1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142 {
143 return ok;
144 }
145
146 #if 0
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148 {
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150 }
151 #endif
152
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154 {
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156 int bad_chain = 0;
157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
158 int depth,i,ok=0;
159 int num;
160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
162 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
163 {
164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
165 return -1;
166 }
167
168 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
169
170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
171 * present and that the first entry is in place */
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
173 {
174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
176 {
177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
178 goto end;
179 }
180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
181 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
182 }
183
184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
187 {
188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
189 goto end;
190 }
191
192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
194 depth=param->depth;
195
196
197 for (;;)
198 {
199 /* If we have enough, we break */
200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
203 * code later.
204 */
205
206 /* If we are self signed, we break */
207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
208
209 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
210 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
211 {
212 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
213 if (xtmp != NULL)
214 {
215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
216 {
217 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 goto end;
219 }
220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
221 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
222 ctx->last_untrusted++;
223 x=xtmp;
224 num++;
225 /* reparse the full chain for
226 * the next one */
227 continue;
228 }
229 }
230 break;
231 }
232
233 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
234 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
235 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
236
237 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
238 * is self signed.
239 */
240
241 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
242 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
243 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
244 {
245 /* we have a self signed certificate */
246 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
247 {
248 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
249 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
250 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
251 */
252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
253 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
254 {
255 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
256 ctx->current_cert=x;
257 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
258 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
259 bad_chain = 1;
260 ok=cb(0,ctx);
261 if (!ok) goto end;
262 }
263 else
264 {
265 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
266 * so we get any trust settings.
267 */
268 X509_free(x);
269 x = xtmp;
270 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
271 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
272 }
273 }
274 else
275 {
276 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
277 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
278 ctx->last_untrusted--;
279 num--;
280 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
281 }
282 }
283
284 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
285 for (;;)
286 {
287 /* If we have enough, we break */
288 if (depth < num) break;
289
290 /* If we are self signed, we break */
291 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
292
293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
294
295 if (ok < 0) return ok;
296 if (ok == 0) break;
297
298 x = xtmp;
299 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
300 {
301 X509_free(xtmp);
302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 return 0;
304 }
305 num++;
306 }
307
308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
309
310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
312 {
313 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
314 {
315 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
316 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
317 else
318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
319 ctx->current_cert=x;
320 }
321 else
322 {
323
324 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
325 num++;
326 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
327 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
328 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
329 chain_ss=NULL;
330 }
331
332 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
333 bad_chain = 1;
334 ok=cb(0,ctx);
335 if (!ok) goto end;
336 }
337
338 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
339 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
340
341 if (!ok) goto end;
342
343 /* Check name constraints */
344
345 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
346
347 if (!ok) goto end;
348
349 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
350
351 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
352
353 if (!ok) goto end;
354
355 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
356 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
357
358 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
359 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
360 */
361
362 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
363 if(!ok) goto end;
364
365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
366 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
367 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
368 else
369 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
370 if(!ok) goto end;
371
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
373 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
374 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
375 if (!ok) goto end;
376 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
377 if (!ok) goto end;
378 #endif
379
380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
383 if(!ok) goto end;
384 if (0)
385 {
386 end:
387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
388 }
389 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
390 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
391 return ok;
392 }
393
394
395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
396 */
397
398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
399 {
400 int i;
401 X509 *issuer;
402 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
403 {
404 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
405 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
406 return issuer;
407 }
408 return NULL;
409 }
410
411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
412
413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
414 {
415 int ret;
416 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
417 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
418 return 1;
419 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
421 return 0;
422
423 ctx->error = ret;
424 ctx->current_cert = x;
425 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
426 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
427 return 0;
428 }
429
430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
431
432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
433 {
434 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
435 if (*issuer)
436 {
437 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
438 return 1;
439 }
440 else
441 return 0;
442 }
443
444
445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
446 * with the supplied purpose
447 */
448
449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
450 {
451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
452 return 1;
453 #else
454 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
455 X509 *x;
456 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
457 int proxy_path_length = 0;
458 int purpose;
459 int allow_proxy_certs;
460 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
461
462 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
463 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
464 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
465 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
466 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
467 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
468 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
469 */
470 must_be_ca = -1;
471
472 /* CRL path validation */
473 if (ctx->parent)
474 {
475 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
476 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
477 }
478 else
479 {
480 allow_proxy_certs =
481 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
482 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
483 software happy */
484 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
485 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
486 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
487 }
488
489 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
490 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
491 {
492 int ret;
493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
494 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
495 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
496 {
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
498 ctx->error_depth = i;
499 ctx->current_cert = x;
500 ok=cb(0,ctx);
501 if (!ok) goto end;
502 }
503 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
504 {
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
506 ctx->error_depth = i;
507 ctx->current_cert = x;
508 ok=cb(0,ctx);
509 if (!ok) goto end;
510 }
511 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
512 switch(must_be_ca)
513 {
514 case -1:
515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
517 {
518 ret = 0;
519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
520 }
521 else
522 ret = 1;
523 break;
524 case 0:
525 if (ret != 0)
526 {
527 ret = 0;
528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
529 }
530 else
531 ret = 1;
532 break;
533 default:
534 if ((ret == 0)
535 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
536 && (ret != 1)))
537 {
538 ret = 0;
539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
540 }
541 else
542 ret = 1;
543 break;
544 }
545 if (ret == 0)
546 {
547 ctx->error_depth = i;
548 ctx->current_cert = x;
549 ok=cb(0,ctx);
550 if (!ok) goto end;
551 }
552 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
553 {
554 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
555 if ((ret == 0)
556 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
557 && (ret != 1)))
558 {
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
560 ctx->error_depth = i;
561 ctx->current_cert = x;
562 ok=cb(0,ctx);
563 if (!ok) goto end;
564 }
565 }
566 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
567 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
568 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
569 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
570 {
571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
572 ctx->error_depth = i;
573 ctx->current_cert = x;
574 ok=cb(0,ctx);
575 if (!ok) goto end;
576 }
577 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
578 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
579 plen++;
580 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
581 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
582 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
583 CA certificate. */
584 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
585 {
586 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
587 {
588 ctx->error =
589 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
590 ctx->error_depth = i;
591 ctx->current_cert = x;
592 ok=cb(0,ctx);
593 if (!ok) goto end;
594 }
595 proxy_path_length++;
596 must_be_ca = 0;
597 }
598 else
599 must_be_ca = 1;
600 }
601 ok = 1;
602 end:
603 return ok;
604 #endif
605 }
606
607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
608 {
609 X509 *x;
610 int i, j, rv;
611 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
612 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
613 {
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
616 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
617 continue;
618 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
619 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
620 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
621 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
622 */
623 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
624 {
625 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
626 if (nc)
627 {
628 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
629 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
630 {
631 ctx->error = rv;
632 ctx->error_depth = i;
633 ctx->current_cert = x;
634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
635 return 0;
636 }
637 }
638 }
639 }
640 return 1;
641 }
642
643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
644 {
645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
646 return 1;
647 #else
648 int i, ok;
649 X509 *x;
650 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
651 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
653 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
654 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
655 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
656 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
657 return 1;
658 ctx->error_depth = i;
659 ctx->current_cert = x;
660 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
662 else
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
664 ok = cb(0, ctx);
665 return ok;
666 #endif
667 }
668
669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
670 {
671 int i, last, ok;
672 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
673 return 1;
674 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
675 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
676 else
677 {
678 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
679 if (ctx->parent)
680 return 1;
681 last = 0;
682 }
683 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
684 {
685 ctx->error_depth = i;
686 ok = check_cert(ctx);
687 if (!ok) return ok;
688 }
689 return 1;
690 }
691
692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
693 {
694 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
695 X509 *x;
696 int ok, cnum;
697 unsigned int last_reasons;
698 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
699 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
700 ctx->current_cert = x;
701 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
702 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
703 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
704 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
705 {
706 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
707 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
708 if (ctx->get_crl)
709 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
710 else
711 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
712 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
713 * notify callback
714 */
715 if(!ok)
716 {
717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
718 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
719 goto err;
720 }
721 ctx->current_crl = crl;
722 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
723 if (!ok)
724 goto err;
725
726 if (dcrl)
727 {
728 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
729 if (!ok)
730 goto err;
731 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
732 if (!ok)
733 goto err;
734 }
735 else
736 ok = 1;
737
738 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
739 if (ok != 2)
740 {
741 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
742 if (!ok)
743 goto err;
744 }
745
746 X509_CRL_free(crl);
747 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
748 crl = NULL;
749 dcrl = NULL;
750 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
751 * another iteration, so exit loop.
752 */
753 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
754 {
755 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
756 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
757 goto err;
758 }
759 }
760 err:
761 X509_CRL_free(crl);
762 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
763
764 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
765 return ok;
766
767 }
768
769 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
770
771 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
772 {
773 time_t *ptime;
774 int i;
775 if (notify)
776 ctx->current_crl = crl;
777 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
778 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
779 else
780 ptime = NULL;
781
782 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
783 if (i == 0)
784 {
785 if (!notify)
786 return 0;
787 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
788 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
789 return 0;
790 }
791
792 if (i > 0)
793 {
794 if (!notify)
795 return 0;
796 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
797 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
798 return 0;
799 }
800
801 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
802 {
803 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
804
805 if (i == 0)
806 {
807 if (!notify)
808 return 0;
809 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
810 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
811 return 0;
812 }
813 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
814 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
815 {
816 if (!notify)
817 return 0;
818 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
819 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
820 return 0;
821 }
822 }
823
824 if (notify)
825 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
826
827 return 1;
828 }
829
830 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
831 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
832 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
833 {
834 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
835 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
836 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
837 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
838 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
839
840 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
841 {
842 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
843 reasons = *preasons;
844 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
845
846 if (crl_score > best_score)
847 {
848 best_crl = crl;
849 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
850 best_score = crl_score;
851 best_reasons = reasons;
852 }
853 }
854
855 if (best_crl)
856 {
857 if (*pcrl)
858 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
859 *pcrl = best_crl;
860 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
861 *pscore = best_score;
862 *preasons = best_reasons;
863 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
864 if (*pdcrl)
865 {
866 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
867 *pdcrl = NULL;
868 }
869 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
870 }
871
872 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
873 return 1;
874
875 return 0;
876 }
877
878 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
879 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
880 */
881
882 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
883 {
884 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
885 int i;
886 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
887 if (i >= 0)
888 {
889 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
890 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
891 return 0;
892 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
893 }
894 else
895 exta = NULL;
896
897 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
898
899 if (i >= 0)
900 {
901
902 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
903 return 0;
904 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
905 }
906 else
907 extb = NULL;
908
909 if (!exta && !extb)
910 return 1;
911
912 if (!exta || !extb)
913 return 0;
914
915
916 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
917 return 0;
918
919 return 1;
920 }
921
922 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
923
924 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
925 {
926 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
927 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
928 return 0;
929 /* Base must have a CRL number */
930 if (!base->crl_number)
931 return 0;
932 /* Issuer names must match */
933 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
934 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
935 return 0;
936 /* AKID and IDP must match */
937 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
938 return 0;
939 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
940 return 0;
941 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
942 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
943 return 0;
944 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
945 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
946 return 1;
947 return 0;
948 }
949
950 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
951 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
952 */
953
954 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
955 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
956 {
957 X509_CRL *delta;
958 int i;
959 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
960 return;
961 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
962 return;
963 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
964 {
965 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
966 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
967 {
968 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
969 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
970 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
971 *dcrl = delta;
972 return;
973 }
974 }
975 *dcrl = NULL;
976 }
977
978 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
979 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
980 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
981 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
982 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
983 */
984
985 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
986 unsigned int *preasons,
987 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
988 {
989
990 int crl_score = 0;
991 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
992
993 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
994
995 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
996 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
997 return 0;
998 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
999 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1000 {
1001 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1002 return 0;
1003 }
1004 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1005 {
1006 /* If no new reasons reject */
1007 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1011 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1012 return 0;
1013 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1014 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1015 {
1016 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019 else
1020 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1021
1022 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1023 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1024
1025 /* Check expiry */
1026 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1027 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1028
1029 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1030 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1031
1032 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1033
1034 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1035 return 0;
1036
1037 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1038
1039 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1040 {
1041 /* If no new reasons reject */
1042 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1043 return 0;
1044 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1045 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1046 }
1047
1048 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1049
1050 return crl_score;
1051
1052 }
1053
1054 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1055 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1056 {
1057 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1058 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1059 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1060 int i;
1061
1062 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1063 cidx++;
1064
1065 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1066
1067 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1068 {
1069 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1070 {
1071 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1072 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1073 return;
1074 }
1075 }
1076
1077 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1078 {
1079 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1080 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1081 continue;
1082 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1083 {
1084 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1085 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1086 return;
1087 }
1088 }
1089
1090 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1091
1092 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1093 return;
1094
1095 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1096 * set of untrusted certificates.
1097 */
1098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1099 {
1100 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1101 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1102 continue;
1103 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1104 {
1105 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1106 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1107 return;
1108 }
1109 }
1110 }
1111
1112 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1113 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1114 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1115 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1116 * practice.
1117 */
1118
1119 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1120 {
1121 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1122 int ret;
1123 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1124 if (ctx->parent)
1125 return 0;
1126 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1127 return -1;
1128
1129 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1130 /* Copy verify params across */
1131 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1132
1133 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1134 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1135
1136 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1137 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1138
1139 if (ret <= 0)
1140 goto err;
1141
1142 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1143
1144 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1145 err:
1146 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1147 return ret;
1148 }
1149
1150 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1151 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1152 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1153 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1154 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1155 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1156 */
1157
1158 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1159 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1160 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1161 {
1162 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1163 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1164 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1165 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1166 return 1;
1167 return 0;
1168 }
1169
1170 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1171 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1172 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1173 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1174 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1175 */
1176
1177
1178 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1179 {
1180 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1181 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1182 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1183 int i, j;
1184 if (!a || !b)
1185 return 1;
1186 if (a->type == 1)
1187 {
1188 if (!a->dpname)
1189 return 0;
1190 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1191 if (b->type == 1)
1192 {
1193 if (!b->dpname)
1194 return 0;
1195 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1196 return 1;
1197 else
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1201 nm = a->dpname;
1202 gens = b->name.fullname;
1203 }
1204 else if (b->type == 1)
1205 {
1206 if (!b->dpname)
1207 return 0;
1208 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1209 gens = a->name.fullname;
1210 nm = b->dpname;
1211 }
1212
1213 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1214 if (nm)
1215 {
1216 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1217 {
1218 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1219 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1220 continue;
1221 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1222 return 1;
1223 }
1224 return 0;
1225 }
1226
1227 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1228
1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1230 {
1231 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1232 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1233 {
1234 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1235 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1236 return 1;
1237 }
1238 }
1239
1240 return 0;
1241
1242 }
1243
1244 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1245 {
1246 int i;
1247 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1248 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1249 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1250 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1251 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1252 {
1253 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1254 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1255 continue;
1256 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1257 return 1;
1258 }
1259 return 0;
1260 }
1261
1262 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1263
1264 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1265 unsigned int *preasons)
1266 {
1267 int i;
1268 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1269 return 0;
1270 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1271 {
1272 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1273 return 0;
1274 }
1275 else
1276 {
1277 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1278 return 0;
1279 }
1280 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1281 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1282 {
1283 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1284 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1285 {
1286 if (!crl->idp ||
1287 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1288 {
1289 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1290 return 1;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 }
1294 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1295 return 1;
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298
1299 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1300 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1301 */
1302
1303 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1304 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1305 {
1306 int ok;
1307 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1308 int crl_score = 0;
1309 unsigned int reasons;
1310 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1311 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1312 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1313 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1314 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1315 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1316
1317 if (ok)
1318 goto done;
1319
1320 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1321
1322 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1323
1324 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1325 if (!skcrl && crl)
1326 goto done;
1327
1328 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1329
1330 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1331
1332 done:
1333
1334 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1335 if (crl)
1336 {
1337 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1338 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1339 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1340 *pcrl = crl;
1341 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1342 return 1;
1343 }
1344
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347
1348 /* Check CRL validity */
1349 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1350 {
1351 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1352 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1353 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1354 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1355 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1356 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1357 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1358 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1359
1360 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1361 * is next certificate in chain.
1362 */
1363 else if (cnum < chnum)
1364 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1365 else
1366 {
1367 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1368 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1369 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1370 {
1371 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1372 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1373 if(!ok) goto err;
1374 }
1375 }
1376
1377 if(issuer)
1378 {
1379 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1380 * been done
1381 */
1382 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1383 {
1384 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1385 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1386 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1387 {
1388 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1389 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1390 if(!ok) goto err;
1391 }
1392
1393 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1394 {
1395 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1396 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1397 if(!ok) goto err;
1398 }
1399
1400 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1401 {
1402 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1403 {
1404 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1405 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1406 if(!ok) goto err;
1407 }
1408 }
1409
1410 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1411 {
1412 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1413 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1414 if(!ok) goto err;
1415 }
1416
1417
1418 }
1419
1420 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1421 {
1422 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1423 if (!ok)
1424 goto err;
1425 }
1426
1427 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1428 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1429
1430 if(!ikey)
1431 {
1432 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1433 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1434 if (!ok) goto err;
1435 }
1436 else
1437 {
1438 /* Verify CRL signature */
1439 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1440 {
1441 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1442 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1443 if (!ok) goto err;
1444 }
1445 }
1446 }
1447
1448 ok = 1;
1449
1450 err:
1451 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1452 return ok;
1453 }
1454
1455 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1456 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1457 {
1458 int ok;
1459 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1460 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1461 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1462 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1463 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1464 */
1465 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1466 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1467 {
1468 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1469 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1470 if(!ok)
1471 return 0;
1472 }
1473 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1474 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1475 */
1476 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1477 {
1478 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1479 return 2;
1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1481 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1482 if (!ok)
1483 return 0;
1484 }
1485
1486 return 1;
1487 }
1488
1489 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1490 {
1491 int ret;
1492 if (ctx->parent)
1493 return 1;
1494 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1495 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1496 if (ret == 0)
1497 {
1498 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1499 return 0;
1500 }
1501 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1502 if (ret == -1)
1503 {
1504 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1505 * callback.
1506 */
1507 X509 *x;
1508 int i;
1509 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1510 {
1511 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1512 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1513 continue;
1514 ctx->current_cert = x;
1515 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1516 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1517 return 0;
1518 }
1519 return 1;
1520 }
1521 if (ret == -2)
1522 {
1523 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1525 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1526 }
1527
1528 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1529 {
1530 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1531 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1532 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1533 return 0;
1534 }
1535
1536 return 1;
1537 }
1538
1539 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1540 {
1541 time_t *ptime;
1542 int i;
1543
1544 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1545 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1546 else
1547 ptime = NULL;
1548
1549 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1550 if (i == 0)
1551 {
1552 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1553 ctx->current_cert=x;
1554 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1555 return 0;
1556 }
1557
1558 if (i > 0)
1559 {
1560 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1561 ctx->current_cert=x;
1562 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1563 return 0;
1564 }
1565
1566 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1567 if (i == 0)
1568 {
1569 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1570 ctx->current_cert=x;
1571 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1572 return 0;
1573 }
1574
1575 if (i < 0)
1576 {
1577 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1578 ctx->current_cert=x;
1579 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1580 return 0;
1581 }
1582
1583 return 1;
1584 }
1585
1586 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1587 {
1588 int ok=0,n;
1589 X509 *xs,*xi;
1590 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1591 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1592
1593 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1594
1595 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1596 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1597 n--;
1598 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1599
1600 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1601 xs=xi;
1602 else
1603 {
1604 if (n <= 0)
1605 {
1606 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1607 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1608 ok=cb(0,ctx);
1609 goto end;
1610 }
1611 else
1612 {
1613 n--;
1614 ctx->error_depth=n;
1615 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1616 }
1617 }
1618
1619 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1620 while (n >= 0)
1621 {
1622 ctx->error_depth=n;
1623
1624 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1625 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1626 * just wastes time.
1627 */
1628 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1629 {
1630 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1631 {
1632 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1633 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1634 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1635 if (!ok) goto end;
1636 }
1637 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1638 {
1639 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1640 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1641 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1642 if (!ok)
1643 {
1644 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1645 goto end;
1646 }
1647 }
1648 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1649 pkey=NULL;
1650 }
1651
1652 xs->valid = 1;
1653
1654 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1655 if (!ok)
1656 goto end;
1657
1658 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1659 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1660 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1661 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1662 if (!ok) goto end;
1663
1664 n--;
1665 if (n >= 0)
1666 {
1667 xi=xs;
1668 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1669 }
1670 }
1671 ok=1;
1672 end:
1673 return ok;
1674 }
1675
1676 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1677 {
1678 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1679 }
1680
1681 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1682 {
1683 char *str;
1684 ASN1_TIME atm;
1685 long offset;
1686 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1687 int i,j;
1688
1689 p=buff1;
1690 i=ctm->length;
1691 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1692 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1693 {
1694 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1695 memcpy(p,str,10);
1696 p+=10;
1697 str+=10;
1698 }
1699 else
1700 {
1701 if (i < 13) return 0;
1702 memcpy(p,str,12);
1703 p+=12;
1704 str+=12;
1705 }
1706
1707 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1708 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1709 else
1710 {
1711 *(p++)= *(str++);
1712 *(p++)= *(str++);
1713 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1714 if (*str == '.')
1715 {
1716 str++;
1717 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1718 }
1719
1720 }
1721 *(p++)='Z';
1722 *(p++)='\0';
1723
1724 if (*str == 'Z')
1725 offset=0;
1726 else
1727 {
1728 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1729 return 0;
1730 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1731 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1732 if (*str == '-')
1733 offset= -offset;
1734 }
1735 atm.type=ctm->type;
1736 atm.flags = 0;
1737 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1738 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1739
1740 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1741 return 0;
1742
1743 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1744 {
1745 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1746 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1747 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1748 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1749
1750 if (i < j) return -1;
1751 if (i > j) return 1;
1752 }
1753 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1754 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1755 return -1;
1756 else
1757 return i;
1758 }
1759
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1761 {
1762 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1763 }
1764
1765 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1766 {
1767 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1768 }
1769
1770 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1771 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1772 {
1773 time_t t;
1774
1775 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1776 else time(&t);
1777
1778 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1779 {
1780 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1781 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1782 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1783 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1784 offset_sec);
1785 }
1786 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1787 }
1788
1789 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1790 {
1791 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1792 int i,j;
1793
1794 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1795
1796 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1797 {
1798 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1799 if (ktmp == NULL)
1800 {
1801 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1802 return 0;
1803 }
1804 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1805 break;
1806 else
1807 {
1808 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1809 ktmp=NULL;
1810 }
1811 }
1812 if (ktmp == NULL)
1813 {
1814 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1815 return 0;
1816 }
1817
1818 /* first, populate the other certs */
1819 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1820 {
1821 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1822 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1823 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1824 }
1825
1826 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1827 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1828 return 1;
1829 }
1830
1831 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1832 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1833 {
1834 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1835 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1836 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1837 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1838 }
1839
1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1841 {
1842 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1843 }
1844
1845 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1846 {
1847 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1848 }
1849
1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1851 {
1852 return ctx->error;
1853 }
1854
1855 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1856 {
1857 ctx->error=err;
1858 }
1859
1860 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861 {
1862 return ctx->error_depth;
1863 }
1864
1865 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866 {
1867 return ctx->current_cert;
1868 }
1869
1870 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1871 {
1872 return ctx->chain;
1873 }
1874
1875 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1876 {
1877 int i;
1878 X509 *x;
1879 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1880 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1881 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1882 {
1883 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1884 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1885 }
1886 return chain;
1887 }
1888
1889 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890 {
1891 return ctx->current_issuer;
1892 }
1893
1894 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1895 {
1896 return ctx->current_crl;
1897 }
1898
1899 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1900 {
1901 return ctx->parent;
1902 }
1903
1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1905 {
1906 ctx->cert=x;
1907 }
1908
1909 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1910 {
1911 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1912 }
1913
1914 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1915 {
1916 ctx->crls=sk;
1917 }
1918
1919 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1920 {
1921 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1922 }
1923
1924 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1925 {
1926 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1927 }
1928
1929 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1930 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1931 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1932 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1933 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1934 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1935 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1936 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1937 */
1938
1939 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1940 int purpose, int trust)
1941 {
1942 int idx;
1943 /* If purpose not set use default */
1944 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1945 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1946 if (purpose)
1947 {
1948 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1949 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1950 if (idx == -1)
1951 {
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1953 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1954 return 0;
1955 }
1956 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1957 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1958 {
1959 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1960 if (idx == -1)
1961 {
1962 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1963 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1964 return 0;
1965 }
1966 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1967 }
1968 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1969 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1970 }
1971 if (trust)
1972 {
1973 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1974 if (idx == -1)
1975 {
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1977 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1978 return 0;
1979 }
1980 }
1981
1982 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1983 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1984 return 1;
1985 }
1986
1987 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1988 {
1989 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1990 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1991 if (!ctx)
1992 {
1993 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1994 return NULL;
1995 }
1996 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1997 return ctx;
1998 }
1999
2000 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2001 {
2002 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2003 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2004 }
2005
2006 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2007 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2008 {
2009 int ret = 1;
2010 ctx->ctx=store;
2011 ctx->current_method=0;
2012 ctx->cert=x509;
2013 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2014 ctx->crls = NULL;
2015 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2016 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2017 ctx->valid=0;
2018 ctx->chain=NULL;
2019 ctx->error=0;
2020 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2021 ctx->error_depth=0;
2022 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2023 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2024 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2025 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2026 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2027 ctx->tree = NULL;
2028 ctx->parent = NULL;
2029
2030 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2031
2032 if (!ctx->param)
2033 {
2034 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2035 return 0;
2036 }
2037
2038 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2039 * use defaults.
2040 */
2041
2042
2043 if (store)
2044 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2045 else
2046 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2047
2048 if (store)
2049 {
2050 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2051 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2052 }
2053 else
2054 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2055
2056 if (ret)
2057 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2058 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2059
2060 if (ret == 0)
2061 {
2062 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2063 return 0;
2064 }
2065
2066 if (store && store->check_issued)
2067 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2068 else
2069 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2070
2071 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2072 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2073 else
2074 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2075
2076 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2077 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2078 else
2079 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2080
2081 if (store && store->verify)
2082 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2083 else
2084 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2085
2086 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2087 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2088 else
2089 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2090
2091 if (store && store->get_crl)
2092 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2093 else
2094 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2095
2096 if (store && store->check_crl)
2097 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2098 else
2099 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2100
2101 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2102 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2103 else
2104 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2105
2106 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2107 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2108 else
2109 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2110
2111 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2112 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2113 else
2114 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2115
2116 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2117
2118
2119 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2120 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2121 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2122 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2123 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2124 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2125 {
2126 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2127 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2128 return 0;
2129 }
2130 return 1;
2131 }
2132
2133 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2134 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2135 */
2136
2137 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2138 {
2139 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2140 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2141 }
2142
2143 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144 {
2145 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2146 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2147 {
2148 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2149 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2150 ctx->param=NULL;
2151 }
2152 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2153 {
2154 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2155 ctx->tree=NULL;
2156 }
2157 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2158 {
2159 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2160 ctx->chain=NULL;
2161 }
2162 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2163 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2164 }
2165
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2167 {
2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2169 }
2170
2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2172 {
2173 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2174 }
2175
2176 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2177 {
2178 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2179 }
2180
2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2182 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2183 {
2184 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2185 }
2186
2187 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2188 {
2189 return ctx->tree;
2190 }
2191
2192 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2193 {
2194 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2195 }
2196
2197 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2198 {
2199 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2200 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2201 if (!param)
2202 return 0;
2203 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2204 }
2205
2206 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2207 {
2208 return ctx->param;
2209 }
2210
2211 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2212 {
2213 if (ctx->param)
2214 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2215 ctx->param = param;
2216 }
2217
2218 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2219 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2220
2221 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2222
2223 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2224 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)