3499 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3500 {
3501 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3502 {
3503 unsigned char *p;
3504 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3505 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3506 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3507 * + (ocsp response)
3508 */
3509 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3510 return -1;
3511
3512 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3513
3514 /* do the header */
3515 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3516 /* message length */
3517 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3518 /* status type */
3519 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3520 /* length of OCSP response */
3521 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3522 /* actual response */
3523 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3524 /* number of bytes to write */
3525 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3527 s->init_off = 0;
3528 }
3529
3530 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3531 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3532 }
3533
3534 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3535 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3536 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3537 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3538 {
3539 int ok;
3540 int proto_len, padding_len;
3541 long n;
3542 const unsigned char *p;
3543
3544 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3545 * extension in their ClientHello */
3546 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3547 {
3548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3549 return -1;
3550 }
3551
3552 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3553 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3554 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3555 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3556 514, /* See the payload format below */
3557 &ok);
3558
3559 if (!ok)
3560 return((int)n);
3561
3562 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3563 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3564 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3565 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3566 {
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3568 return -1;
3569 }
3570
3571 if (n < 2)
3572 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3573
3574 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3575
3576 /* The payload looks like:
3577 * uint8 proto_len;
3578 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3579 * uint8 padding_len;
3580 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3581 */
3582 proto_len = p[0];
3583 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3584 return 0;
3585 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3586 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3587 return 0;
3588
3589 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3590 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3591 {
3592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3593 return 0;
3594 }
3595 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3596 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3597
3598 return 1;
3599 }
3600 # endif
3601 #endif