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4853 illumos-gate is not lint-clean when built with openssl 1.0
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--- old/usr/src/lib/openssl/libsunw_ssl/d1_both.c
+++ new/usr/src/lib/openssl/libsunw_ssl/d1_both.c
1 1 /* ssl/d1_both.c */
2 2 /*
3 3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 5 */
6 6 /* ====================================================================
7 7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 8 *
9 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 11 * are met:
12 12 *
13 13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 15 *
16 16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 19 * distribution.
20 20 *
21 21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 25 *
26 26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 30 *
31 31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 34 *
35 35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 36 * acknowledgment:
37 37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 39 *
40 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 52 * ====================================================================
53 53 *
54 54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 57 *
58 58 */
59 59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 60 * All rights reserved.
61 61 *
62 62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 65 *
66 66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 72 *
73 73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 79 *
80 80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 82 * are met:
83 83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 97 *
98 98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 109 *
110 110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 114 */
115 115
116 116 #include <limits.h>
117 117 #include <string.h>
118 118 #include <stdio.h>
119 119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 120 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
121 121 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 122 #include <openssl/objects.h>
123 123 #include <openssl/evp.h>
124 124 #include <openssl/x509.h>
125 125
126 126 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
127 127
128 128 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
129 129 if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
130 130 long ii; \
131 131 for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
132 132 } else { \
133 133 long ii; \
134 134 bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
135 135 for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
136 136 bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
137 137 } }
138 138
139 139 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
140 140 long ii; \
141 141 OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
142 142 is_complete = 1; \
143 143 if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
144 144 if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
145 145 if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
146 146
147 147 #if 0
148 148 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
149 149 long ii; \
150 150 printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
151 151 printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
152 152 printf("\n"); }
153 153 #endif
154 154
155 155 static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
156 156 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
157 157
158 158 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
159 159 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
160 160
161 161 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
162 162 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
163 163 unsigned long frag_len);
164 164 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
165 165 unsigned char *p);
166 166 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
167 167 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
168 168 unsigned long frag_len);
169 169 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
170 170 long max, int *ok);
171 171
172 172 static hm_fragment *
173 173 dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
174 174 {
175 175 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
176 176 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
177 177 unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
178 178
179 179 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
180 180 if ( frag == NULL)
181 181 return NULL;
182 182
183 183 if (frag_len)
184 184 {
185 185 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
186 186 if ( buf == NULL)
187 187 {
188 188 OPENSSL_free(frag);
189 189 return NULL;
190 190 }
191 191 }
192 192
193 193 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
194 194 frag->fragment = buf;
195 195
196 196 /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
197 197 if (reassembly)
198 198 {
199 199 bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
200 200 if (bitmask == NULL)
201 201 {
202 202 if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
203 203 OPENSSL_free(frag);
204 204 return NULL;
205 205 }
206 206 memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
207 207 }
208 208
209 209 frag->reassembly = bitmask;
210 210
211 211 return frag;
212 212 }
213 213
214 214 static void
215 215 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
216 216 {
217 217
218 218 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
219 219 {
220 220 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
221 221 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
222 222 }
223 223 if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
224 224 if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
225 225 OPENSSL_free(frag);
226 226 }
227 227
228 228 /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
229 229 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
230 230 {
231 231 int ret;
232 232 int curr_mtu;
233 233 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
234 234
235 235 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
236 236 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
237 237 {
238 238 s->d1->mtu =
239 239 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
240 240
241 241 /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
242 242 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
243 243 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
244 244 {
245 245 s->d1->mtu = 0;
246 246 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
247 247 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
248 248 s->d1->mtu, NULL);
249 249 }
250 250 }
251 251 #if 0
252 252 mtu = s->d1->mtu;
253 253
254 254 fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
255 255
256 256 mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
257 257
258 258 curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
259 259
260 260 if ( curr_mtu > 0)
261 261 mtu = curr_mtu;
262 262 else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
263 263 return ret;
264 264
265 265 if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
266 266 {
267 267 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
268 268 if ( ret <= 0)
269 269 return ret;
270 270 mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
271 271 }
272 272 #endif
273 273
274 274 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
275 275
276 276 if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
277 277 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
278 278 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
279 279
280 280 if (s->write_hash)
281 281 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
282 282 else
283 283 mac_size = 0;
284 284
285 285 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
286 286 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
287 287 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
288 288 else
289 289 blocksize = 0;
290 290
291 291 frag_off = 0;
292 292 while( s->init_num)
293 293 {
294 294 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
295 295 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
296 296
297 297 if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
298 298 {
299 299 /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
300 300 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
301 301 if ( ret <= 0)
302 302 return ret;
303 303 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
304 304 mac_size - blocksize;
305 305 }
306 306
307 307 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
308 308 len = curr_mtu;
309 309 else
310 310 len = s->init_num;
311 311
312 312
313 313 /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
314 314 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
315 315 {
316 316 if ( s->init_off != 0)
317 317 {
318 318 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
319 319 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
320 320 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
321 321
322 322 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
323 323 len = curr_mtu;
324 324 else
325 325 len = s->init_num;
326 326 }
327 327
328 328 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
329 329 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
330 330
331 331 dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
332 332
333 333 OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
334 334 }
335 335
336 336 ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
337 337 len);
338 338 if (ret < 0)
339 339 {
340 340 /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
341 341 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
342 342 * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
343 343 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
344 344 * retransmit
345 345 */
346 346 if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
347 347 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
348 348 s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
349 349 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
350 350 else
351 351 return(-1);
352 352 }
353 353 else
354 354 {
355 355
356 356 /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
357 357 * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
358 358 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
359 359
360 360 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
361 361 {
362 362 /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
363 363 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
364 364 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
365 365 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
366 366 int xlen;
367 367
368 368 if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
369 369 {
370 370 /* reconstruct message header is if it
371 371 * is being sent in single fragment */
372 372 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
373 373 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
374 374 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
375 375 l2n3(0,p);
376 376 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
377 377 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
378 378 xlen = ret;
379 379 }
380 380 else
381 381 {
382 382 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
383 383 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
384 384 }
385 385
386 386 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
387 387 }
388 388
389 389 if (ret == s->init_num)
390 390 {
391 391 if (s->msg_callback)
392 392 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
393 393 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
394 394 s->msg_callback_arg);
395 395
396 396 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
397 397 s->init_num = 0;
398 398
399 399 return(1);
400 400 }
401 401 s->init_off+=ret;
402 402 s->init_num-=ret;
403 403 frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
404 404 }
405 405 }
406 406 return(0);
407 407 }
408 408
409 409
410 410 /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
411 411 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
412 412 * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
413 413 * fragments.
414 414 */
415 415 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
416 416 {
417 417 int i, al;
418 418 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
419 419 unsigned char *p;
420 420 unsigned long msg_len;
421 421
422 422 /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
423 423 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
424 424 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
425 425 {
426 426 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
427 427 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
428 428 {
429 429 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
430 430 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
431 431 goto f_err;
432 432 }
433 433 *ok=1;
434 434 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
435 435 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
436 436 return s->init_num;
437 437 }
438 438
439 439 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
440 440 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
441 441
442 442 again:
443 443 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
444 444 if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
445 445 i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
446 446 goto again;
447 447 else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
448 448 return i;
449 449
450 450 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
451 451 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
452 452
453 453 /* reconstruct message header */
454 454 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
455 455 l2n3(msg_len,p);
456 456 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
457 457 l2n3(0,p);
458 458 l2n3(msg_len,p);
459 459 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
460 460 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
461 461 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
462 462 }
463 463
464 464 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
465 465 if (s->msg_callback)
466 466 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
467 467 p, msg_len,
468 468 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
469 469
470 470 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
471 471
472 472 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
473 473 if (!s->d1->listen)
474 474 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
475 475
476 476 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
477 477 return s->init_num;
478 478
479 479 f_err:
480 480 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
481 481 *ok = 0;
482 482 return -1;
483 483 }
484 484
485 485
486 486 static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
487 487 {
488 488 size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
489 489
490 490 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
491 491 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
492 492 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
493 493
494 494 /* sanity checking */
495 495 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
496 496 {
497 497 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
498 498 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
499 499 }
500 500
501 501 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
502 502 {
503 503 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
504 504 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
505 505 }
506 506
507 507 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
508 508 {
509 509 /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
510 510 * against max above */
511 511 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
512 512 {
513 513 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
514 514 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
515 515 }
516 516
517 517 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
518 518 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
519 519 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
520 520 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
521 521 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
522 522 }
523 523 else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
524 524 {
525 525 /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
526 526 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
527 527 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
528 528 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
529 529 }
530 530
531 531 return 0; /* no error */
532 532 }
533 533
534 534
535 535 static int
536 536 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
537 537 {
538 538 /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
539 539 * if so:
540 540 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
541 541 * (2) update s->init_num
542 542 */
543 543 pitem *item;
544 544 hm_fragment *frag;
545 545 int al;
546 546
547 547 *ok = 0;
548 548 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
549 549 if ( item == NULL)
550 550 return 0;
551 551
552 552 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
553 553
554 554 /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
555 555 if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
556 556 return 0;
557 557
558 558 if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
559 559 {
560 560 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
561 561 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
562 562
563 563 al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
564 564
565 565 if (al==0) /* no alert */
566 566 {
567 567 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
568 568 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
569 569 frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
570 570 }
571 571
572 572 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
573 573 pitem_free(item);
574 574
575 575 if (al==0)
576 576 {
577 577 *ok = 1;
578 578 return frag_len;
579 579 }
580 580
581 581 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
582 582 s->init_num = 0;
583 583 *ok = 0;
584 584 return -1;
585 585 }
586 586 else
587 587 return 0;
588 588 }
589 589
590 590 /* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
591 591 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
592 592 * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
593 593 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
594 594 {
595 595 unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
596 596 if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
597 597 return s->max_cert_list;
598 598 return max_len;
599 599 }
600 600
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600 lines elided |
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601 601 static int
602 602 dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
603 603 {
604 604 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
605 605 pitem *item = NULL;
606 606 int i = -1, is_complete;
607 607 unsigned char seq64be[8];
608 608 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
609 609
610 610 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
611 - msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
611 + msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
612 612 goto err;
613 613
614 614 if (frag_len == 0)
615 615 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
616 616
617 617 /* Try to find item in queue */
618 618 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
619 619 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
620 620 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
621 621 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
622 622
623 623 if (item == NULL)
624 624 {
625 625 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
626 626 if ( frag == NULL)
627 627 goto err;
628 628 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
629 629 frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
630 630 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
631 631 }
632 632 else
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11 lines elided |
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633 633 {
634 634 frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
635 635 if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
636 636 {
637 637 item = NULL;
638 638 frag = NULL;
639 639 goto err;
640 640 }
641 641 }
642 642
643 -
644 643 /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
645 644 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
646 645 * does not need to be freed.
647 646 */
648 647 if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
649 648 {
650 649 unsigned char devnull [256];
651 650
652 651 while (frag_len)
653 652 {
654 653 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
655 654 devnull,
656 655 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
657 656 if (i<=0) goto err;
658 657 frag_len -= i;
659 658 }
660 659 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
661 660 }
662 661
663 662 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
664 663 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
665 664 frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
666 665 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
667 666 i=-1;
668 667 if (i<=0)
669 668 goto err;
670 669
671 670 RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
672 671 (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
673 672
674 673 RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
675 674 is_complete);
676 675
677 676 if (is_complete)
678 677 {
679 678 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
680 679 frag->reassembly = NULL;
681 680 }
682 681
683 682 if (item == NULL)
684 683 {
685 684 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
686 685 if (item == NULL)
687 686 {
688 687 i = -1;
689 688 goto err;
690 689 }
691 690
692 691 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
693 692 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
694 693 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
695 694 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
696 695 * would never have reached this branch. */
697 696 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
698 697 }
699 698
700 699 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
701 700
702 701 err:
703 702 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
704 703 *ok = 0;
705 704 return i;
706 705 }
707 706
708 707
709 708 static int
710 709 dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
711 710 {
712 711 int i=-1;
713 712 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
714 713 pitem *item = NULL;
715 714 unsigned char seq64be[8];
716 715 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
717 716
718 717 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
719 718 goto err;
720 719
721 720 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
722 721 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
723 722 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
724 723 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
725 724 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
726 725
727 726 /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
728 727 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
729 728 */
730 729 if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
731 730 item = NULL;
732 731
733 732 /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
734 733 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
735 734 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
736 735 * retransmit.
737 736 */
738 737 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
739 738 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
740 739 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
741 740 {
742 741 unsigned char devnull [256];
743 742
744 743 while (frag_len)
745 744 {
746 745 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
747 746 devnull,
748 747 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
749 748 if (i<=0) goto err;
750 749 frag_len -= i;
751 750 }
752 751 }
753 752 else
754 753 {
755 754 if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
756 755 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
757 756
758 757 if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
759 758 goto err;
760 759
761 760 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
762 761 if ( frag == NULL)
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109 lines elided |
↑ open up ↑ |
763 762 goto err;
764 763
765 764 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
766 765
767 766 if (frag_len)
768 767 {
769 768 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
770 769 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
771 770 frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
772 771 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
773 - i = -1;
772 + i=-1;
774 773 if (i<=0)
775 774 goto err;
776 775 }
777 776
778 777 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
779 778 if ( item == NULL)
780 779 goto err;
781 780
782 781 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
783 782 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
784 783 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
785 784 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
786 785 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
787 786 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
788 787 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
789 788 * been discarded. */
790 789 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
791 790 }
792 791
793 792 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
794 793
795 794 err:
796 795 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
797 796 *ok = 0;
798 797 return i;
799 798 }
800 799
801 800
802 801 static long
803 802 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
804 803 {
805 804 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
806 805 unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
807 806 int i,al;
808 807 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
809 808
810 809 redo:
811 810 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
812 811 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
813 812 {
814 813 if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
815 814 return frag_len;
816 815 }
817 816
818 817 /* read handshake message header */
819 818 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
820 819 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
821 820 if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
822 821 {
823 822 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
824 823 *ok = 0;
825 824 return i;
826 825 }
827 826 /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
828 827 if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
829 828 {
830 829 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
831 830 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
832 831 goto f_err;
833 832 }
834 833
835 834 /* parse the message fragment header */
836 835 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
837 836
838 837 /*
839 838 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
840 839 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
841 840 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
842 841 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
843 842 */
844 843 if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
845 844 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
846 845
847 846 len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
848 847 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
849 848 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
850 849
851 850 if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
852 851 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
853 852
854 853 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
855 854 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
856 855 {
857 856 /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
858 857 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
859 858 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
860 859 * 'Finished' MAC. */
861 860 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
862 861 {
863 862 if (s->msg_callback)
864 863 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
865 864 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
866 865 s->msg_callback_arg);
867 866
868 867 s->init_num = 0;
869 868 goto redo;
870 869 }
871 870 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
872 871 {
873 872 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
874 873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
875 874 goto f_err;
876 875 }
877 876 }
878 877
879 878 if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
880 879 goto f_err;
881 880
882 881 /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
883 882 s->state=stn;
884 883
885 884 if ( frag_len > 0)
886 885 {
887 886 unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
888 887
889 888 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
890 889 &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
891 890 /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
892 891 if (i <= 0)
893 892 {
894 893 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
895 894 *ok = 0;
896 895 return i;
897 896 }
898 897 }
899 898 else
900 899 i = 0;
901 900
902 901 /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
903 902 * handshake to fail */
904 903 if (i != (int)frag_len)
905 904 {
906 905 al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
907 906 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
908 907 goto f_err;
909 908 }
910 909
911 910 *ok = 1;
912 911
913 912 /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
914 913 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
915 914 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
916 915 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
917 916 s->init_num = frag_len;
918 917 return frag_len;
919 918
920 919 f_err:
921 920 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
922 921 s->init_num = 0;
923 922
924 923 *ok=0;
925 924 return(-1);
926 925 }
927 926
928 927 int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
929 928 {
930 929 unsigned char *p,*d;
931 930 int i;
932 931 unsigned long l;
933 932
934 933 if (s->state == a)
935 934 {
936 935 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
937 936 p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
938 937
939 938 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
940 939 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
941 940 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
942 941 memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
943 942 p+=i;
944 943 l=i;
945 944
946 945 /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
947 946 * renegotiation checks
948 947 */
949 948 if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
950 949 {
951 950 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
952 951 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
953 952 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
954 953 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
955 954 }
956 955 else
957 956 {
958 957 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
959 958 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
960 959 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
961 960 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
962 961 }
963 962
964 963 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
965 964 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
966 965 * I do this.
967 966 */
968 967 l&=0xffff;
969 968 #endif
970 969
971 970 d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
972 971 s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
973 972 s->init_off=0;
974 973
975 974 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
976 975 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
977 976
978 977 s->state=b;
979 978 }
980 979
981 980 /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
982 981 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
983 982 }
984 983
985 984 /* for these 2 messages, we need to
986 985 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
987 986 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
988 987 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
989 988 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
990 989 * ssl->session->read_compression assign
991 990 * ssl->session->read_hash assign
992 991 */
993 992 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
994 993 {
995 994 unsigned char *p;
996 995
997 996 if (s->state == a)
998 997 {
999 998 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1000 999 *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
1001 1000 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1002 1001 s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1003 1002
1004 1003 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1005 1004 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1006 1005 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
1007 1006 s->init_num+=2;
1008 1007 }
1009 1008
1010 1009 s->init_off=0;
1011 1010
1012 1011 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
1013 1012 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
1014 1013
1015 1014 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1016 1015 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1017 1016
1018 1017 s->state=b;
1019 1018 }
1020 1019
1021 1020 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1022 1021 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1023 1022 }
1024 1023
1025 1024 static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
1026 1025 {
1027 1026 int n;
1028 1027 unsigned char *p;
1029 1028
1030 1029 n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
1031 1030 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
1032 1031 {
1033 1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1034 1033 return 0;
1035 1034 }
1036 1035 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
1037 1036 l2n3(n,p);
1038 1037 i2d_X509(x,&p);
1039 1038 *l+=n+3;
1040 1039
1041 1040 return 1;
1042 1041 }
1043 1042 unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
1044 1043 {
1045 1044 unsigned char *p;
1046 1045 int i;
1047 1046 unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1048 1047 BUF_MEM *buf;
1049 1048
1050 1049 /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
1051 1050 buf=s->init_buf;
1052 1051 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
1053 1052 {
1054 1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1055 1054 return(0);
1056 1055 }
1057 1056 if (x != NULL)
1058 1057 {
1059 1058 X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
1060 1059
1061 1060 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
1062 1061 {
1063 1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1064 1063 return(0);
1065 1064 }
1066 1065
1067 1066 X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
1068 1067 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1069 1068 ERR_clear_error();
1070 1069 for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
1071 1070 {
1072 1071 x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
1073 1072
1074 1073 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1075 1074 {
1076 1075 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1077 1076 return 0;
1078 1077 }
1079 1078 }
1080 1079 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1081 1080 }
1082 1081 /* Thawte special :-) */
1083 1082 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
1084 1083 {
1085 1084 x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
1086 1085 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1087 1086 return 0;
1088 1087 }
1089 1088
1090 1089 l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
1091 1090
1092 1091 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1093 1092 l2n3(l,p);
1094 1093 l+=3;
1095 1094 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
1096 1095 p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
1097 1096
1098 1097 l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1099 1098 return(l);
1100 1099 }
1101 1100
1102 1101 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1103 1102 {
1104 1103 if ( code > 0)
1105 1104 {
1106 1105 fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1107 1106 return 1;
1108 1107 }
1109 1108
1110 1109 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
1111 1110 {
1112 1111 /* not a timeout, none of our business,
1113 1112 let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
1114 1113 return code;
1115 1114 }
1116 1115
1117 1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1118 1117 if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1119 1118 #else
1120 1119 if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1121 1120 #endif
1122 1121 {
1123 1122 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1124 1123 return code;
1125 1124 }
1126 1125
1127 1126 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
1128 1127 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1129 1128 if ( item )
1130 1129 {
1131 1130 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1132 1131 }
1133 1132 else
1134 1133 #endif
1135 1134
1136 1135 #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
1137 1136 if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1138 1137 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1139 1138 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1140 1139 #endif
1141 1140
1142 1141 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1143 1142 }
1144 1143
1145 1144 int
1146 1145 dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1147 1146 {
1148 1147 /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
1149 1148 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
1150 1149 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
1151 1150 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
1152 1151 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
1153 1152 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
1154 1153 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1155 1154 */
1156 1155 return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1157 1156 }
1158 1157
1159 1158 int
1160 1159 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1161 1160 {
1162 1161 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1163 1162 piterator iter;
1164 1163 pitem *item;
1165 1164 hm_fragment *frag;
1166 1165 int found = 0;
1167 1166
1168 1167 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1169 1168
1170 1169 for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
1171 1170 {
1172 1171 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1173 1172 if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1174 1173 (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
1175 1174 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
1176 1175 {
1177 1176 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1178 1177 return -1;
1179 1178 }
1180 1179 }
1181 1180
1182 1181 return 1;
1183 1182 }
1184 1183
1185 1184 int
1186 1185 dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1187 1186 {
1188 1187 pitem *item;
1189 1188 hm_fragment *frag;
1190 1189 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1191 1190
1192 1191 /* this function is called immediately after a message has
1193 1192 * been serialized */
1194 1193 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1195 1194
1196 1195 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1197 1196 if (!frag)
1198 1197 return 0;
1199 1198
1200 1199 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1201 1200
1202 1201 if ( is_ccs)
1203 1202 {
1204 1203 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1205 1204 ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1206 1205 }
1207 1206 else
1208 1207 {
1209 1208 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1210 1209 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1211 1210 }
1212 1211
1213 1212 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1214 1213 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1215 1214 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1216 1215 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1217 1216 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1218 1217 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1219 1218
1220 1219 /* save current state*/
1221 1220 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1222 1221 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1223 1222 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1224 1223 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1225 1224 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1226 1225
1227 1226 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1228 1227 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1229 1228 frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
1230 1229 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1231 1230 frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1232 1231
1233 1232 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1234 1233 if ( item == NULL)
1235 1234 {
1236 1235 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1237 1236 return 0;
1238 1237 }
1239 1238
1240 1239 #if 0
1241 1240 fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1242 1241 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1243 1242 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1244 1243 #endif
1245 1244
1246 1245 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1247 1246 return 1;
1248 1247 }
1249 1248
1250 1249 int
1251 1250 dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1252 1251 int *found)
1253 1252 {
1254 1253 int ret;
1255 1254 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1256 1255 pitem *item;
1257 1256 hm_fragment *frag ;
1258 1257 unsigned long header_length;
1259 1258 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1260 1259 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1261 1260 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1262 1261
1263 1262 /*
1264 1263 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1265 1264 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1266 1265 */
1267 1266
1268 1267 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1269 1268 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1270 1269 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
1271 1270 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1272 1271
1273 1272 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1274 1273 if ( item == NULL)
1275 1274 {
1276 1275 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1277 1276 *found = 0;
1278 1277 return 0;
1279 1278 }
1280 1279
1281 1280 *found = 1;
1282 1281 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1283 1282
1284 1283 if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1285 1284 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1286 1285 else
1287 1286 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1288 1287
1289 1288 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1290 1289 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1291 1290 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1292 1291
1293 1292 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1294 1293 frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1295 1294 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1296 1295
1297 1296 /* save current state */
1298 1297 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1299 1298 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1300 1299 saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1301 1300 saved_state.session = s->session;
1302 1301 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1303 1302 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1304 1303
1305 1304 s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1306 1305
1307 1306 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1308 1307 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1309 1308 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1310 1309 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1311 1310 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1312 1311 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1313 1312
1314 1313 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1315 1314 {
1316 1315 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1317 1316 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1318 1317 }
1319 1318
1320 1319 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1321 1320 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1322 1321
1323 1322 /* restore current state */
1324 1323 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1325 1324 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1326 1325 s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1327 1326 s->session = saved_state.session;
1328 1327 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1329 1328
1330 1329 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1331 1330 {
1332 1331 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1333 1332 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1334 1333 }
1335 1334
1336 1335 s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1337 1336
1338 1337 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1339 1338 return ret;
1340 1339 }
1341 1340
1342 1341 /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1343 1342 void
1344 1343 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1345 1344 {
1346 1345 pitem *item;
1347 1346
1348 1347 for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1349 1348 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
1350 1349 {
1351 1350 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1352 1351 pitem_free(item);
1353 1352 }
1354 1353 }
1355 1354
1356 1355
1357 1356 unsigned char *
1358 1357 dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
1359 1358 unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1360 1359 {
1361 1360 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1362 1361 if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
1363 1362 {
1364 1363 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1365 1364 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1366 1365 }
1367 1366
1368 1367 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1369 1368 frag_off, frag_len);
1370 1369
1371 1370 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1372 1371 }
1373 1372
1374 1373
1375 1374 /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1376 1375 static void
1377 1376 dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1378 1377 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1379 1378 unsigned long frag_len)
1380 1379 {
1381 1380 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1382 1381
1383 1382 msg_hdr->type = mt;
1384 1383 msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1385 1384 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1386 1385 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1387 1386 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1388 1387 }
1389 1388
1390 1389 static void
1391 1390 dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1392 1391 unsigned long frag_len)
1393 1392 {
1394 1393 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1395 1394
1396 1395 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1397 1396 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1398 1397 }
1399 1398
1400 1399 static unsigned char *
1401 1400 dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1402 1401 {
1403 1402 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1404 1403
1405 1404 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1406 1405 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1407 1406
1408 1407 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1409 1408 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1410 1409 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1411 1410
1412 1411 return p;
1413 1412 }
1414 1413
1415 1414 unsigned int
1416 1415 dtls1_min_mtu(void)
1417 1416 {
1418 1417 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1419 1418 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1420 1419 }
1421 1420
1422 1421 static unsigned int
1423 1422 dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
1424 1423 {
1425 1424 unsigned int i;
1426 1425
1427 1426 if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
1428 1427 return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
1429 1428
1430 1429 for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
1431 1430 if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
1432 1431 return g_probable_mtu[i];
1433 1432
1434 1433 return curr_mtu;
1435 1434 }
1436 1435
1437 1436 void
1438 1437 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1439 1438 {
1440 1439 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1441 1440 msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1442 1441 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1443 1442
1444 1443 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1445 1444 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1446 1445 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1447 1446 }
1448 1447
1449 1448 void
1450 1449 dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1451 1450 {
1452 1451 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1453 1452
1454 1453 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1455 1454 }
1456 1455
1457 1456 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1458 1457 {
1459 1458 int ret;
1460 1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1461 1460 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1462 1461 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
1463 1462 {
1464 1463 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1465 1464 if (ret < 0) return -1;
1466 1465
1467 1466 if (ret == 0)
1468 1467 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
1469 1468 }
1470 1469 #endif
1471 1470 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1472 1471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1473 1472 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1474 1473 #endif
1475 1474 return ret;
1476 1475 }
1477 1476
1478 1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1479 1478 int
1480 1479 dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1481 1480 {
1482 1481 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1483 1482 unsigned short hbtype;
1484 1483 unsigned int payload;
1485 1484 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1486 1485
1487 1486 if (s->msg_callback)
1488 1487 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1489 1488 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1490 1489 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1491 1490
1492 1491 /* Read type and payload length first */
1493 1492 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1494 1493 return 0; /* silently discard */
1495 1494 hbtype = *p++;
1496 1495 n2s(p, payload);
1497 1496 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1498 1497 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1499 1498 pl = p;
1500 1499
1501 1500 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1502 1501 {
1503 1502 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1504 1503 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1505 1504 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1506 1505 payload + padding;
1507 1506 int r;
1508 1507
1509 1508 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1510 1509 return 0;
1511 1510
1512 1511 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1513 1512 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
1514 1513 * payload, plus padding
1515 1514 */
1516 1515 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1517 1516 bp = buffer;
1518 1517
1519 1518 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1520 1519 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1521 1520 s2n(payload, bp);
1522 1521 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1523 1522 bp += payload;
1524 1523 /* Random padding */
1525 1524 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
1526 1525
1527 1526 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1528 1527
1529 1528 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1530 1529 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1531 1530 buffer, write_length,
1532 1531 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1533 1532
1534 1533 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1535 1534
1536 1535 if (r < 0)
1537 1536 return r;
1538 1537 }
1539 1538 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
1540 1539 {
1541 1540 unsigned int seq;
1542 1541
1543 1542 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
1544 1543 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
1545 1544 * sequence number */
1546 1545 n2s(pl, seq);
1547 1546
1548 1547 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
1549 1548 {
1550 1549 dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1551 1550 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
1552 1551 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1553 1552 }
1554 1553 }
1555 1554
1556 1555 return 0;
1557 1556 }
1558 1557
1559 1558 int
1560 1559 dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1561 1560 {
1562 1561 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1563 1562 int ret;
1564 1563 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1565 1564 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1566 1565
1567 1566 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1568 1567 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1569 1568 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
1570 1569 {
1571 1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1572 1571 return -1;
1573 1572 }
1574 1573
1575 1574 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1576 1575 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1577 1576 {
1578 1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1579 1578 return -1;
1580 1579 }
1581 1580
1582 1581 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1583 1582 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
1584 1583 {
1585 1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1586 1585 return -1;
1587 1586 }
1588 1587
1589 1588 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
1590 1589 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1591 1590 */
1592 1591 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1593 1592
1594 1593 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1595 1594 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1596 1595 * some random stuff.
1597 1596 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1598 1597 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1599 1598 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1600 1599 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1601 1600 * - Padding
1602 1601 */
1603 1602 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1604 1603 p = buf;
1605 1604 /* Message Type */
1606 1605 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1607 1606 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1608 1607 s2n(payload, p);
1609 1608 /* Sequence number */
1610 1609 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1611 1610 /* 16 random bytes */
1612 1611 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
1613 1612 p += 16;
1614 1613 /* Random padding */
1615 1614 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
1616 1615
1617 1616 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1618 1617 if (ret >= 0)
1619 1618 {
1620 1619 if (s->msg_callback)
1621 1620 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1622 1621 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1623 1622 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1624 1623
1625 1624 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1626 1625 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1627 1626 }
1628 1627
1629 1628 OPENSSL_free(buf);
1630 1629
1631 1630 return ret;
1632 1631 }
1633 1632 #endif
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