1 /*
2 * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
3 * Use is subject to license terms.
4 */
5
6 /* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
7 /*
8 * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
9 * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
10 *
11 * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
12 * Afchine Madjlessi.
13 */
14 /*
15 * ====================================================================
16 * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
17 *
18 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
19 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
20 * are met:
21 *
22 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
23 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
24 *
25 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
27 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
28 * distribution.
29 *
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
31 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
32 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
33 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
34 *
35 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
36 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
37 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
38 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
39 *
40 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
41 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
42 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
43 *
44 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
45 * acknowledgment:
46 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
47 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
48 *
49 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
50 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
51 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
52 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
53 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
54 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
55 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
56 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
57 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
58 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
59 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
60 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
61 * ====================================================================
62 *
63 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
64 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
65 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
66 *
67 */
68
69 #include <stdio.h>
70 #include <stdlib.h>
71 #include <string.h>
72 #include <sys/types.h>
73 #include <unistd.h>
74
75 #include <openssl/e_os2.h>
76 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
77 #include <openssl/engine.h>
78 #include <openssl/dso.h>
79 #include <openssl/err.h>
80 #include <openssl/bn.h>
81 #include <openssl/pem.h>
82 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
83 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
84 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
86 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
87 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
89 #include <openssl/dh.h>
90 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
91 #include <openssl/rand.h>
92 #include <openssl/objects.h>
93 #include <openssl/x509.h>
94 #include <cryptlib.h>
95 #include <pthread.h>
96
97 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
98 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
99
100 #include "cryptoki.h"
101 #include "pkcs11.h"
102 #include "hw_pk11_err.h"
103
104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
105 /* RSA stuff */
106 static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
107 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
108 static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
109 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
110 static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
111 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
112 static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
113 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
114 static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
115 static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
116 static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
117 unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
118 static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
119 unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
120 const RSA *rsa);
121 EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
122 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
123 EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
124 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
125
126 static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
128 static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
129 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
130 static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
131 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
132 static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
133 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
134
135 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
136 BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
137 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
138 BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
139
140 static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
141 static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
142 #endif
143
144 /* DSA stuff */
145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
146 static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
147 static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
148 static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
149 DSA *dsa);
150 static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
151 DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
152
153 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
154 BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
155 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
156 BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
157
158 static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
159 static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
160 #endif
161
162 /* DH stuff */
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
165 static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
166 static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
167 static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
168 const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
169
170 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
171 BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
172
173 static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
174 #endif
175
176 static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
177 CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
178
179 /* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
180 #if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
181 static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
182 #else
183 static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
184 #endif
185
186 /*
187 * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
188 * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
189 * variable and jump to the specified label.
190 */
191 #define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \
192 { \
193 if (sunw_pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \
194 { \
195 var = TRUE; \
196 if (unlock) \
197 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
198 goto label; \
199 } \
200 }
201
202 /*
203 * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
204 * entry otherwise return NULL.
205 *
206 * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
207 * held.
208 */
209 static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
210 {
211 PK11_active *entry;
212
213 for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
214 if (entry->h == h)
215 return (entry);
216
217 return (NULL);
218 }
219
220 /*
221 * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
222 * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
223 * failure.
224 *
225 * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
226 * held.
227 */
228 int
229 sunw_pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
230 {
231 PK11_active *entry = NULL;
232
233 if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
234 {
235 PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
236 return (-1);
237 }
238
239 /* search for entry in the active list */
240 if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
241 entry->refcnt++;
242 else
243 {
244 /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
245 entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
246 if (entry == NULL)
247 {
248 PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
249 return (-1);
250 }
251 entry->h = h;
252 entry->refcnt = 1;
253 entry->prev = NULL;
254 entry->next = NULL;
255 /* connect the newly created entry to the list */
256 if (active_list[type] == NULL)
257 active_list[type] = entry;
258 else /* make the entry first in the list */
259 {
260 entry->next = active_list[type];
261 active_list[type]->prev = entry;
262 active_list[type] = entry;
263 }
264 }
265
266 return (entry->refcnt);
267 }
268
269 /*
270 * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
271 *
272 * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
273 * held.
274 */
275 void
276 sunw_pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
277 {
278 PK11_active *prev_entry;
279
280 /* remove the entry from the list and free it */
281 if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
282 {
283 prev_entry->next = entry->next;
284 if (entry->next != NULL)
285 entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
286 }
287 else
288 {
289 active_list[type] = entry->next;
290 /* we were the first but not the only one */
291 if (entry->next != NULL)
292 entry->next->prev = NULL;
293 }
294
295 /* sanitization */
296 entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
297 entry->prev = NULL;
298 entry->next = NULL;
299 OPENSSL_free(entry);
300 }
301
302 /* Free all entries from the active list. */
303 void
304 sunw_pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
305 {
306 PK11_active *entry;
307
308 /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
309 switch (type)
310 {
311 case OP_RSA:
312 case OP_DSA:
313 case OP_DH:
314 break;
315 default:
316 return;
317 }
318
319 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
320 LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
321 while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
322 sunw_pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
323 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
324 }
325
326 /*
327 * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
328 * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
329 *
330 * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
331 * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
332 *
333 * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
334 * held.
335 */
336 int
337 sunw_pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
338 {
339 PK11_active *entry = NULL;
340
341 if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
342 {
343 PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
344 return (-1);
345 }
346
347 OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
348 entry->refcnt--;
349 if (entry->refcnt == 0)
350 {
351 sunw_pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
352 return (1);
353 }
354
355 return (0);
356 }
357
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
359 /* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
360 static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
361 {
362 "PKCS#11 RSA method",
363 pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */
364 pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */
365 pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */
366 pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */
367 NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */
368 NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
369 pk11_RSA_init, /* init */
370 pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */
371 RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */
372 NULL, /* app_data */
373 pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */
374 pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */
375 };
376
377 RSA_METHOD *
378 PK11_RSA(void)
379 {
380 return (&pk11_rsa);
381 }
382 #endif
383
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
385 /* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
386 static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
387 {
388 "PKCS#11 DSA method",
389 pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */
390 NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
391 pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */
392 NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
393 NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
394 pk11_DSA_init, /* init */
395 pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */
396 0, /* flags */
397 NULL /* app_data */
398 };
399
400 DSA_METHOD *
401 PK11_DSA(void)
402 {
403 return (&pk11_dsa);
404 }
405 #endif
406
407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
408 /*
409 * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
410 * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
411 * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
412 * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
413 * enough.
414 */
415 #define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8
416
417 /* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
418 static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
419 {
420 "PKCS#11 DH method",
421 pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */
422 pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */
423 NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */
424 pk11_DH_init, /* init */
425 pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */
426 0, /* flags */
427 NULL, /* app_data */
428 NULL /* generate_params */
429 };
430
431 DH_METHOD *
432 PK11_DH(void)
433 {
434 return (&pk11_dh);
435 }
436 #endif
437
438 /* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
439 #define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
440
441 /* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
442 #define DSA_DATA_LEN 20
443 #define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40
444
445 static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
446 static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
447
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
449 /*
450 * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
451 * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
452 * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
453 * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
454 */
455 static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
456 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
457 {
458 int i, num = 0, r = -1;
459 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
460
461 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
462 if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
463 {
464 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
465 goto err;
466 }
467
468 switch (padding)
469 {
470 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
471 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
472 break;
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
474 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
475 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
476 break;
477 #endif
478 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
479 i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
480 break;
481 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
482 i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
483 break;
484 default:
485 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
486 goto err;
487 }
488 if (i <= 0) goto err;
489
490 /* PK11 functions are called here */
491 r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
492 err:
493 if (buf != NULL)
494 {
495 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
496 OPENSSL_free(buf);
497 }
498 return (r);
499 }
500
501
502 /*
503 * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
504 * should be catched in the padding functions
505 */
506 static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
507 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
508 {
509 int i, num = 0, r = -1;
510 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
511
512 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
513 if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
514 {
515 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
516 goto err;
517 }
518
519 switch (padding)
520 {
521 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
522 i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
523 break;
524 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
525 i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
526 break;
527 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
528 default:
529 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
530 goto err;
531 }
532 if (i <= 0) goto err;
533
534 /* PK11 functions are called here */
535 r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
536 err:
537 if (buf != NULL)
538 {
539 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
540 OPENSSL_free(buf);
541 }
542 return (r);
543 }
544
545 /* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
546 static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
547 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
548 {
549 BIGNUM f;
550 int j, num = 0, r = -1;
551 unsigned char *p;
552 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
553
554 BN_init(&f);
555
556 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
557
558 if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
559 {
560 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
561 goto err;
562 }
563
564 /*
565 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
566 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
567 */
568 if (flen > num)
569 {
570 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
571 PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
572 goto err;
573 }
574
575 /* make data into a big number */
576 if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
577 goto err;
578
579 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
580 {
581 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
582 PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
583 goto err;
584 }
585
586 /* PK11 functions are called here */
587 r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
588
589 /*
590 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
591 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
592 */
593 for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
594 if (buf[j] != 0)
595 break;
596
597 p = buf + j;
598 j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
599
600 switch (padding)
601 {
602 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
603 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
604 break;
605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
606 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
607 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
608 break;
609 #endif
610 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
611 r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
612 break;
613 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
614 r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
615 break;
616 default:
617 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
618 goto err;
619 }
620 if (r < 0)
621 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
622
623 err:
624 BN_clear_free(&f);
625 if (buf != NULL)
626 {
627 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
628 OPENSSL_free(buf);
629 }
630 return (r);
631 }
632
633 /* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
634 static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
635 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
636 {
637 BIGNUM f;
638 int i, num = 0, r = -1;
639 unsigned char *p;
640 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
641
642 BN_init(&f);
643 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
644 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
645 if (buf == NULL)
646 {
647 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
648 goto err;
649 }
650
651 /*
652 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
653 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
654 */
655 if (flen > num)
656 {
657 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
658 goto err;
659 }
660
661 if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
662 goto err;
663
664 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
665 {
666 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
667 PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
668 goto err;
669 }
670
671 /* PK11 functions are called here */
672 r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
673
674 /*
675 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
676 * Needs to skip these 0's here
677 */
678 for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
679 if (buf[i] != 0)
680 break;
681
682 p = buf + i;
683 i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
684
685 switch (padding)
686 {
687 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
688 r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
689 break;
690 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
691 r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
692 break;
693 default:
694 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
695 goto err;
696 }
697 if (r < 0)
698 RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
699
700 err:
701 BN_clear_free(&f);
702 if (buf != NULL)
703 {
704 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
705 OPENSSL_free(buf);
706 }
707 return (r);
708 }
709
710 /*
711 * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
712 * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
713 * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
714 */
715 static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
716 const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
717 {
718 CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
719 int retval = -1;
720 CK_RV rv;
721 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
722 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
723 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
724 PK11_SESSION *sp;
725
726 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
727 return (-1);
728
729 (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
730
731 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
732 if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
733 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
734 pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
735 &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
736 sp->session);
737
738 if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
739 {
740 rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
741 h_pub_key);
742
743 if (rv != CKR_OK)
744 {
745 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
746 PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
747 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
748 return (-1);
749 }
750
751 rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
752 (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
753
754 if (rv != CKR_OK)
755 {
756 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
757 PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
758 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
759 return (-1);
760 }
761 retval = bytes_encrypted;
762 }
763
764 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
765 return (retval);
766 }
767
768
769 /*
770 * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
771 * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
772 * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
773 */
774 static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
775 const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
776 {
777 CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
778 int retval = -1;
779 CK_RV rv;
780 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
781 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
782 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
783 PK11_SESSION *sp;
784
785 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
786 return (-1);
787
788 (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
789
790 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
791 if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
792 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
793 pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
794 &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
795
796 if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
797 {
798 rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
799 h_priv_key);
800
801 if (rv != CKR_OK)
802 {
803 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
804 PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
805 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
806 return (-1);
807 }
808
809 rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
810 (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
811
812 if (rv != CKR_OK)
813 {
814 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
815 rv);
816 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
817 return (-1);
818 }
819
820 retval = ul_sig_len;
821 }
822
823 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
824 return (retval);
825 }
826
827
828 /*
829 * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
830 * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
831 * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
832 */
833 static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
834 const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
835 {
836 CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
837 int retval = -1;
838 CK_RV rv;
839 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
840 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
841 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
842 PK11_SESSION *sp;
843
844 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
845 return (-1);
846
847 (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
848
849 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
850 if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
851 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
852 pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
853 &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
854
855 if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
856 {
857 rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
858 h_priv_key);
859
860 if (rv != CKR_OK)
861 {
862 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
863 PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
864 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
865 return (-1);
866 }
867
868 rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
869 (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
870
871 if (rv != CKR_OK)
872 {
873 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
874 PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
875 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
876 return (-1);
877 }
878 retval = bytes_decrypted;
879 }
880
881 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
882 return (retval);
883 }
884
885
886 /*
887 * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
888 * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
889 * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
890 */
891 static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
892 const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
893 {
894 CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
895 int retval = -1;
896 CK_RV rv;
897 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
898 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
899 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
900 PK11_SESSION *sp;
901
902 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
903 return (-1);
904
905 (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
906
907 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
908 if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
909 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
910 pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
911 &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
912 sp->session);
913
914 if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
915 {
916 rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
917 p_mech, h_pub_key);
918
919 if (rv != CKR_OK)
920 {
921 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
922 PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
923 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
924 return (-1);
925 }
926
927 rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
928 (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
929
930 if (rv != CKR_OK)
931 {
932 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
933 PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
934 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
935 return (-1);
936 }
937 retval = bytes_decrypted;
938 }
939
940 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
941 return (retval);
942 }
943
944 static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
945 {
946 /*
947 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
948 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
949 */
950 rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
951
952 return (1);
953 }
954
955 static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
956 {
957 /*
958 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
959 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
960 * structures.
961 */
962 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
963 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
964 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
965 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
966 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
967 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
968
969 return (1);
970 }
971
972 /*
973 * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
974 * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
975 * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
976 */
977 static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
978 unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
979 {
980 X509_SIG sig;
981 ASN1_TYPE parameter;
982 int i, j=0;
983 unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
984 X509_ALGOR algor;
985 ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
986 CK_RV rv;
987 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
988 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
989 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
990 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
991 int ret = 0;
992 unsigned long ulsiglen;
993
994 /* Encode the digest */
995 /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
996 if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
997 {
998 if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
999 {
1000 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
1001 PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
1002 goto err;
1003 }
1004 i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
1005 s = (unsigned char *)m;
1006 }
1007 else
1008 {
1009 sig.algor = &algor;
1010 sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
1011 if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
1012 {
1013 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
1014 PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
1015 goto err;
1016 }
1017 if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
1018 {
1019 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
1020 PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
1021 goto err;
1022 }
1023 parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
1024 parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
1025 sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
1026
1027 sig.digest = &digest;
1028 sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
1029 sig.digest->length = m_len;
1030
1031 i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
1032 }
1033
1034 j = RSA_size(rsa);
1035 if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
1036 {
1037 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
1038 goto err;
1039 }
1040
1041 if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
1042 {
1043 s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
1044 if (s == NULL)
1045 {
1046 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1047 goto err;
1048 }
1049 p = s;
1050 (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
1051 }
1052
1053 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
1054 goto err;
1055
1056 (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
1057
1058 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
1059 if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1060 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
1061 pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
1062 &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
1063 &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, sp->session);
1064
1065 if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1066 {
1067 rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
1068
1069 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1070 {
1071 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
1072 goto err;
1073 }
1074
1075 ulsiglen = j;
1076 rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
1077 (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
1078 *siglen = ulsiglen;
1079
1080 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1081 {
1082 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
1083 goto err;
1084 }
1085 ret = 1;
1086 }
1087
1088 err:
1089 if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
1090 {
1091 (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
1092 OPENSSL_free(s);
1093 }
1094
1095 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
1096 return (ret);
1097 }
1098
1099 static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
1100 unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
1101 const RSA *rsa)
1102 {
1103 X509_SIG sig;
1104 ASN1_TYPE parameter;
1105 int i, j;
1106 unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
1107 X509_ALGOR algor;
1108 ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
1109 CK_RV rv;
1110 CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
1111 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
1112 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
1113 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
1114 int ret = 0;
1115
1116 /* Encode the digest */
1117 /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
1118 if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
1119 {
1120 if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
1121 {
1122 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
1123 PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
1124 goto err;
1125 }
1126 i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
1127 s = (unsigned char *)m;
1128 }
1129 else
1130 {
1131 sig.algor = &algor;
1132 sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
1133 if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
1134 {
1135 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
1136 PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
1137 goto err;
1138 }
1139 if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
1140 {
1141 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
1142 PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
1143 goto err;
1144 }
1145 parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
1146 parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
1147 sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
1148 sig.digest = &digest;
1149 sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
1150 sig.digest->length = m_len;
1151 i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
1152 }
1153
1154 j = RSA_size(rsa);
1155 if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
1156 {
1157 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
1158 goto err;
1159 }
1160
1161 if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
1162 {
1163 s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
1164 if (s == NULL)
1165 {
1166 PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1167 goto err;
1168 }
1169 p = s;
1170 (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
1171 }
1172
1173 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
1174 goto err;
1175
1176 (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
1177
1178 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
1179 if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1180 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
1181 pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
1182 &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
1183 sp->session);
1184
1185 if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1186 {
1187 rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
1188 h_pub_key);
1189
1190 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1191 {
1192 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
1193 rv);
1194 goto err;
1195 }
1196 rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, (CK_BYTE_PTR) sigbuf,
1197 (CK_ULONG)siglen);
1198
1199 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1200 {
1201 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
1202 goto err;
1203 }
1204 ret = 1;
1205 }
1206
1207 err:
1208 if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
1209 {
1210 (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)siglen);
1211 OPENSSL_free(s);
1212 }
1213
1214 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
1215 return (ret);
1216 }
1217
1218 /* load RSA private key from a file */
1219 /* ARGSUSED */
1220 EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char *privkey_file,
1221 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
1222 {
1223 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1224 FILE *pubkey;
1225 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1226 RSA *rsa;
1227 PK11_SESSION *sp;
1228
1229 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
1230 return (NULL);
1231
1232 if ((pubkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
1233 {
1234 pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1235 (void) fclose(pubkey);
1236 if (pkey != NULL)
1237 {
1238 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
1239 if (rsa != NULL)
1240 {
1241 (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
1242
1243 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
1244 pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
1245 &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
1246 sp->session);
1247 if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1248 {
1249 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1250 pkey = NULL;
1251 }
1252 }
1253 else
1254 {
1255 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1256 pkey = NULL;
1257 }
1258 }
1259 }
1260
1261 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
1262 return (pkey);
1263 }
1264
1265 /* load RSA public key from a file */
1266 /* ARGSUSED */
1267 EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char *pubkey_file,
1268 UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
1269 {
1270 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1271 FILE *pubkey;
1272 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1273 RSA *rsa;
1274 PK11_SESSION *sp;
1275
1276 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
1277 return (NULL);
1278
1279 if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
1280 {
1281 pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1282 (void) fclose(pubkey);
1283 if (pkey != NULL)
1284 {
1285 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
1286 if (rsa != NULL)
1287 {
1288 (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
1289
1290 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
1291 pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
1292 &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
1293 &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
1294 if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1295 {
1296 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1297 pkey = NULL;
1298 }
1299 }
1300 else
1301 {
1302 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1303 pkey = NULL;
1304 }
1305 }
1306 }
1307
1308 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
1309 return (pkey);
1310 }
1311
1312 /*
1313 * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
1314 * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
1315 */
1316 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa,
1317 RSA** key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
1318 CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
1319 {
1320 CK_RV rv;
1321 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1322 CK_ULONG found;
1323 CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
1324 CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
1325 CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
1326 CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
1327
1328 CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
1329 {
1330 {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
1331 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
1332 {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
1333 {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
1334 {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &true, sizeof (true)},
1335 {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
1336 {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
1337 };
1338
1339 int i;
1340
1341 a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
1342 a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
1343
1344 a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
1345 a_key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
1346 (size_t)a_key_template[5].ulValueLen);
1347 if (a_key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
1348 {
1349 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1350 goto malloc_err;
1351 }
1352
1353 BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[5].pValue);
1354
1355 a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
1356 a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
1357 (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
1358 if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
1359 {
1360 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1361 goto malloc_err;
1362 }
1363
1364 BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[6].pValue);
1365
1366 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
1367 LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
1368 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
1369 ul_key_attr_count);
1370
1371 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1372 {
1373 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
1374 rv);
1375 goto err;
1376 }
1377
1378 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
1379
1380 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1381 {
1382 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
1383 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
1384 goto err;
1385 }
1386
1387 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
1388
1389 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1390 {
1391 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
1392 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
1393 goto err;
1394 }
1395
1396 if (found == 0)
1397 {
1398 rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
1399 a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
1400 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1401 {
1402 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
1403 PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
1404 goto err;
1405 }
1406 }
1407
1408 if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
1409 if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
1410 {
1411 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1412 rollback = TRUE;
1413 goto err;
1414 }
1415 if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
1416 if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
1417 {
1418 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1419 BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
1420 *rsa_n_num = NULL;
1421 rollback = TRUE;
1422 goto err;
1423 }
1424
1425 /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
1426 KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
1427 if (key_ptr != NULL)
1428 *key_ptr = rsa;
1429
1430 err:
1431 if (rollback)
1432 {
1433 /*
1434 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
1435 * since we are doing rollback.
1436 */
1437 if (found == 0)
1438 (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
1439 h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1440 }
1441
1442 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
1443
1444 malloc_err:
1445 for (i = 5; i <= 6; i++)
1446 {
1447 if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
1448 {
1449 OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
1450 a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
1451 }
1452 }
1453
1454 return (h_key);
1455 }
1456
1457 /*
1458 * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
1459 * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
1460 */
1461 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa,
1462 RSA** key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
1463 {
1464 CK_RV rv;
1465 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1466 int i;
1467 CK_ULONG found;
1468 CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
1469 CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
1470 CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
1471 CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
1472
1473 /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
1474 CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
1475 {
1476 {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
1477 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
1478 {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
1479 {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
1480 {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof (true)},
1481 {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
1482 {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
1483 {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
1484 {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
1485 {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
1486 {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
1487 {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
1488 {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
1489 {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
1490 };
1491
1492 a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
1493 a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
1494
1495 /* Put the private key components into the template */
1496 if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
1497 &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1498 init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
1499 &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1500 init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
1501 &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1502 init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
1503 &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1504 init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
1505 &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1506 init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
1507 &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1508 init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
1509 &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1510 init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
1511 &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
1512 {
1513 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1514 goto malloc_err;
1515 }
1516
1517 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
1518 LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
1519 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
1520 ul_key_attr_count);
1521
1522 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1523 {
1524 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
1525 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
1526 goto err;
1527 }
1528
1529 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
1530
1531 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1532 {
1533 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
1534 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
1535 goto err;
1536 }
1537
1538 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
1539
1540 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1541 {
1542 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
1543 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
1544 goto err;
1545 }
1546
1547 if (found == 0)
1548 {
1549 rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
1550 a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
1551 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1552 {
1553 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
1554 PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
1555 goto err;
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
1560 if ((*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
1561 {
1562 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1563 rollback = TRUE;
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566
1567 /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
1568 KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
1569 if (key_ptr != NULL)
1570 *key_ptr = rsa;
1571
1572 err:
1573 if (rollback)
1574 {
1575 /*
1576 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
1577 * since we are doing rollback.
1578 */
1579 if (found == 0)
1580 (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
1581 h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1582 }
1583
1584 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
1585
1586 malloc_err:
1587 /*
1588 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
1589 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
1590 */
1591 for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
1592 {
1593 if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
1594 {
1595 (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
1596 a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
1597 OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
1598 a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
1599 }
1600 }
1601
1602 return (h_key);
1603 }
1604
1605 /*
1606 * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
1607 * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
1608 */
1609 static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
1610 {
1611 /*
1612 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
1613 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
1614 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
1615 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
1616 */
1617 if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
1618 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
1619 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0))
1620 {
1621 /*
1622 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
1623 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
1624 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
1625 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
1626 */
1627 (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
1628 return (0);
1629 }
1630 return (1);
1631 }
1632
1633 /*
1634 * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
1635 * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
1636 */
1637 static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
1638 {
1639 /*
1640 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
1641 * check for cache hit stronger. Comparing private exponent of RSA
1642 * key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure should
1643 * be sufficient.
1644 */
1645 if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
1646 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, rsa->d) != 0))
1647 {
1648 /*
1649 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
1650 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
1651 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
1652 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
1653 */
1654 (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
1655 return (0);
1656 }
1657 return (1);
1658 }
1659 #endif
1660
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1662 /* The DSA function implementation */
1663 /* ARGSUSED */
1664 static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
1665 {
1666 return (1);
1667 }
1668
1669 /* ARGSUSED */
1670 static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
1671 {
1672 return (1);
1673 }
1674
1675
1676 static DSA_SIG *
1677 pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
1678 {
1679 BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
1680 int i;
1681 DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
1682
1683 CK_RV rv;
1684 CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
1685 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
1686 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
1687
1688 /*
1689 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
1690 * each is 20 bytes long
1691 */
1692 unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
1693 unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
1694 unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
1695
1696 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
1697
1698 if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
1699 {
1700 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
1701 goto ret;
1702 }
1703
1704 i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
1705 if (dlen > i)
1706 {
1707 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1708 goto ret;
1709 }
1710
1711 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
1712 goto ret;
1713
1714 (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
1715
1716 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
1717 if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1718 h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
1719 pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
1720 &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
1721 &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
1722
1723 if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1724 {
1725 rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
1726
1727 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1728 {
1729 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
1730 goto ret;
1731 }
1732
1733 (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
1734 rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
1735 (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigret,
1736 (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
1737
1738 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1739 {
1740 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
1741 goto ret;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745
1746 if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
1747 {
1748 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1749 goto ret;
1750 }
1751
1752 if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
1753 {
1754 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 goto ret;
1756 }
1757
1758 if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
1759 {
1760 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1761 goto ret;
1762 }
1763
1764 if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
1765 BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
1766 {
1767 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1768 goto ret;
1769 }
1770
1771 dsa_sig->r = r;
1772 dsa_sig->s = s;
1773
1774 ret:
1775 if (dsa_sig == NULL)
1776 {
1777 if (r != NULL)
1778 BN_free(r);
1779 if (s != NULL)
1780 BN_free(s);
1781 }
1782
1783 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
1784 return (dsa_sig);
1785 }
1786
1787 static int
1788 pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
1789 DSA *dsa)
1790 {
1791 int i;
1792 CK_RV rv;
1793 int retval = 0;
1794 CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
1795 CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
1796 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
1797
1798 unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
1799 unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
1800 unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
1801
1802 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
1803
1804 if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
1805 {
1806 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
1807 PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
1808 goto ret;
1809 }
1810
1811 if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
1812 {
1813 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
1814 PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
1815 goto ret;
1816 }
1817
1818 i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
1819
1820 if (dlen > i)
1821 {
1822 PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
1823 PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1824 goto ret;
1825 }
1826
1827 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
1828 goto ret;
1829
1830 (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
1831
1832 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
1833 if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1834 h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
1835 pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
1836 &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
1837
1838 if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
1839 {
1840 rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
1841 h_pub_key);
1842
1843 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1844 {
1845 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
1846 rv);
1847 goto ret;
1848 }
1849
1850 /*
1851 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
1852 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
1853 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
1854 */
1855 (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
1856 BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
1857 BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
1858 BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
1859
1860 rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
1861 (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
1862
1863 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1864 {
1865 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
1866 goto ret;
1867 }
1868 }
1869
1870 retval = 1;
1871 ret:
1872
1873 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
1874 return (retval);
1875 }
1876
1877
1878 /*
1879 * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
1880 * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
1881 */
1882 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
1883 DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
1884 {
1885 CK_RV rv;
1886 CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
1887 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1888 CK_ULONG found;
1889 CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
1890 CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
1891 CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
1892 int i;
1893
1894 CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
1895 {
1896 {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
1897 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
1898 {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
1899 {CKA_VERIFY, &true, sizeof (true)},
1900 {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
1901 {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
1902 {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
1903 {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */
1904 };
1905
1906 a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
1907 a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
1908
1909 if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
1910 &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1911 init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
1912 &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1913 init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
1914 &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
1915 init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
1916 &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
1917 {
1918 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1919 goto malloc_err;
1920 }
1921
1922 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
1923 LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
1924 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
1925 ul_key_attr_count);
1926
1927 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1928 {
1929 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,
1930 rv);
1931 goto err;
1932 }
1933
1934 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
1935
1936 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1937 {
1938 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
1939 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
1940 goto err;
1941 }
1942
1943 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
1944
1945 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1946 {
1947 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
1948 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951
1952 if (found == 0)
1953 {
1954 rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
1955 a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
1956 if (rv != CKR_OK)
1957 {
1958 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
1959 PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
1960 goto err;
1961 }
1962 }
1963
1964 if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
1965 if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
1966 {
1967 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1968 rollback = TRUE;
1969 goto err;
1970 }
1971
1972 /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
1973 KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
1974 if (key_ptr != NULL)
1975 *key_ptr = dsa;
1976
1977 err:
1978 if (rollback)
1979 {
1980 /*
1981 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
1982 * since we are doing rollback.
1983 */
1984 if (found == 0)
1985 (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
1986 h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
1987 }
1988
1989 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
1990
1991 malloc_err:
1992 for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
1993 {
1994 if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
1995 {
1996 OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
1997 a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
1998 }
1999 }
2000
2001 return (h_key);
2002 }
2003
2004 /*
2005 * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
2006 * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
2007 */
2008 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
2009 DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
2010 {
2011 CK_RV rv;
2012 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2013 CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
2014 int i;
2015 CK_ULONG found;
2016 CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
2017 CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
2018 CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
2019
2020 /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
2021 CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
2022 {
2023 {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
2024 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
2025 {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof (true)},
2026 {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (true)},
2027 {CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
2028 {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */
2029 {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */
2030 {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */
2031 {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */
2032 };
2033
2034 a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
2035 a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
2036
2037 /* Put the private key components into the template */
2038 if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
2039 &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
2040 init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
2041 &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
2042 init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
2043 &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
2044 init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
2045 &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
2046 {
2047 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2048 goto malloc_err;
2049 }
2050
2051 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
2052 LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
2053 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
2054 ul_key_attr_count);
2055
2056 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2057 {
2058 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
2059 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
2060 goto err;
2061 }
2062
2063 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
2064
2065 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2066 {
2067 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
2068 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
2069 goto err;
2070 }
2071
2072 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
2073
2074 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2075 {
2076 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
2077 PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
2078 goto err;
2079 }
2080
2081 if (found == 0)
2082 {
2083 rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
2084 a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
2085 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2086 {
2087 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
2088 PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
2089 goto err;
2090 }
2091 }
2092
2093 if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
2094 if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
2095 {
2096 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2097 rollback = TRUE;
2098 goto err;
2099 }
2100
2101 /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
2102 KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
2103 if (key_ptr != NULL)
2104 *key_ptr = dsa;
2105
2106 err:
2107 if (rollback)
2108 {
2109 /*
2110 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
2111 * since we are doing rollback.
2112 */
2113 if (found == 0)
2114 (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
2115 h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2116 }
2117
2118 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
2119
2120 malloc_err:
2121 /*
2122 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
2123 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
2124 */
2125 for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
2126 {
2127 if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
2128 {
2129 (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
2130 a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
2131 OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
2132 a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
2133 }
2134 }
2135
2136 return (h_key);
2137 }
2138
2139 /*
2140 * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
2141 * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
2142 */
2143 static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
2144 {
2145 /*
2146 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
2147 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
2148 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
2149 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
2150 */
2151 if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
2152 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
2153 {
2154 /*
2155 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
2156 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
2157 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
2158 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
2159 */
2160 (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
2161 return (0);
2162 }
2163 return (1);
2164 }
2165
2166 /*
2167 * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
2168 * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
2169 */
2170 static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
2171 {
2172 /*
2173 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
2174 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
2175 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
2176 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
2177 */
2178 if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
2179 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
2180 {
2181 /*
2182 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
2183 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
2184 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
2185 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
2186 */
2187 (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
2188 return (0);
2189 }
2190 return (1);
2191 }
2192 #endif
2193
2194
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2196 /* The DH function implementation */
2197 /* ARGSUSED */
2198 static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
2199 {
2200 return (1);
2201 }
2202
2203 /* ARGSUSED */
2204 static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
2205 {
2206 return (1);
2207 }
2208
2209 /*
2210 * Generate DH key-pair.
2211 *
2212 * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
2213 * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
2214 * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
2215 * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
2216 * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
2217 */
2218 static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
2219 {
2220 CK_ULONG i;
2221 CK_RV rv, rv1;
2222 int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
2223 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
2224 CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
2225
2226 CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
2227 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2228 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2229
2230 CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
2231 CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
2232 {
2233 {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
2234 {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
2235 {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
2236 };
2237
2238 CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
2239 CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
2240 {
2241 {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
2242 {CKA_SENSITIVE, &false, sizeof (false)},
2243 {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)}
2244 };
2245
2246 CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
2247 CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
2248 {
2249 {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
2250 };
2251
2252 CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
2253 CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
2254 {
2255 {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
2256 };
2257
2258 pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
2259 if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
2260 {
2261 /*
2262 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
2263 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
2264 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
2265 */
2266 pub_key_template[1].pValue =
2267 OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
2268 DH_BUF_RESERVE);
2269 if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
2270 {
2271 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2272 goto err;
2273 }
2274
2275 i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
2276 }
2277 else
2278 goto err;
2279
2280 pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
2281 if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
2282 {
2283 pub_key_template[2].pValue =
2284 OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
2285 DH_BUF_RESERVE);
2286 if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
2287 {
2288 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2289 goto err;
2290 }
2291
2292 i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
2293 }
2294 else
2295 goto err;
2296
2297 /*
2298 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
2299 * a session handle. The objects created in this function are
2300 * destroyed before return and thus not cached.
2301 */
2302 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
2303 goto err;
2304
2305 rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
2306 &mechanism,
2307 pub_key_template,
2308 ul_pub_key_attr_count,
2309 priv_key_template,
2310 ul_priv_key_attr_count,
2311 &h_pub_key,
2312 &h_priv_key);
2313 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2314 {
2315 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
2316 goto err;
2317 }
2318
2319 /*
2320 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
2321 * should be sufficient for reuse.
2322 */
2323 if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
2324 {
2325 reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
2326 reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
2327 }
2328 else
2329 {
2330 reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
2331 reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
2332 }
2333
2334 rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
2335 pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
2336 rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
2337 priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
2338
2339 if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
2340 {
2341 rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
2342 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2343 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
2344 goto err;
2345 }
2346
2347 if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
2348 ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
2349 {
2350 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
2351 goto err;
2352 }
2353
2354 /* Reuse the memory allocated */
2355 pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
2356 pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
2357
2358 rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
2359 pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
2360
2361 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2362 {
2363 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2364 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
2365 goto err;
2366 }
2367
2368 if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
2369 {
2370 if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
2371 if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
2372 {
2373 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2374 PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2375 goto err;
2376 }
2377 dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
2378 pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
2379 if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
2380 {
2381 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 goto err;
2383 }
2384 }
2385
2386 /* Reuse the memory allocated */
2387 priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
2388 priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
2389
2390 rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
2391 priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
2392
2393 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2394 {
2395 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2396 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
2397 goto err;
2398 }
2399
2400 if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
2401 {
2402 if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
2403 if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
2404 {
2405 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2406 PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2407 goto err;
2408 }
2409 dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
2410 priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
2411 if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
2412 {
2413 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2414 goto err;
2415 }
2416 }
2417
2418 ret = 1;
2419
2420 err:
2421
2422 if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
2423 {
2424 rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
2425 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2426 {
2427 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2428 PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
2429 }
2430 }
2431
2432 if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
2433 {
2434 rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
2435 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2436 {
2437 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
2438 PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
2439 }
2440 }
2441
2442 for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
2443 {
2444 if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
2445 {
2446 OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
2447 pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
2448 }
2449 }
2450
2451 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
2452 return (ret);
2453 }
2454
2455 static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
2456 DH *dh)
2457 {
2458 int i;
2459 CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
2460 CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
2461 CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
2462 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2463 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2464
2465 CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 2;
2466 CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
2467 {
2468 {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
2469 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
2470 };
2471
2472 CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
2473 CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
2474 {
2475 {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
2476 };
2477
2478 CK_RV rv;
2479 int ret = -1;
2480 PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
2481
2482 if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
2483 goto err;
2484
2485 priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
2486 priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
2487
2488 if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
2489 goto err;
2490
2491 mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
2492 mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
2493 if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
2494 {
2495 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2496 goto err;
2497 }
2498 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
2499
2500 (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
2501
2502 h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
2503 if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
2504 h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
2505 pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
2506 &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
2507
2508 if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
2509 {
2510 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
2511 goto err;
2512 }
2513
2514 rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
2515 &mechanism,
2516 h_key,
2517 priv_key_template,
2518 ul_priv_key_attr_count,
2519 &h_derived_key);
2520 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2521 {
2522 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525
2526 rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
2527 priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
2528
2529 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2530 {
2531 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
2532 rv);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535
2536 if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
2537 {
2538 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
2539 goto err;
2540 }
2541 priv_key_result[0].pValue =
2542 OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
2543 if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
2544 {
2545 PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2546 goto err;
2547 }
2548
2549 rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
2550 priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
2551
2552 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2553 {
2554 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
2555 rv);
2556 goto err;
2557 }
2558
2559 /*
2560 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
2561 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
2562 */
2563 if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
2564 {
2565 /*
2566 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
2567 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
2568 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
2569 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
2570 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
2571 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
2572 * pre-master secret.
2573 */
2574 for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
2575 {
2576 if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
2577 break;
2578 }
2579
2580 (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
2581 priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
2582 ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
2583 }
2584
2585 err:
2586
2587 if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
2588 {
2589 rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
2590 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2591 {
2592 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
2593 PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
2594 }
2595 }
2596 if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
2597 {
2598 OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
2599 priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
2600 }
2601
2602 if (mechanism.pParameter)
2603 {
2604 OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
2605 mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
2606 }
2607
2608 pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
2609 return (ret);
2610 }
2611
2612
2613 static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
2614 DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
2615 {
2616 CK_RV rv;
2617 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2618 CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
2619 CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
2620 CK_ULONG found;
2621 CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
2622 int i;
2623
2624 CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
2625 CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
2626 {
2627 {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
2628 {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
2629 {CKA_DERIVE, &true, sizeof (true)},
2630 {CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
2631 {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
2632 {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
2633 {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
2634 };
2635
2636 key_template[0].pValue = &class;
2637 key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
2638
2639 key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
2640 key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
2641 (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
2642 if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
2643 {
2644 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2645 goto malloc_err;
2646 }
2647
2648 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
2649
2650 key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
2651 key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
2652 (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
2653 if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
2654 {
2655 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2656 goto malloc_err;
2657 }
2658
2659 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
2660
2661 key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
2662 key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
2663 (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
2664 if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
2665 {
2666 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2667 goto malloc_err;
2668 }
2669
2670 BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
2671
2672 /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
2673 LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
2674 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
2675 ul_key_attr_count);
2676
2677 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2678 {
2679 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
2680 goto err;
2681 }
2682
2683 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
2684
2685 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2686 {
2687 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
2688 goto err;
2689 }
2690
2691 rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
2692
2693 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2694 {
2695 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
2696 rv);
2697 goto err;
2698 }
2699
2700 if (found == 0)
2701 {
2702 rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
2703 key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
2704 if (rv != CKR_OK)
2705 {
2706 PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
2707 rv);
2708 goto err;
2709 }
2710 }
2711
2712 if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
2713 if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
2714 {
2715 PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 rollback = TRUE;
2717 goto err;
2718 }
2719
2720 /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
2721 KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
2722 if (key_ptr != NULL)
2723 *key_ptr = dh;
2724
2725 err:
2726 if (rollback)
2727 {
2728 /*
2729 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
2730 * since we are doing rollback.
2731 */
2732 if (found == 0)
2733 (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
2734 h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
2735 }
2736
2737 UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
2738
2739 malloc_err:
2740 for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
2741 {
2742 if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
2743 {
2744 OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
2745 key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
2746 }
2747 }
2748
2749 return (h_key);
2750 }
2751
2752 /*
2753 * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
2754 * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
2755 *
2756 * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
2757 * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
2758 */
2759 static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
2760 {
2761 /*
2762 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
2763 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
2764 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
2765 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
2766 */
2767 if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
2768 (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
2769 {
2770 /*
2771 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
2772 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
2773 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
2774 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
2775 */
2776 (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
2777 return (0);
2778 }
2779 return (1);
2780 }
2781 #endif
2782
2783 /*
2784 * Local function to simplify key template population
2785 * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
2786 */
2787 static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
2788 CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
2789 {
2790 CK_ULONG len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
2791 if (len == 0)
2792 return (1);
2793
2794 *ul_value_len = len;
2795 *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
2796 if (*p_value == NULL)
2797 return (0);
2798
2799 BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
2800
2801 return (1);
2802 }
2803
2804 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
2805 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */