--- /dev/null	2014-08-13 19:25:43.000000000 +0400
+++ new/usr/src/lib/openssl/libsunw_crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c	2014-08-13 19:25:43.155345719 +0400
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+	{
+	int i;
+	X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
+
+	ai=a->cert_info;
+	bi=b->cert_info;
+	i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
+	if (i) return(i);
+	return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
+	{
+	unsigned long ret=0;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	unsigned char md[16];
+	char *f;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
+	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+		goto err;
+	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
+		goto err;
+	OPENSSL_free(f);
+	if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+		(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+		goto err;
+	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
+		goto err;
+	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+		)&0xffffffffL;
+	err:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+#endif
+
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
+	}
+
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
+	}
+
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+	{
+	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+	}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
+	{
+	return(a->cert_info->issuer);
+	}
+
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+	}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
+	{
+	return(a->cert_info->subject);
+	}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
+	{
+	return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
+	}
+
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+	{
+	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
+ * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
+ * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
+ * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
+ * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
+ * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
+ * with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+	/* ensure hash is valid */
+	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+	{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+
+	if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
+		{
+		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return -2;
+		}
+
+	if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
+		{
+		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return -2;
+		}
+
+	ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+
+	}
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+	{
+	unsigned long ret=0;
+	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+	if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+		NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+		)&0xffffffffL;
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+/* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient. */
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+	{
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+	unsigned long ret=0;
+	unsigned char md[16];
+
+	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+	    && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+	    && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
+		ret=(((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+		     ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+		     )&0xffffffffL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+	return(ret);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+		ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+	{
+	int i;
+	X509_CINF cinf;
+	X509 x,*x509=NULL;
+
+	if(!sk) return NULL;
+
+	x.cert_info= &cinf;
+	cinf.serialNumber=serial;
+	cinf.issuer=name;
+
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
+		if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
+			return(x509);
+		}
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
+	{
+	X509 *x509;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
+		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
+			return(x509);
+		}
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+	{
+	if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+		return(NULL);
+	return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+	}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+	{
+	if(!x) return NULL;
+	return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+	}
+
+int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *xk;
+	int ret;
+
+	xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+	if (xk)
+		ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+	else
+		ret = -2;
+
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+	case 1:
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+		break;
+	case -1:
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+		break;
+	case -2:
+	        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+		}
+	if (xk)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+	if (ret > 0)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
