1 /*
   2  * CDDL HEADER START
   3  *
   4  * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
   5  * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
   6  * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
   7  *
   8  * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
   9  * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
  10  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
  11  * and limitations under the License.
  12  *
  13  * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
  14  * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
  15  * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
  16  * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
  17  * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
  18  *
  19  * CDDL HEADER END
  20  */
  21 
  22 /*
  23  * Copyright (c) 1992, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
  24  */
  25 
  26 /*
  27  * This file contains the audit hook support code for auditing.
  28  */
  29 
  30 #include <sys/types.h>
  31 #include <sys/proc.h>
  32 #include <sys/vnode.h>
  33 #include <sys/vfs.h>
  34 #include <sys/file.h>
  35 #include <sys/user.h>
  36 #include <sys/stropts.h>
  37 #include <sys/systm.h>
  38 #include <sys/pathname.h>
  39 #include <sys/syscall.h>
  40 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
  41 #include <sys/ipc_impl.h>
  42 #include <sys/msg_impl.h>
  43 #include <sys/sem_impl.h>
  44 #include <sys/shm_impl.h>
  45 #include <sys/kmem.h>             /* for KM_SLEEP */
  46 #include <sys/socket.h>
  47 #include <sys/cmn_err.h>  /* snprintf... */
  48 #include <sys/debug.h>
  49 #include <sys/thread.h>
  50 #include <netinet/in.h>
  51 #include <c2/audit.h>             /* needs to be included before user.h */
  52 #include <c2/audit_kernel.h>      /* for M_DONTWAIT */
  53 #include <c2/audit_kevents.h>
  54 #include <c2/audit_record.h>
  55 #include <sys/strsubr.h>
  56 #include <sys/tihdr.h>
  57 #include <sys/tiuser.h>
  58 #include <sys/timod.h>
  59 #include <sys/model.h>            /* for model_t */
  60 #include <sys/disp.h>             /* for servicing_interrupt() */
  61 #include <sys/devpolicy.h>
  62 #include <sys/crypto/ioctladmin.h>
  63 #include <sys/cred_impl.h>
  64 #include <inet/kssl/kssl.h>
  65 #include <net/pfpolicy.h>
  66 
  67 static void add_return_token(caddr_t *, unsigned int scid, int err, int rval);
  68 
  69 static void audit_pathbuild(struct pathname *pnp);
  70 
  71 
  72 /*
  73  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_SAVEPATH
  74  * PURPOSE:
  75  * CALLBY:      LOOKUPPN
  76  *
  77  * NOTE:        We have reached the end of a path in fs/lookup.c.
  78  *              We get two pieces of information here:
  79  *              the vnode of the last component (vp) and
  80  *              the status of the last access (flag).
  81  * TODO:
  82  * QUESTION:
  83  */
  84 
  85 /*ARGSUSED*/
  86 int
  87 audit_savepath(
  88         struct pathname *pnp,           /* pathname to lookup */
  89         struct vnode *vp,               /* vnode of the last component */
  90         struct vnode *pvp,              /* vnode of the last parent component */
  91         int    flag,                    /* status of the last access */
  92         cred_t *cr)                     /* cred of requestor */
  93 {
  94 
  95         t_audit_data_t *tad;    /* current thread */
  96         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
  97 
  98         tad = U2A(u);
  99 
 100         /*
 101          * Noise elimination in audit trails - this event will be discarded if:
 102          * - the public policy is not active AND
 103          * - the system call is a public operation AND
 104          * - the file was not found: VFS lookup failed with ENOENT error AND
 105          * - the missing file would have been located in the public directory
 106          *   owned by root if it had existed
 107          */
 108         if (tad->tad_flag != 0 && flag == ENOENT && pvp != NULL &&
 109             (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_PUBLIC_EV) &&
 110             !(kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_PUBLIC)) {
 111                 struct vattr attr;
 112 
 113                 attr.va_mask = AT_ALL;
 114                 if (VOP_GETATTR(pvp, &attr, 0, CRED(), NULL) == 0) {
 115                         if (object_is_public(&attr)) {
 116                                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOAUDIT;
 117                         }
 118                 }
 119         }
 120 
 121         /*
 122          * this event being audited or do we need path information
 123          * later? This might be for a chdir/chroot or open (add path
 124          * to file pointer. If the path has already been found for an
 125          * open/creat then we don't need to process the path.
 126          *
 127          * S2E_SP (TAD_SAVPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 128          *      chroot, chdir, open, creat system call processing. It determines
 129          *      if audit_savepath() will discard the path or we need it later.
 130          * TAD_PATHFND means path already included in this audit record. It
 131          *      is used in cases where multiple path lookups are done per
 132          *      system call. The policy flag, AUDIT_PATH, controls if multiple
 133          *      paths are allowed.
 134          * S2E_NPT (TAD_NOPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 135          *      exit processing to inhibit any paths that may be added due to
 136          *      closes.
 137          */
 138         if ((tad->tad_flag == 0 && !(tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_SAVPATH)) ||
 139             ((tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_PATHFND) &&
 140             !(kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_PATH)) ||
 141             (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_NOPATH)) {
 142                 return (0);
 143         }
 144 
 145         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOPATH;         /* prevent possible reentry */
 146 
 147         audit_pathbuild(pnp);
 148 
 149         /*
 150          * are we auditing only if error, or if it is not open or create
 151          * otherwise audit_setf will do it
 152          */
 153 
 154         if (tad->tad_flag) {
 155                 if (flag &&
 156                     (tad->tad_scid == SYS_open ||
 157                     tad->tad_scid == SYS_open64 ||
 158                     tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat ||
 159                     tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat64)) {
 160                         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_TRUE_CREATE;
 161                 }
 162 
 163                 /* add token to audit record for this name */
 164                 au_uwrite(au_to_path(tad->tad_aupath));
 165 
 166                 /* add the attributes of the object */
 167                 if (vp) {
 168                         /*
 169                          * only capture attributes when there is no error
 170                          * lookup will not return the vnode of the failing
 171                          * component.
 172                          *
 173                          * if there was a lookup error, then don't add
 174                          * attribute. if lookup in vn_create(),
 175                          * then don't add attribute,
 176                          * it will be added at end of vn_create().
 177                          */
 178                         if (!flag && !(tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_NOATTRB))
 179                                 audit_attributes(vp);
 180                 }
 181         }
 182 
 183         /* free up space if we're not going to save path (open, creat) */
 184         if ((tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_SAVPATH) == 0) {
 185                 if (tad->tad_aupath != NULL) {
 186                         au_pathrele(tad->tad_aupath);
 187                         tad->tad_aupath = NULL;
 188                 }
 189         }
 190         if (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_MLD)
 191                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_PATHFND;
 192 
 193         tad->tad_ctrl &= ~TAD_NOPATH;            /* restore */
 194         return (0);
 195 }
 196 
 197 static void
 198 audit_pathbuild(struct pathname *pnp)
 199 {
 200         char *pp;       /* pointer to path */
 201         int len;        /* length of incoming segment */
 202         int newsect;    /* path requires a new section */
 203         struct audit_path       *pfxapp;        /* prefix for path */
 204         struct audit_path       *newapp;        /* new audit_path */
 205         t_audit_data_t *tad;    /* current thread */
 206         p_audit_data_t *pad;    /* current process */
 207 
 208         tad = U2A(u);
 209         ASSERT(tad != NULL);
 210         pad = P2A(curproc);
 211         ASSERT(pad != NULL);
 212 
 213         len = (pnp->pn_path - pnp->pn_buf) + 1;           /* +1 for terminator */
 214         ASSERT(len > 0);
 215 
 216         /* adjust for path prefix: tad_aupath, ATPATH, CRD, or CWD */
 217         mutex_enter(&pad->pad_lock);
 218         if (tad->tad_aupath != NULL) {
 219                 pfxapp = tad->tad_aupath;
 220         } else if ((tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_ATCALL) && pnp->pn_buf[0] != '/') {
 221                 ASSERT(tad->tad_atpath != NULL);
 222                 pfxapp = tad->tad_atpath;
 223         } else if (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_ABSPATH) {
 224                 pfxapp = pad->pad_root;
 225         } else {
 226                 pfxapp = pad->pad_cwd;
 227         }
 228         au_pathhold(pfxapp);
 229         mutex_exit(&pad->pad_lock);
 230 
 231         /* get an expanded buffer to hold the anchored path */
 232         newsect = tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_ATTPATH;
 233         newapp = au_pathdup(pfxapp, newsect, len);
 234         au_pathrele(pfxapp);
 235 
 236         pp = newapp->audp_sect[newapp->audp_cnt] - len;
 237         if (!newsect) {
 238                 /* overlay previous NUL terminator */
 239                 *(pp - 1) = '/';
 240         }
 241 
 242         /* now add string of processed path */
 243         bcopy(pnp->pn_buf, pp, len);
 244         pp[len - 1] = '\0';
 245 
 246         /* perform path simplification as necessary */
 247         audit_fixpath(newapp, len);
 248 
 249         if (tad->tad_aupath)
 250                 au_pathrele(tad->tad_aupath);
 251         tad->tad_aupath = newapp;
 252 
 253         /* for case where multiple lookups in one syscall (rename) */
 254         tad->tad_ctrl &= ~(TAD_ABSPATH | TAD_ATTPATH);
 255 }
 256 
 257 
 258 /*
 259  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_ANCHORPATH
 260  * PURPOSE:
 261  * CALLBY:      LOOKUPPN
 262  * NOTE:
 263  * anchor path at "/". We have seen a symbolic link or entering for the
 264  * first time we will throw away any saved path if path is anchored.
 265  *
 266  * flag = 0, path is relative.
 267  * flag = 1, path is absolute. Free any saved path and set flag to TAD_ABSPATH.
 268  *
 269  * If the (new) path is absolute, then we have to throw away whatever we have
 270  * already accumulated since it is being superseded by new path which is
 271  * anchored at the root.
 272  *              Note that if the path is relative, this function does nothing
 273  * TODO:
 274  * QUESTION:
 275  */
 276 /*ARGSUSED*/
 277 void
 278 audit_anchorpath(struct pathname *pnp, int flag)
 279 {
 280         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 281         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 282 
 283         tad = U2A(u);
 284 
 285         /*
 286          * this event being audited or do we need path information
 287          * later? This might be for a chdir/chroot or open (add path
 288          * to file pointer. If the path has already been found for an
 289          * open/creat then we don't need to process the path.
 290          *
 291          * S2E_SP (TAD_SAVPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 292          *      chroot, chdir, open, creat system call processing. It determines
 293          *      if audit_savepath() will discard the path or we need it later.
 294          * TAD_PATHFND means path already included in this audit record. It
 295          *      is used in cases where multiple path lookups are done per
 296          *      system call. The policy flag, AUDIT_PATH, controls if multiple
 297          *      paths are allowed.
 298          * S2E_NPT (TAD_NOPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 299          *      exit processing to inhibit any paths that may be added due to
 300          *      closes.
 301          */
 302         if ((tad->tad_flag == 0 && !(tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_SAVPATH)) ||
 303             ((tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_PATHFND) &&
 304             !(kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_PATH)) ||
 305             (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_NOPATH)) {
 306                 return;
 307         }
 308 
 309         if (flag) {
 310                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_ABSPATH;
 311                 if (tad->tad_aupath != NULL) {
 312                         au_pathrele(tad->tad_aupath);
 313                         tad->tad_aupath = NULL;
 314                 }
 315         }
 316 }
 317 
 318 
 319 /*
 320  * symbolic link. Save previous components.
 321  *
 322  * the path seen so far looks like this
 323  *
 324  *  +-----------------------+----------------+
 325  *  | path processed so far | remaining path |
 326  *  +-----------------------+----------------+
 327  *  \-----------------------/
 328  *      save this string if
 329  *      symbolic link relative
 330  *      (but don't include  symlink component)
 331  */
 332 
 333 /*ARGSUSED*/
 334 
 335 
 336 /*
 337  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_SYMLINK
 338  * PURPOSE:
 339  * CALLBY:      LOOKUPPN
 340  * NOTE:
 341  * TODO:
 342  * QUESTION:
 343  */
 344 void
 345 audit_symlink(struct pathname *pnp, struct pathname *sympath)
 346 {
 347         char *sp;       /* saved initial pp */
 348         char *cp;       /* start of symlink path */
 349         uint_t len_path;        /* processed path before symlink */
 350         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 351         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 352 
 353         tad = U2A(u);
 354 
 355         /*
 356          * this event being audited or do we need path information
 357          * later? This might be for a chdir/chroot or open (add path
 358          * to file pointer. If the path has already been found for an
 359          * open/creat then we don't need to process the path.
 360          *
 361          * S2E_SP (TAD_SAVPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 362          *      chroot, chdir, open, creat system call processing. It determines
 363          *      if audit_savepath() will discard the path or we need it later.
 364          * TAD_PATHFND means path already included in this audit record. It
 365          *      is used in cases where multiple path lookups are done per
 366          *      system call. The policy flag, AUDIT_PATH, controls if multiple
 367          *      paths are allowed.
 368          * S2E_NPT (TAD_NOPATH) flag comes from audit_s2e[].au_ctrl. Used with
 369          *      exit processing to inhibit any paths that may be added due to
 370          *      closes.
 371          */
 372         if ((tad->tad_flag == 0 &&
 373             !(tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_SAVPATH)) ||
 374             ((tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_PATHFND) &&
 375             !(kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_PATH)) ||
 376             (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_NOPATH)) {
 377                 return;
 378         }
 379 
 380         /*
 381          * if symbolic link is anchored at / then do nothing.
 382          * When we cycle back to begin: in lookuppn() we will
 383          * call audit_anchorpath() with a flag indicating if the
 384          * path is anchored at / or is relative. We will release
 385          * any saved path at that point.
 386          *
 387          * Note In the event that an error occurs in pn_combine then
 388          * we want to remain pointing at the component that caused the
 389          * path to overflow the pnp structure.
 390          */
 391         if (sympath->pn_buf[0] == '/')
 392                 return;
 393 
 394         /* backup over last component */
 395         sp = cp = pnp->pn_path;
 396         while (*--cp != '/' && cp > pnp->pn_buf)
 397                 ;
 398 
 399         len_path = cp - pnp->pn_buf;
 400 
 401         /* is there anything to save? */
 402         if (len_path) {
 403                 pnp->pn_path = pnp->pn_buf;
 404                 audit_pathbuild(pnp);
 405                 pnp->pn_path = sp;
 406         }
 407 }
 408 
 409 /*
 410  * object_is_public : determine whether events for the object (corresponding to
 411  *                      the specified file/directory attr) should be audited or
 412  *                      ignored.
 413  *
 414  * returns:     1 - if audit policy and object attributes indicate that
 415  *                      file/directory is effectively public. read events for
 416  *                      the file should not be audited.
 417  *              0 - otherwise
 418  *
 419  * The required attributes to be considered a public object are:
 420  * - owned by root, AND
 421  * - world-readable (permissions for other include read), AND
 422  * - NOT world-writeable (permissions for other don't
 423  *      include write)
 424  *   (mode doesn't need to be checked for symlinks)
 425  */
 426 int
 427 object_is_public(struct vattr *attr)
 428 {
 429         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 430 
 431         if (!(kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_PUBLIC) && (attr->va_uid == 0) &&
 432             ((attr->va_type == VLNK) ||
 433             ((attr->va_mode & (VREAD>>6)) != 0) &&
 434             ((attr->va_mode & (VWRITE>>6)) == 0))) {
 435                 return (1);
 436         }
 437         return (0);
 438 }
 439 
 440 
 441 /*
 442  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_ATTRIBUTES
 443  * PURPOSE:     Audit the attributes so we can tell why the error occurred
 444  * CALLBY:      AUDIT_SAVEPATH
 445  *              AUDIT_VNCREATE_FINISH
 446  *              AUS_FCHOWN...audit_event.c...audit_path.c
 447  * NOTE:
 448  * TODO:
 449  * QUESTION:
 450  */
 451 void
 452 audit_attributes(struct vnode *vp)
 453 {
 454         struct vattr attr;
 455         struct t_audit_data *tad;
 456 
 457         tad = U2A(u);
 458 
 459         if (vp) {
 460                 attr.va_mask = AT_ALL;
 461                 if (VOP_GETATTR(vp, &attr, 0, CRED(), NULL) != 0)
 462                         return;
 463 
 464                 if (object_is_public(&attr) &&
 465                     (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_PUBLIC_EV)) {
 466                         /*
 467                          * This is a public object and a "public" event
 468                          * (i.e., read only) -- either by definition
 469                          * (e.g., stat, access...) or by virtue of write access
 470                          * not being requested (e.g. mmap).
 471                          * Flag it in the tad to prevent this audit at the end.
 472                          */
 473                         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOAUDIT;
 474                 } else {
 475                         au_uwrite(au_to_attr(&attr));
 476                         audit_sec_attributes(&(u_ad), vp);
 477                 }
 478         }
 479 }
 480 
 481 
 482 /*
 483  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_EXIT
 484  * PURPOSE:
 485  * CALLBY:      EXIT
 486  * NOTE:
 487  * TODO:
 488  * QUESTION:    why cmw code as offset by 2 but not here
 489  */
 490 /* ARGSUSED */
 491 void
 492 audit_exit(int code, int what)
 493 {
 494         struct t_audit_data *tad;
 495         tad = U2A(u);
 496 
 497         /*
 498          * tad_scid will be set by audit_start even if we are not auditing
 499          * the event.
 500          */
 501         if (tad->tad_scid == SYS_exit) {
 502                 /*
 503                  * if we are auditing the exit system call, then complete
 504                  * audit record generation (no return from system call).
 505                  */
 506                 if (tad->tad_flag && tad->tad_event == AUE_EXIT)
 507                         audit_finish(0, SYS_exit, 0, 0);
 508                 return;
 509         }
 510 
 511         /*
 512          * Anyone auditing the system call that was aborted?
 513          */
 514         if (tad->tad_flag) {
 515                 au_uwrite(au_to_text("event aborted"));
 516                 audit_finish(0, tad->tad_scid, 0, 0);
 517         }
 518 
 519         /*
 520          * Generate an audit record for process exit if preselected.
 521          */
 522         (void) audit_start(0, SYS_exit, AUC_UNSET, 0, 0);
 523         audit_finish(0, SYS_exit, 0, 0);
 524 }
 525 
 526 /*
 527  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_CORE_START
 528  * PURPOSE:
 529  * CALLBY:      PSIG
 530  * NOTE:
 531  * TODO:
 532  */
 533 void
 534 audit_core_start(int sig)
 535 {
 536         au_event_t event;
 537         au_state_t estate;
 538         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 539         au_kcontext_t   *kctx;
 540 
 541         tad = U2A(u);
 542 
 543         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
 544 
 545         ASSERT(tad->tad_scid == 0);
 546         ASSERT(tad->tad_event == 0);
 547         ASSERT(tad->tad_evmod == 0);
 548         ASSERT(tad->tad_ctrl == 0);
 549         ASSERT(tad->tad_flag == 0);
 550         ASSERT(tad->tad_aupath == NULL);
 551 
 552         kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 553 
 554         /* get basic event for system call */
 555         event = AUE_CORE;
 556         estate = kctx->auk_ets[event];
 557 
 558         if ((tad->tad_flag = auditme(kctx, tad, estate)) == 0)
 559                 return;
 560 
 561         /* reset the flags for non-user attributable events */
 562         tad->tad_ctrl   = TAD_CORE;
 563         tad->tad_scid   = 0;
 564 
 565         /* if auditing not enabled, then don't generate an audit record */
 566 
 567         if (!((kctx->auk_auditstate == AUC_AUDITING ||
 568             kctx->auk_auditstate == AUC_INIT_AUDIT) ||
 569             kctx->auk_auditstate == AUC_NOSPACE)) {
 570                 tad->tad_flag = 0;
 571                 tad->tad_ctrl = 0;
 572                 return;
 573         }
 574 
 575         tad->tad_event  = event;
 576         tad->tad_evmod  = 0;
 577 
 578         ASSERT(tad->tad_ad == NULL);
 579 
 580         au_write(&(u_ad), au_to_arg32(1, "signal", (uint32_t)sig));
 581 }
 582 
 583 /*
 584  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_CORE_FINISH
 585  * PURPOSE:
 586  * CALLBY:      PSIG
 587  * NOTE:
 588  * TODO:
 589  * QUESTION:
 590  */
 591 
 592 /*ARGSUSED*/
 593 void
 594 audit_core_finish(int code)
 595 {
 596         int flag;
 597         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 598         au_kcontext_t   *kctx;
 599 
 600         tad = U2A(u);
 601 
 602         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
 603 
 604         if ((flag = tad->tad_flag) == 0) {
 605                 tad->tad_event = 0;
 606                 tad->tad_evmod = 0;
 607                 tad->tad_ctrl  = 0;
 608                 ASSERT(tad->tad_aupath == NULL);
 609                 return;
 610         }
 611         tad->tad_flag = 0;
 612 
 613         kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 614 
 615         /* kludge for error 0, should use `code==CLD_DUMPED' instead */
 616         if (flag = audit_success(kctx, tad, 0, NULL)) {
 617                 cred_t *cr = CRED();
 618                 const auditinfo_addr_t *ainfo = crgetauinfo(cr);
 619 
 620                 ASSERT(ainfo != NULL);
 621 
 622                 /*
 623                  * Add subject information (no locks since our private copy of
 624                  * credential
 625                  */
 626                 AUDIT_SETSUBJ(&(u_ad), cr, ainfo, kctx);
 627 
 628                 /* Add a return token (should use f argument) */
 629                 add_return_token((caddr_t *)&(u_ad), tad->tad_scid, 0, 0);
 630 
 631                 AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
 632                 AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
 633         }
 634 
 635         /* Close up everything */
 636         au_close(kctx, &(u_ad), flag, tad->tad_event, tad->tad_evmod, NULL);
 637 
 638         /* free up any space remaining with the path's */
 639         if (tad->tad_aupath != NULL) {
 640                 au_pathrele(tad->tad_aupath);
 641                 tad->tad_aupath = NULL;
 642         }
 643         tad->tad_event = 0;
 644         tad->tad_evmod = 0;
 645         tad->tad_ctrl  = 0;
 646 }
 647 
 648 
 649 /*ARGSUSED*/
 650 void
 651 audit_strgetmsg(struct vnode *vp, struct strbuf *mctl, struct strbuf *mdata,
 652     unsigned char *pri, int *flag, int fmode)
 653 {
 654         struct stdata *stp;
 655         t_audit_data_t *tad = U2A(u);
 656 
 657         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
 658 
 659         stp = vp->v_stream;
 660 
 661         /* lock stdata from audit_sock */
 662         mutex_enter(&stp->sd_lock);
 663 
 664         /* proceed ONLY if user is being audited */
 665         if (!tad->tad_flag) {
 666                 /*
 667                  * this is so we will not add audit data onto
 668                  * a thread that is not being audited.
 669                  */
 670                 stp->sd_t_audit_data = NULL;
 671                 mutex_exit(&stp->sd_lock);
 672                 return;
 673         }
 674 
 675         stp->sd_t_audit_data = (caddr_t)curthread;
 676         mutex_exit(&stp->sd_lock);
 677 }
 678 
 679 /*ARGSUSED*/
 680 void
 681 audit_strputmsg(struct vnode *vp, struct strbuf *mctl, struct strbuf *mdata,
 682     unsigned char pri, int flag, int fmode)
 683 {
 684         struct stdata *stp;
 685         t_audit_data_t *tad = U2A(u);
 686 
 687         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
 688 
 689         stp = vp->v_stream;
 690 
 691         /* lock stdata from audit_sock */
 692         mutex_enter(&stp->sd_lock);
 693 
 694         /* proceed ONLY if user is being audited */
 695         if (!tad->tad_flag) {
 696                 /*
 697                  * this is so we will not add audit data onto
 698                  * a thread that is not being audited.
 699                  */
 700                 stp->sd_t_audit_data = NULL;
 701                 mutex_exit(&stp->sd_lock);
 702                 return;
 703         }
 704 
 705         stp->sd_t_audit_data = (caddr_t)curthread;
 706         mutex_exit(&stp->sd_lock);
 707 }
 708 
 709 /*
 710  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_CLOSEF
 711  * PURPOSE:
 712  * CALLBY:      CLOSEF
 713  * NOTE:
 714  * release per file audit resources when file structure is being released.
 715  *
 716  * IMPORTANT NOTE: Since we generate an audit record here, we may sleep
 717  *      on the audit queue if it becomes full. This means
 718  *      audit_closef can not be called when f_count == 0. Since
 719  *      f_count == 0 indicates the file structure is free, another
 720  *      process could attempt to use the file while we were still
 721  *      asleep waiting on the audit queue. This would cause the
 722  *      per file audit data to be corrupted when we finally do
 723  *      wakeup.
 724  * TODO:
 725  * QUESTION:
 726  */
 727 
 728 void
 729 audit_closef(struct file *fp)
 730 {       /* AUDIT_CLOSEF */
 731         f_audit_data_t *fad;
 732         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 733         int success;
 734         au_state_t estate;
 735         struct vnode *vp;
 736         token_t *ad = NULL;
 737         struct vattr attr;
 738         au_emod_t evmod = 0;
 739         const auditinfo_addr_t *ainfo;
 740         cred_t *cr;
 741         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 742         uint32_t auditing;
 743         boolean_t audit_attr = B_FALSE;
 744 
 745         fad = F2A(fp);
 746         estate = kctx->auk_ets[AUE_CLOSE];
 747         tad = U2A(u);
 748         cr = CRED();
 749 
 750         /* audit record already generated by system call envelope */
 751         if (tad->tad_event == AUE_CLOSE) {
 752                 /* so close audit event will have bits set */
 753                 tad->tad_evmod |= (au_emod_t)fad->fad_flags;
 754                 return;
 755         }
 756 
 757         /* if auditing not enabled, then don't generate an audit record */
 758         auditing = (tad->tad_audit == AUC_UNSET) ?
 759             kctx->auk_auditstate : tad->tad_audit;
 760         if (auditing & ~(AUC_AUDITING | AUC_INIT_AUDIT | AUC_NOSPACE))
 761                 return;
 762 
 763         ainfo = crgetauinfo(cr);
 764         if (ainfo == NULL)
 765                 return;
 766 
 767         success = ainfo->ai_mask.as_success & estate;
 768 
 769         /* not selected for this event */
 770         if (success == 0)
 771                 return;
 772 
 773         /*
 774          * can't use audit_attributes here since we use a private audit area
 775          * to build the audit record instead of the one off the thread.
 776          */
 777         if ((vp = fp->f_vnode) != NULL) {
 778                 attr.va_mask = AT_ALL;
 779                 if (VOP_GETATTR(vp, &attr, 0, CRED(), NULL) == 0) {
 780                         if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0 &&
 781                             object_is_public(&attr)) {
 782                                 /*
 783                                  * When write was not used and the file can be
 784                                  * considered public, then skip the audit.
 785                                  */
 786                                 return;
 787                         }
 788                         audit_attr = B_TRUE;
 789                 }
 790         }
 791 
 792         evmod = (au_emod_t)fad->fad_flags;
 793         if (fad->fad_aupath != NULL) {
 794                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(ad), au_to_path(fad->fad_aupath));
 795         } else {
 796 #ifdef _LP64
 797                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(ad), au_to_arg64(
 798                         1, "no path: fp", (uint64_t)fp));
 799 #else
 800                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(ad), au_to_arg32(
 801                         1, "no path: fp", (uint32_t)fp));
 802 #endif
 803         }
 804 
 805         if (audit_attr) {
 806                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(ad), au_to_attr(&attr));
 807                 audit_sec_attributes((caddr_t *)&(ad), vp);
 808         }
 809 
 810         /* Add subject information */
 811         AUDIT_SETSUBJ((caddr_t *)&(ad), cr, ainfo, kctx);
 812 
 813         /* add a return token */
 814         add_return_token((caddr_t *)&(ad), tad->tad_scid, 0, 0);
 815 
 816         AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
 817         AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
 818 
 819         /*
 820          * Close up everything
 821          * Note: path space recovery handled by normal system
 822          * call envelope if not at last close.
 823          * Note there is no failure at this point since
 824          *   this represents closes due to exit of process,
 825          *   thus we always indicate successful closes.
 826          */
 827         au_close(kctx, (caddr_t *)&(ad), AU_OK | AU_DEFER,
 828             AUE_CLOSE, evmod, NULL);
 829 }
 830 
 831 /*
 832  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_SET
 833  * PURPOSE:     Audit the file path and file attributes.
 834  * CALLBY:      SETF
 835  * NOTE:        SETF associate a file pointer with user area's open files.
 836  * TODO:
 837  * call audit_finish directly ???
 838  * QUESTION:
 839  */
 840 
 841 /*ARGSUSED*/
 842 void
 843 audit_setf(file_t *fp, int fd)
 844 {
 845         f_audit_data_t *fad;
 846         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 847 
 848         if (fp == NULL)
 849                 return;
 850 
 851         tad = T2A(curthread);
 852         fad = F2A(fp);
 853 
 854         if (!(tad->tad_scid == SYS_open ||
 855             tad->tad_scid == SYS_open64 ||
 856             tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat ||
 857             tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat64))
 858                 return;
 859 
 860         /* no path */
 861         if (tad->tad_aupath == 0)
 862                 return;
 863 
 864         /*
 865          * assign path information associated with file audit data
 866          * use tad hold
 867          */
 868         fad->fad_aupath = tad->tad_aupath;
 869         tad->tad_aupath = NULL;
 870 
 871         if (!(tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_TRUE_CREATE)) {
 872                 /* adjust event type by dropping the 'creat' part */
 873                 switch (tad->tad_event) {
 874                 case AUE_OPEN_RC:
 875                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_R;
 876                         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_PUBLIC_EV;
 877                         break;
 878                 case AUE_OPEN_RTC:
 879                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_RT;
 880                         break;
 881                 case AUE_OPEN_WC:
 882                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_W;
 883                         break;
 884                 case AUE_OPEN_WTC:
 885                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_WT;
 886                         break;
 887                 case AUE_OPEN_RWC:
 888                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_RW;
 889                         break;
 890                 case AUE_OPEN_RWTC:
 891                         tad->tad_event = AUE_OPEN_RWT;
 892                         break;
 893                 default:
 894                         break;
 895                 }
 896         }
 897 }
 898 
 899 
 900 void
 901 audit_ipc(int type, int id, void *vp)
 902 {
 903         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
 904         if (ad_flag == 0)
 905                 return;
 906 
 907         switch (type) {
 908         case AT_IPC_MSG:
 909                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc(AT_IPC_MSG, id));
 910                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((kmsqid_t *)vp)->msg_perm)));
 911                 break;
 912         case AT_IPC_SEM:
 913                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc(AT_IPC_SEM, id));
 914                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((ksemid_t *)vp)->sem_perm)));
 915                 break;
 916         case AT_IPC_SHM:
 917                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc(AT_IPC_SHM, id));
 918                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((kshmid_t *)vp)->shm_perm)));
 919                 break;
 920         }
 921 }
 922 
 923 void
 924 audit_ipcget(int type, void *vp)
 925 {
 926         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
 927         if (ad_flag == 0)
 928                 return;
 929 
 930         switch (type) {
 931         case NULL:
 932                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm((struct kipc_perm *)vp));
 933                 break;
 934         case AT_IPC_MSG:
 935                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((kmsqid_t *)vp)->msg_perm)));
 936                 break;
 937         case AT_IPC_SEM:
 938                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((ksemid_t *)vp)->sem_perm)));
 939                 break;
 940         case AT_IPC_SHM:
 941                 au_uwrite(au_to_ipc_perm(&(((kshmid_t *)vp)->shm_perm)));
 942                 break;
 943         }
 944 }
 945 
 946 /*
 947  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_REBOOT
 948  * PURPOSE:
 949  * CALLBY:
 950  * NOTE:
 951  * At this point we know that the system call reboot will not return. We thus
 952  * have to complete the audit record generation and put it onto the queue.
 953  * This might be fairly useless if the auditing daemon is already dead....
 954  * TODO:
 955  * QUESTION:    who calls audit_reboot
 956  */
 957 
 958 void
 959 audit_reboot(void)
 960 {
 961         int flag;
 962         t_audit_data_t *tad;
 963         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
 964 
 965         tad = U2A(u);
 966 
 967         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
 968         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
 969                 return;
 970 
 971         /* do preselection on success/failure */
 972         if (flag = audit_success(kctx, tad, 0, NULL)) {
 973                 /* add a process token */
 974 
 975                 cred_t *cr = CRED();
 976                 const auditinfo_addr_t *ainfo = crgetauinfo(cr);
 977 
 978                 if (ainfo == NULL)
 979                         return;
 980 
 981                 /* Add subject information */
 982                 AUDIT_SETSUBJ(&(u_ad), cr, ainfo, kctx);
 983 
 984                 /* add a return token */
 985                 add_return_token((caddr_t *)&(u_ad), tad->tad_scid, 0, 0);
 986 
 987                 AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
 988                 AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
 989         }
 990 
 991         /*
 992          * Flow control useless here since we're going
 993          * to drop everything in the queue anyway. Why
 994          * block and wait. There aint anyone left alive to
 995          * read the records remaining anyway.
 996          */
 997 
 998         /* Close up everything */
 999         au_close(kctx, &(u_ad), flag | AU_DONTBLOCK,
1000             tad->tad_event, tad->tad_evmod, NULL);
1001 }
1002 
1003 void
1004 audit_setfsat_path(int argnum)
1005 {
1006         klwp_id_t clwp = ttolwp(curthread);
1007         struct file  *fp;
1008         uint32_t fd;
1009         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1010         struct f_audit_data *fad;
1011         p_audit_data_t *pad;    /* current process */
1012         uint_t fm;
1013         struct a {
1014                 long arg1;
1015                 long arg2;
1016                 long arg3;
1017                 long arg4;
1018                 long arg5;
1019         } *uap;
1020 
1021         if (clwp == NULL)
1022                 return;
1023         uap = (struct a *)clwp->lwp_ap;
1024 
1025         tad = U2A(u);
1026         ASSERT(tad != NULL);
1027 
1028         switch (tad->tad_scid) {
1029         case SYS_faccessat:
1030         case SYS_fchmodat:
1031         case SYS_fchownat:
1032         case SYS_fstatat:
1033         case SYS_fstatat64:
1034         case SYS_mkdirat:
1035         case SYS_mknodat:
1036         case SYS_openat:
1037         case SYS_openat64:
1038         case SYS_readlinkat:
1039         case SYS_unlinkat:
1040                 fd = uap->arg1;
1041                 break;
1042         case SYS_linkat:
1043         case SYS_renameat:
1044                 if (argnum == 3)
1045                         fd = uap->arg3;
1046                 else
1047                         fd = uap->arg1;
1048                 break;
1049         case SYS_symlinkat:
1050         case SYS_utimesys:
1051                 fd = uap->arg2;
1052                 break;
1053         case SYS_open:
1054         case SYS_open64:
1055                 fd = AT_FDCWD;
1056                 break;
1057         default:
1058                 return;
1059         }
1060 
1061         if (tad->tad_atpath != NULL) {
1062                 au_pathrele(tad->tad_atpath);
1063                 tad->tad_atpath = NULL;
1064         }
1065 
1066         if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
1067                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_ATCALL;
1068 
1069                 if (tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat ||
1070                     tad->tad_scid == SYS_openat64) {
1071                         fm = (uint_t)uap->arg3;
1072                         if (fm & (FXATTR | FXATTRDIROPEN)) {
1073                                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_ATTPATH;
1074                         }
1075                 }
1076 
1077                 if ((fp = getf(fd)) == NULL) {
1078                         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOPATH;
1079                         return;
1080                 }
1081                 fad = F2A(fp);
1082                 ASSERT(fad);
1083                 if (fad->fad_aupath == NULL) {
1084                         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOPATH;
1085                         releasef(fd);
1086                         return;
1087                 }
1088                 au_pathhold(fad->fad_aupath);
1089                 tad->tad_atpath = fad->fad_aupath;
1090                 releasef(fd);
1091         } else {
1092                 if (tad->tad_scid == SYS_open ||
1093                     tad->tad_scid == SYS_open64) {
1094                         fm = (uint_t)uap->arg2;
1095                         if (fm & FXATTR) {
1096                                 tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_ATTPATH;
1097                         }
1098                         return;
1099                 }
1100                 pad = P2A(curproc);
1101                 mutex_enter(&pad->pad_lock);
1102                 au_pathhold(pad->pad_cwd);
1103                 tad->tad_atpath = pad->pad_cwd;
1104                 mutex_exit(&pad->pad_lock);
1105         }
1106 }
1107 
1108 void
1109 audit_symlink_create(vnode_t *dvp, char *sname, char *target, int error)
1110 {
1111         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1112         vnode_t *vp;
1113 
1114         tad = U2A(u);
1115 
1116         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
1117         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
1118                 return;
1119 
1120         au_uwrite(au_to_text(target));
1121 
1122         if (error)
1123                 return;
1124 
1125         error = VOP_LOOKUP(dvp, sname, &vp, NULL, 0, NULL, CRED(),
1126             NULL, NULL, NULL);
1127         if (error == 0) {
1128                 audit_attributes(vp);
1129                 VN_RELE(vp);
1130         }
1131 }
1132 
1133 /*
1134  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_VNCREATE_START
1135  * PURPOSE:     set flag so path name lookup in create will not add attribute
1136  * CALLBY:      VN_CREATE
1137  * NOTE:
1138  * TODO:
1139  * QUESTION:
1140  */
1141 
1142 void
1143 audit_vncreate_start()
1144 {
1145         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1146 
1147         tad = U2A(u);
1148         tad->tad_ctrl |= TAD_NOATTRB;
1149 }
1150 
1151 /*
1152  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_VNCREATE_FINISH
1153  * PURPOSE:
1154  * CALLBY:      VN_CREATE
1155  * NOTE:
1156  * TODO:
1157  * QUESTION:
1158  */
1159 void
1160 audit_vncreate_finish(struct vnode *vp, int error)
1161 {
1162         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1163 
1164         if (error)
1165                 return;
1166 
1167         tad = U2A(u);
1168 
1169         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
1170         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
1171                 return;
1172 
1173         if (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_TRUE_CREATE) {
1174                 audit_attributes(vp);
1175         }
1176 
1177         if (tad->tad_ctrl & TAD_CORE) {
1178                 audit_attributes(vp);
1179                 tad->tad_ctrl &= ~TAD_CORE;
1180         }
1181 
1182         if (!error && ((tad->tad_event == AUE_MKNOD) ||
1183             (tad->tad_event == AUE_MKDIR))) {
1184                 audit_attributes(vp);
1185         }
1186 
1187         /* for case where multiple lookups in one syscall (rename) */
1188         tad->tad_ctrl &= ~TAD_NOATTRB;
1189 }
1190 
1191 
1192 
1193 
1194 
1195 
1196 
1197 
1198 /*
1199  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_EXEC
1200  * PURPOSE:     Records the function arguments and environment variables
1201  * CALLBY:      EXEC_ARGS
1202  * NOTE:
1203  * TODO:
1204  * QUESTION:
1205  */
1206 
1207 void
1208 audit_exec(
1209         const char *argstr,     /* argument strings */
1210         const char *envstr,     /* environment strings */
1211         ssize_t argc,           /* total # arguments */
1212         ssize_t envc,           /* total # environment variables */
1213         cred_t *pfcred)         /* the additional privileges in a profile */
1214 {
1215         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1216         au_kcontext_t   *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
1217 
1218         tad = U2A(u);
1219 
1220         /* if not auditing this event, then do nothing */
1221         if (!tad->tad_flag)
1222                 return;
1223 
1224         if (pfcred != NULL) {
1225                 p_audit_data_t *pad;
1226                 cred_t *cr = CRED();
1227                 priv_set_t pset = CR_IPRIV(cr);
1228 
1229                 pad = P2A(curproc);
1230 
1231                 /* It's a different event. */
1232                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PFEXEC;
1233 
1234                 /* Add the current working directory to the audit trail. */
1235                 if (pad->pad_cwd != NULL)
1236                         au_uwrite(au_to_path(pad->pad_cwd));
1237 
1238                 /*
1239                  * The new credential is not yet in place when audit_exec
1240                  * is called.
1241                  * Compute the additional bits available in the new credential
1242                  * and the limit set.
1243                  */
1244                 priv_inverse(&pset);
1245                 priv_intersect(&CR_IPRIV(pfcred), &pset);
1246                 if (!priv_isemptyset(&pset) ||
1247                     !priv_isequalset(&CR_LPRIV(pfcred), &CR_LPRIV(cr))) {
1248                         au_uwrite(au_to_privset(
1249                             priv_getsetbynum(PRIV_INHERITABLE), &pset, AUT_PRIV,
1250                             0));
1251                         au_uwrite(au_to_privset(priv_getsetbynum(PRIV_LIMIT),
1252                             &CR_LPRIV(pfcred), AUT_PRIV, 0));
1253                 }
1254                 /*
1255                  * Compare the uids & gids: create a process token if changed.
1256                  */
1257                 if (crgetuid(cr) != crgetuid(pfcred) ||
1258                     crgetruid(cr) != crgetruid(pfcred) ||
1259                     crgetgid(cr) != crgetgid(pfcred) ||
1260                     crgetrgid(cr) != crgetrgid(pfcred)) {
1261                         AUDIT_SETPROC(&(u_ad), cr, crgetauinfo(cr));
1262                 }
1263         }
1264 
1265         if (pfcred != NULL || (kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_ARGV) != 0)
1266                 au_uwrite(au_to_exec_args(argstr, argc));
1267 
1268         if (kctx->auk_policy & AUDIT_ARGE)
1269                 au_uwrite(au_to_exec_env(envstr, envc));
1270 }
1271 
1272 /*
1273  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_ENTERPROM
1274  * PURPOSE:
1275  * CALLBY:      KBDINPUT
1276  *              ZSA_XSINT
1277  * NOTE:
1278  * TODO:
1279  * QUESTION:
1280  */
1281 void
1282 audit_enterprom(int flg)
1283 {
1284         token_t *rp = NULL;
1285         int sorf;
1286 
1287         if (flg)
1288                 sorf = AUM_SUCC;
1289         else
1290                 sorf = AUM_FAIL;
1291 
1292         AUDIT_ASYNC_START(rp, AUE_ENTERPROM, sorf);
1293 
1294         au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_text("kmdb"));
1295 
1296         if (flg)
1297                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_return32(0, 0));
1298         else
1299                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_return32(ECANCELED, 0));
1300 
1301         AUDIT_ASYNC_FINISH(rp, AUE_ENTERPROM, NULL, NULL);
1302 }
1303 
1304 
1305 /*
1306  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_EXITPROM
1307  * PURPOSE:
1308  * CALLBY:      KBDINPUT
1309  *              ZSA_XSINT
1310  * NOTE:
1311  * TODO:
1312  * QUESTION:
1313  */
1314 void
1315 audit_exitprom(int flg)
1316 {
1317         int sorf;
1318         token_t *rp = NULL;
1319 
1320         if (flg)
1321                 sorf = AUM_SUCC;
1322         else
1323                 sorf = AUM_FAIL;
1324 
1325         AUDIT_ASYNC_START(rp, AUE_EXITPROM, sorf);
1326 
1327         au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_text("kmdb"));
1328 
1329         if (flg)
1330                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_return32(0, 0));
1331         else
1332                 au_write((caddr_t *)&(rp), au_to_return32(ECANCELED, 0));
1333 
1334         AUDIT_ASYNC_FINISH(rp, AUE_EXITPROM, NULL, NULL);
1335 }
1336 
1337 struct fcntla {
1338         int fdes;
1339         int cmd;
1340         intptr_t arg;
1341 };
1342 
1343 
1344 /*
1345  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_CHDIREC
1346  * PURPOSE:
1347  * CALLBY:      CHDIREC
1348  * NOTE:        The main function of CHDIREC
1349  * TODO:        Move the audit_chdirec hook above the VN_RELE in vncalls.c
1350  * QUESTION:
1351  */
1352 
1353 /*ARGSUSED*/
1354 void
1355 audit_chdirec(vnode_t *vp, vnode_t **vpp)
1356 {
1357         int             chdir;
1358         int             fchdir;
1359         struct audit_path       **appp;
1360         struct file     *fp;
1361         f_audit_data_t *fad;
1362         p_audit_data_t *pad = P2A(curproc);
1363         t_audit_data_t *tad = T2A(curthread);
1364 
1365         struct a {
1366                 long fd;
1367         } *uap = (struct a *)ttolwp(curthread)->lwp_ap;
1368 
1369         if ((tad->tad_scid == SYS_chdir) || (tad->tad_scid == SYS_chroot)) {
1370                 chdir = tad->tad_scid == SYS_chdir;
1371                 if (tad->tad_aupath) {
1372                         mutex_enter(&pad->pad_lock);
1373                         if (chdir)
1374                                 appp = &(pad->pad_cwd);
1375                         else
1376                                 appp = &(pad->pad_root);
1377                         au_pathrele(*appp);
1378                         /* use tad hold */
1379                         *appp = tad->tad_aupath;
1380                         tad->tad_aupath = NULL;
1381                         mutex_exit(&pad->pad_lock);
1382                 }
1383         } else if ((tad->tad_scid == SYS_fchdir) ||
1384             (tad->tad_scid == SYS_fchroot)) {
1385                 fchdir = tad->tad_scid == SYS_fchdir;
1386                 if ((fp = getf(uap->fd)) == NULL)
1387                         return;
1388                 fad = F2A(fp);
1389                 if (fad->fad_aupath) {
1390                         au_pathhold(fad->fad_aupath);
1391                         mutex_enter(&pad->pad_lock);
1392                         if (fchdir)
1393                                 appp = &(pad->pad_cwd);
1394                         else
1395                                 appp = &(pad->pad_root);
1396                         au_pathrele(*appp);
1397                         *appp = fad->fad_aupath;
1398                         mutex_exit(&pad->pad_lock);
1399                         if (tad->tad_flag) {
1400                                 au_uwrite(au_to_path(fad->fad_aupath));
1401                                 audit_attributes(fp->f_vnode);
1402                         }
1403                 }
1404                 releasef(uap->fd);
1405         }
1406 }
1407 
1408 
1409 /*
1410  *      Audit hook for stream based socket and tli request.
1411  *      Note that we do not have user context while executing
1412  *      this code so we had to record them earlier during the
1413  *      putmsg/getmsg to figure out which user we are dealing with.
1414  */
1415 
1416 /*ARGSUSED*/
1417 void
1418 audit_sock(
1419         int type,       /* type of tihdr.h header requests */
1420         queue_t *q,     /* contains the process and thread audit data */
1421         mblk_t *mp,     /* contains the tihdr.h header structures */
1422         int from)       /* timod or sockmod request */
1423 {
1424         int32_t    len;
1425         int32_t    offset;
1426         struct sockaddr_in *sock_data;
1427         struct T_conn_req *conn_req;
1428         struct T_conn_ind *conn_ind;
1429         struct T_unitdata_req *unitdata_req;
1430         struct T_unitdata_ind *unitdata_ind;
1431         au_state_t estate;
1432         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1433         caddr_t saved_thread_ptr;
1434         au_mask_t amask;
1435         const auditinfo_addr_t *ainfo;
1436         au_kcontext_t   *kctx;
1437 
1438         if (q->q_stream == NULL)
1439                 return;
1440         mutex_enter(&q->q_stream->sd_lock);
1441         /* are we being audited */
1442         saved_thread_ptr = q->q_stream->sd_t_audit_data;
1443         /* no pointer to thread, nothing to do */
1444         if (saved_thread_ptr == NULL) {
1445                 mutex_exit(&q->q_stream->sd_lock);
1446                 return;
1447         }
1448         /* only allow one addition of a record token */
1449         q->q_stream->sd_t_audit_data = NULL;
1450         /*
1451          * thread is not the one being audited, then nothing to do
1452          * This could be the stream thread handling the module
1453          * service routine. In this case, the context for the audit
1454          * record can no longer be assumed. Simplest to just drop
1455          * the operation.
1456          */
1457         if (curthread != (kthread_id_t)saved_thread_ptr) {
1458                 mutex_exit(&q->q_stream->sd_lock);
1459                 return;
1460         }
1461         if (curthread->t_sysnum >= SYS_so_socket &&
1462             curthread->t_sysnum <= SYS_sockconfig) {
1463                 mutex_exit(&q->q_stream->sd_lock);
1464                 return;
1465         }
1466         mutex_exit(&q->q_stream->sd_lock);
1467         /*
1468          * we know that the thread that did the put/getmsg is the
1469          * one running. Now we can get the TAD and see if we should
1470          * add an audit token.
1471          */
1472         tad = U2A(u);
1473 
1474         kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
1475 
1476         /* proceed ONLY if user is being audited */
1477         if (!tad->tad_flag)
1478                 return;
1479 
1480         ainfo = crgetauinfo(CRED());
1481         if (ainfo == NULL)
1482                 return;
1483         amask = ainfo->ai_mask;
1484 
1485         /*
1486          * Figure out the type of stream networking request here.
1487          * Note that getmsg and putmsg are always preselected
1488          * because during the beginning of the system call we have
1489          * not yet figure out which of the socket or tli request
1490          * we are looking at until we are here. So we need to check
1491          * against that specific request and reset the type of event.
1492          */
1493         switch (type) {
1494         case T_CONN_REQ:        /* connection request */
1495                 conn_req = (struct T_conn_req *)mp->b_rptr;
1496                 if (conn_req->DEST_offset < sizeof (struct T_conn_req))
1497                         return;
1498                 offset = conn_req->DEST_offset;
1499                 len = conn_req->DEST_length;
1500                 estate = kctx->auk_ets[AUE_SOCKCONNECT];
1501                 if (amask.as_success & estate || amask.as_failure & estate) {
1502                         tad->tad_event = AUE_SOCKCONNECT;
1503                         break;
1504                 } else {
1505                         return;
1506                 }
1507         case T_CONN_IND:         /* connectionless receive request */
1508                 conn_ind = (struct T_conn_ind *)mp->b_rptr;
1509                 if (conn_ind->SRC_offset < sizeof (struct T_conn_ind))
1510                         return;
1511                 offset = conn_ind->SRC_offset;
1512                 len = conn_ind->SRC_length;
1513                 estate = kctx->auk_ets[AUE_SOCKACCEPT];
1514                 if (amask.as_success & estate || amask.as_failure & estate) {
1515                         tad->tad_event = AUE_SOCKACCEPT;
1516                         break;
1517                 } else {
1518                         return;
1519                 }
1520         case T_UNITDATA_REQ:     /* connectionless send request */
1521                 unitdata_req = (struct T_unitdata_req *)mp->b_rptr;
1522                 if (unitdata_req->DEST_offset < sizeof (struct T_unitdata_req))
1523                         return;
1524                 offset = unitdata_req->DEST_offset;
1525                 len = unitdata_req->DEST_length;
1526                 estate = kctx->auk_ets[AUE_SOCKSEND];
1527                 if (amask.as_success & estate || amask.as_failure & estate) {
1528                         tad->tad_event = AUE_SOCKSEND;
1529                         break;
1530                 } else {
1531                         return;
1532                 }
1533         case T_UNITDATA_IND:     /* connectionless receive request */
1534                 unitdata_ind = (struct T_unitdata_ind *)mp->b_rptr;
1535                 if (unitdata_ind->SRC_offset < sizeof (struct T_unitdata_ind))
1536                         return;
1537                 offset = unitdata_ind->SRC_offset;
1538                 len = unitdata_ind->SRC_length;
1539                 estate = kctx->auk_ets[AUE_SOCKRECEIVE];
1540                 if (amask.as_success & estate || amask.as_failure & estate) {
1541                         tad->tad_event = AUE_SOCKRECEIVE;
1542                         break;
1543                 } else {
1544                         return;
1545                 }
1546         default:
1547                 return;
1548         }
1549 
1550         /*
1551          * we are only interested in tcp stream connections,
1552          * not unix domain stuff
1553          */
1554         if ((len < 0) || (len > sizeof (struct sockaddr_in))) {
1555                 tad->tad_event = AUE_GETMSG;
1556                 return;
1557         }
1558         /* skip over TPI header and point to the ip address */
1559         sock_data = (struct sockaddr_in *)((char *)mp->b_rptr + offset);
1560 
1561         switch (sock_data->sin_family) {
1562         case AF_INET:
1563                 au_write(&(tad->tad_ad), au_to_sock_inet(sock_data));
1564                 break;
1565         default:        /* reset to AUE_PUTMSG if not a inet request */
1566                 tad->tad_event = AUE_GETMSG;
1567                 break;
1568         }
1569 }
1570 
1571 
1572 static void
1573 add_return_token(caddr_t *ad, unsigned int scid, int err, int rval)
1574 {
1575         unsigned int sy_flags;
1576 
1577 #ifdef _SYSCALL32_IMPL
1578         /*
1579          * Guard against t_lwp being NULL when this function is called
1580          * from a kernel queue instead of from a direct system call.
1581          * In that case, assume the running kernel data model.
1582          */
1583         if ((curthread->t_lwp == NULL) || (lwp_getdatamodel(
1584             ttolwp(curthread)) == DATAMODEL_NATIVE))
1585                 sy_flags = sysent[scid].sy_flags & SE_RVAL_MASK;
1586         else
1587                 sy_flags = sysent32[scid].sy_flags & SE_RVAL_MASK;
1588 #else
1589                 sy_flags = sysent[scid].sy_flags & SE_RVAL_MASK;
1590 #endif
1591 
1592         if (sy_flags == SE_64RVAL)
1593                 au_write(ad, au_to_return64(err, rval));
1594         else
1595                 au_write(ad, au_to_return32(err, rval));
1596 
1597 }
1598 
1599 /*ARGSUSED*/
1600 void
1601 audit_fdsend(fd, fp, error)
1602         int fd;
1603         struct file *fp;
1604         int error;              /* ignore for now */
1605 {
1606         t_audit_data_t *tad;    /* current thread */
1607         f_audit_data_t *fad;    /* per file audit structure */
1608         struct vnode *vp;       /* for file attributes */
1609 
1610         /* is this system call being audited */
1611         tad = U2A(u);
1612         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
1613         if (!tad->tad_flag)
1614                 return;
1615 
1616         fad = F2A(fp);
1617 
1618         /* add path and file attributes */
1619         if (fad != NULL && fad->fad_aupath != NULL) {
1620                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "send fd", (uint32_t)fd));
1621                 au_uwrite(au_to_path(fad->fad_aupath));
1622         } else {
1623                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "send fd", (uint32_t)fd));
1624 #ifdef _LP64
1625                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg64(0, "no path", (uint64_t)fp));
1626 #else
1627                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "no path", (uint32_t)fp));
1628 #endif
1629         }
1630         vp = fp->f_vnode;    /* include vnode attributes */
1631         audit_attributes(vp);
1632 }
1633 
1634 /*
1635  * Record privileges successfully used and we attempted to use but
1636  * didn't have.
1637  */
1638 void
1639 audit_priv(int priv, const priv_set_t *set, int flag)
1640 {
1641         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1642         int sbit;
1643         priv_set_t *target;
1644 
1645         /* Make sure this isn't being called in an interrupt context */
1646         ASSERT(servicing_interrupt() == 0);
1647 
1648         tad = U2A(u);
1649 
1650         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
1651                 return;
1652 
1653         target = flag ? &tad->tad_sprivs : &tad->tad_fprivs;
1654         sbit = flag ? PAD_SPRIVUSE : PAD_FPRIVUSE;
1655 
1656         /* Tell audit_success() and audit_finish() that we saw this case */
1657         if (!(tad->tad_evmod & sbit)) {
1658                 /* Clear set first time around */
1659                 priv_emptyset(target);
1660                 tad->tad_evmod |= sbit;
1661         }
1662 
1663         /* Save the privileges in the tad */
1664         if (priv == PRIV_ALL) {
1665                 priv_fillset(target);
1666         } else {
1667                 ASSERT(set != NULL || priv != PRIV_NONE);
1668                 if (set != NULL)
1669                         priv_union(set, target);
1670                 if (priv != PRIV_NONE)
1671                         priv_addset(target, priv);
1672         }
1673 }
1674 
1675 /*
1676  * Audit the setpriv() system call; the operation, the set name and
1677  * the current value as well as the set argument are put in the
1678  * audit trail.
1679  */
1680 void
1681 audit_setppriv(int op, int set, const priv_set_t *newpriv, const cred_t *ocr)
1682 {
1683         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1684         const priv_set_t *oldpriv;
1685         priv_set_t report;
1686         const char *setname;
1687 
1688         tad = U2A(u);
1689 
1690         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
1691                 return;
1692 
1693         oldpriv = priv_getset(ocr, set);
1694 
1695         /* Generate the actual record, include the before and after */
1696         au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(2, "op", op));
1697         setname = priv_getsetbynum(set);
1698 
1699         switch (op) {
1700         case PRIV_OFF:
1701                 /* Report privileges actually switched off */
1702                 report = *oldpriv;
1703                 priv_intersect(newpriv, &report);
1704                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset(setname, &report, AUT_PRIV, 0));
1705                 break;
1706         case PRIV_ON:
1707                 /* Report privileges actually switched on */
1708                 report = *oldpriv;
1709                 priv_inverse(&report);
1710                 priv_intersect(newpriv, &report);
1711                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset(setname, &report, AUT_PRIV, 0));
1712                 break;
1713         case PRIV_SET:
1714                 /* Report before and after */
1715                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset(setname, oldpriv, AUT_PRIV, 0));
1716                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset(setname, newpriv, AUT_PRIV, 0));
1717                 break;
1718         }
1719 }
1720 
1721 /*
1722  * Dump the full device policy setting in the audit trail.
1723  */
1724 void
1725 audit_devpolicy(int nitems, const devplcysys_t *items)
1726 {
1727         t_audit_data_t *tad;
1728         int i;
1729 
1730         tad = U2A(u);
1731 
1732         if (tad->tad_flag == 0)
1733                 return;
1734 
1735         for (i = 0; i < nitems; i++) {
1736                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(2, "major", items[i].dps_maj));
1737                 if (items[i].dps_minornm[0] == '\0') {
1738                         au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(2, "lomin", items[i].dps_lomin));
1739                         au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(2, "himin", items[i].dps_himin));
1740                 } else
1741                         au_uwrite(au_to_text(items[i].dps_minornm));
1742 
1743                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset("read", &items[i].dps_rdp,
1744                     AUT_PRIV, 0));
1745                 au_uwrite(au_to_privset("write", &items[i].dps_wrp,
1746                     AUT_PRIV, 0));
1747         }
1748 }
1749 
1750 /*ARGSUSED*/
1751 void
1752 audit_fdrecv(fd, fp)
1753         int fd;
1754         struct file *fp;
1755 {
1756         t_audit_data_t *tad;    /* current thread */
1757         f_audit_data_t *fad;    /* per file audit structure */
1758         struct vnode *vp;       /* for file attributes */
1759 
1760         /* is this system call being audited */
1761         tad = U2A(u);
1762         ASSERT(tad != (t_audit_data_t *)0);
1763         if (!tad->tad_flag)
1764                 return;
1765 
1766         fad = F2A(fp);
1767 
1768         /* add path and file attributes */
1769         if (fad != NULL && fad->fad_aupath != NULL) {
1770                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "recv fd", (uint32_t)fd));
1771                 au_uwrite(au_to_path(fad->fad_aupath));
1772         } else {
1773                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "recv fd", (uint32_t)fd));
1774 #ifdef _LP64
1775                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg64(0, "no path", (uint64_t)fp));
1776 #else
1777                 au_uwrite(au_to_arg32(0, "no path", (uint32_t)fp));
1778 #endif
1779         }
1780         vp = fp->f_vnode;    /* include vnode attributes */
1781         audit_attributes(vp);
1782 }
1783 
1784 /*
1785  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_CRYPTOADM
1786  * PURPOSE:     Records arguments to administrative ioctls on /dev/cryptoadm
1787  * CALLBY:      CRYPTO_LOAD_DEV_DISABLED, CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_DISABLED,
1788  *              CRYPTO_UNLOAD_SOFT_MODULE, CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_CONFIG,
1789  *              CRYPTO_POOL_CREATE, CRYPTO_POOL_WAIT, CRYPTO_POOL_RUN,
1790  *              CRYPTO_LOAD_DOOR
1791  * NOTE:
1792  * TODO:
1793  * QUESTION:
1794  */
1795 
1796 void
1797 audit_cryptoadm(int cmd, char *module_name, crypto_mech_name_t *mech_names,
1798     uint_t mech_count, uint_t device_instance, uint32_t rv, int error)
1799 {
1800         boolean_t               mech_list_required = B_FALSE;
1801         cred_t                  *cr = CRED();
1802         t_audit_data_t          *tad;
1803         token_t                 *ad = NULL;
1804         const auditinfo_addr_t  *ainfo = crgetauinfo(cr);
1805         char                    buffer[MAXNAMELEN * 2];
1806         au_kcontext_t           *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
1807 
1808         tad = U2A(u);
1809         if (tad == NULL)
1810                 return;
1811 
1812         if (ainfo == NULL)
1813                 return;
1814 
1815         tad->tad_event = AUE_CRYPTOADM;
1816 
1817         if (audit_success(kctx, tad, error, NULL) != AU_OK)
1818                 return;
1819 
1820         /* Add subject information */
1821         AUDIT_SETSUBJ((caddr_t *)&(ad), cr, ainfo, kctx);
1822 
1823         switch (cmd) {
1824         case CRYPTO_LOAD_DEV_DISABLED:
1825                 if (error == 0 && rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1826                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1827                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_DEV_DISABLED, module=%s,"
1828                             " dev_instance=%d",
1829                             module_name, device_instance);
1830                         mech_list_required = B_TRUE;
1831                 } else {
1832                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1833                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_DEV_DISABLED, return_val=%d", rv);
1834                 }
1835                 break;
1836 
1837         case CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_DISABLED:
1838                 if (error == 0 && rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1839                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1840                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_DISABLED, module=%s",
1841                             module_name);
1842                         mech_list_required = B_TRUE;
1843                 } else {
1844                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1845                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_DISABLED, return_val=%d", rv);
1846                 }
1847                 break;
1848 
1849         case CRYPTO_UNLOAD_SOFT_MODULE:
1850                 if (error == 0 && rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1851                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1852                             "op=CRYPTO_UNLOAD_SOFT_MODULE, module=%s",
1853                             module_name);
1854                 } else {
1855                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1856                             "op=CRYPTO_UNLOAD_SOFT_MODULE, return_val=%d", rv);
1857                 }
1858                 break;
1859 
1860         case CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_CONFIG:
1861                 if (error == 0 && rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
1862                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1863                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_CONFIG, module=%s",
1864                             module_name);
1865                         mech_list_required = B_TRUE;
1866                 } else {
1867                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1868                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_SOFT_CONFIG, return_val=%d", rv);
1869                 }
1870                 break;
1871 
1872         case CRYPTO_POOL_CREATE:
1873                 (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1874                     "op=CRYPTO_POOL_CREATE");
1875                 break;
1876 
1877         case CRYPTO_POOL_WAIT:
1878                 (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer), "op=CRYPTO_POOL_WAIT");
1879                 break;
1880 
1881         case CRYPTO_POOL_RUN:
1882                 (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer), "op=CRYPTO_POOL_RUN");
1883                 break;
1884 
1885         case CRYPTO_LOAD_DOOR:
1886                 if (error == 0 && rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
1887                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1888                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_DOOR");
1889                 else
1890                         (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1891                             "op=CRYPTO_LOAD_DOOR, return_val=%d", rv);
1892                 break;
1893 
1894         case CRYPTO_FIPS140_SET:
1895                 (void) snprintf(buffer, sizeof (buffer),
1896                     "op=CRYPTO_FIPS140_SET, fips_state=%d", rv);
1897                 break;
1898 
1899         default:
1900                 return;
1901         }
1902 
1903         au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buffer));
1904 
1905         if (mech_list_required) {
1906                 int i;
1907 
1908                 if (mech_count == 0) {
1909                         au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text("mech=list empty"));
1910                 } else {
1911                         char    *pb = buffer;
1912                         size_t  l = sizeof (buffer);
1913                         size_t  n;
1914                         char    space[2] = ":";
1915 
1916                         n = snprintf(pb, l, "mech=");
1917 
1918                         for (i = 0; i < mech_count; i++) {
1919                                 pb += n;
1920                                 l = (n >= l) ? 0 : l - n;
1921 
1922                                 if (i == mech_count - 1)
1923                                         (void) strcpy(space, "");
1924 
1925                                 n = snprintf(pb, l, "%s%s", mech_names[i],
1926                                     space);
1927                         }
1928                         au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buffer));
1929                 }
1930         }
1931 
1932         /* add a return token */
1933         if (error || (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS))
1934                 add_return_token((caddr_t *)&ad, tad->tad_scid, -1, error);
1935         else
1936                 add_return_token((caddr_t *)&ad, tad->tad_scid, 0, rv);
1937 
1938         AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
1939         AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
1940 
1941         au_close(kctx, (caddr_t *)&ad, AU_OK, AUE_CRYPTOADM, tad->tad_evmod,
1942             NULL);
1943 }
1944 
1945 /*
1946  * Audit the kernel SSL administration command. The address and the
1947  * port number for the SSL instance, and the proxy port are put in the
1948  * audit trail.
1949  */
1950 void
1951 audit_kssl(int cmd, void *params, int error)
1952 {
1953         cred_t                  *cr = CRED();
1954         t_audit_data_t          *tad;
1955         token_t                 *ad = NULL;
1956         const auditinfo_addr_t  *ainfo = crgetauinfo(cr);
1957         au_kcontext_t           *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
1958 
1959         tad = U2A(u);
1960 
1961         if (ainfo == NULL)
1962                 return;
1963 
1964         tad->tad_event = AUE_CONFIGKSSL;
1965 
1966         if (audit_success(kctx, tad, error, NULL) != AU_OK)
1967                 return;
1968 
1969         /* Add subject information */
1970         AUDIT_SETSUBJ((caddr_t *)&ad, cr, ainfo, kctx);
1971 
1972         switch (cmd) {
1973         case KSSL_ADD_ENTRY: {
1974                 char buf[32];
1975                 kssl_params_t *kp = (kssl_params_t *)params;
1976                 struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr = &kp->kssl_addr;
1977 
1978                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text("op=KSSL_ADD_ENTRY"));
1979                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad,
1980                     au_to_in_addr_ex((int32_t *)&saddr->sin6_addr));
1981                 (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf), "SSL port=%d",
1982                     saddr->sin6_port);
1983                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buf));
1984 
1985                 (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf), "proxy port=%d",
1986                     kp->kssl_proxy_port);
1987                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buf));
1988                 break;
1989         }
1990 
1991         case KSSL_DELETE_ENTRY: {
1992                 char buf[32];
1993                 struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)params;
1994 
1995                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text("op=KSSL_DELETE_ENTRY"));
1996                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad,
1997                     au_to_in_addr_ex((int32_t *)&saddr->sin6_addr));
1998                 (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf), "SSL port=%d",
1999                     saddr->sin6_port);
2000                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buf));
2001                 break;
2002         }
2003 
2004         default:
2005                 return;
2006         }
2007 
2008         /* add a return token */
2009         add_return_token((caddr_t *)&ad, tad->tad_scid, error, 0);
2010 
2011         AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
2012         AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
2013 
2014         au_close(kctx, (caddr_t *)&ad, AU_OK, AUE_CONFIGKSSL, tad->tad_evmod,
2015             NULL);
2016 }
2017 
2018 /*
2019  * Audit the kernel PF_POLICY administration commands.  Record command,
2020  * zone, policy type (global or tunnel, active or inactive)
2021  */
2022 /*
2023  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_PF_POLICY
2024  * PURPOSE:     Records arguments to administrative ioctls on PF_POLICY socket
2025  * CALLBY:      SPD_ADDRULE, SPD_DELETERULE, SPD_FLUSH, SPD_UPDATEALGS,
2026  *              SPD_CLONE, SPD_FLIP
2027  * NOTE:
2028  * TODO:
2029  * QUESTION:
2030  */
2031 
2032 void
2033 audit_pf_policy(int cmd, cred_t *cred, netstack_t *ns, char *tun,
2034     boolean_t active, int error, pid_t pid)
2035 {
2036         const auditinfo_addr_t  *ainfo;
2037         t_audit_data_t          *tad;
2038         token_t                 *ad = NULL;
2039         au_kcontext_t           *kctx = GET_KCTX_PZ;
2040         char                    buf[80];
2041         int                     flag;
2042 
2043         tad = U2A(u);
2044         if (tad == NULL)
2045                 return;
2046 
2047         ainfo = crgetauinfo((cred != NULL) ? cred : CRED());
2048         if (ainfo == NULL)
2049                 return;
2050 
2051         /*
2052          * Initialize some variables since these are only set
2053          * with system calls.
2054          */
2055 
2056         switch (cmd) {
2057         case SPD_ADDRULE: {
2058                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_ADDRULE;
2059                 break;
2060         }
2061 
2062         case SPD_DELETERULE: {
2063                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_DELRULE;
2064                 break;
2065         }
2066 
2067         case SPD_FLUSH: {
2068                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_FLUSH;
2069                 break;
2070         }
2071 
2072         case SPD_UPDATEALGS: {
2073                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_ALGS;
2074                 break;
2075         }
2076 
2077         case SPD_CLONE: {
2078                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_CLONE;
2079                 break;
2080         }
2081 
2082         case SPD_FLIP: {
2083                 tad->tad_event = AUE_PF_POLICY_FLIP;
2084                 break;
2085         }
2086 
2087         default:
2088                 tad->tad_event = AUE_NULL;
2089         }
2090 
2091         tad->tad_evmod = 0;
2092 
2093         if (flag = audit_success(kctx, tad, error, cred)) {
2094                 zone_t *nszone;
2095 
2096                 /*
2097                  * For now, just audit that an event happened,
2098                  * along with the error code.
2099                  */
2100                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad,
2101                     au_to_arg32(1, "Policy Active?", (uint32_t)active));
2102                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad,
2103                     au_to_arg32(2, "Policy Global?", (uint32_t)(tun == NULL)));
2104 
2105                 /* Supplemental data */
2106 
2107                 /*
2108                  * Generate this zone token if the target zone differs
2109                  * from the administrative zone.  If netstacks are expanded
2110                  * to something other than a 1-1 relationship with zones,
2111                  * the auditing framework should create a new token type
2112                  * and audit it as a netstack instead.
2113                  * Turn on general zone auditing to get the administrative zone.
2114                  */
2115 
2116                 nszone = zone_find_by_id(netstackid_to_zoneid(
2117                     ns->netstack_stackid));
2118                 if (nszone != NULL) {
2119                         if (strncmp(crgetzone(cred)->zone_name,
2120                             nszone->zone_name, ZONENAME_MAX) != 0) {
2121                                 token_t *ztoken;
2122 
2123                                 ztoken = au_to_zonename(0, nszone);
2124                                 au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, ztoken);
2125                         }
2126                         zone_rele(nszone);
2127                 }
2128 
2129                 if (tun != NULL) {
2130                         /* write tunnel name - tun is bounded */
2131                         (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf), "tunnel_name:%s",
2132                             tun);
2133                         au_write((caddr_t *)&ad, au_to_text(buf));
2134                 }
2135 
2136                 /* Add subject information */
2137                 AUDIT_SETSUBJ_GENERIC((caddr_t *)&ad,
2138                     ((cred != NULL) ? cred : CRED()), ainfo, kctx, pid);
2139 
2140                 /* add a return token */
2141                 add_return_token((caddr_t *)&ad, 0, error, 0);
2142 
2143                 AS_INC(as_generated, 1, kctx);
2144                 AS_INC(as_kernel, 1, kctx);
2145 
2146         }
2147         au_close(kctx, (caddr_t *)&ad, flag, tad->tad_event, tad->tad_evmod,
2148             NULL);
2149 
2150         /*
2151          * clear the ctrl flag so that we don't have spurious collection of
2152          * audit information.
2153          */
2154         tad->tad_scid  = 0;
2155         tad->tad_event = 0;
2156         tad->tad_evmod = 0;
2157         tad->tad_ctrl  = 0;
2158 }
2159 
2160 /*
2161  * ROUTINE:     AUDIT_SEC_ATTRIBUTES
2162  * PURPOSE:     Add security attributes
2163  * CALLBY:      AUDIT_ATTRIBUTES
2164  *              AUDIT_CLOSEF
2165  *              AUS_CLOSE
2166  * NOTE:
2167  * TODO:
2168  * QUESTION:
2169  */
2170 
2171 void
2172 audit_sec_attributes(caddr_t *ad, struct vnode *vp)
2173 {
2174         /* Dump the SL */
2175         if (is_system_labeled()) {
2176                 ts_label_t      *tsl;
2177                 bslabel_t       *bsl;
2178 
2179                 tsl = getflabel(vp);
2180                 if (tsl == NULL)
2181                         return;                 /* nothing else to do */
2182 
2183                 bsl = label2bslabel(tsl);
2184                 if (bsl == NULL)
2185                         return;                 /* nothing else to do */
2186                 au_write(ad, au_to_label(bsl));
2187                 label_rele(tsl);
2188         }
2189 
2190 }       /* AUDIT_SEC_ATTRIBUTES */